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ABSTRACT
Computing technology has transformed almost every area of modern
life, sometimes in rather intangible and inconspicuous ways. Enabling
students to recognize and evaluate that ubiquitous impact is an inter-
nationally proclaimed goal of a secondary informatics education. To
that end, students need to actually engage with their school-learned
informatics knowledge in the context of everyday situations. Taking
theories of knowledge transfer, variation theory, and prior research
on student conceptions as its points of departure, the three studies
reported in this thesis assume a naturalistic approach to investigate
students’ thinking and learning processes in the context of concrete
computational artifacts.
The first study investigates how students generally differentiate
technology, i.e., what subordinate kinds they distinguish. Based on
21 interviews, I propose a grounded theory for a related taxonomy.
The results suggest that computing technology is, in fact, not a very
salient kind of technology for students, which would pose a challenge
for related transfer. The second study then investigates more directly
how students distinguish computing from non-computing technology.
Based on 28 interviews, including the participants of the first study,
I propose a grounded theory of their related reasoning processes. In
particular, the results suggest that several students may inappropri-
ately distinguish computing devices on the basis of inherent capability
limitations, which would also be detrimental to transfer. The third
study then investigates students’ learning processes in the context
of an intervention designed to address the aforementioned issues. I
propose a framework of four so-called “critical aspects” aiming, in
particular, to reveal related learning difficulties. Accordingly, several
students apparently had difficulty to conceive of computing technol-
ogy as simultaneously economical and powerful, thus limiting its
potential ubiquity and impact. The analysis also indicates some initial
guidelines for the design of related interventions.
Subsequently, the results of the three studies are integrated and dis-
cussed. In particular, I propose a set of constituent learning objectives
and activities as a partial answer to my original guiding question:
what is it that students need to learn in order to adequately recognize
and evaluate the various computing technologies in their environ-
ment? I discuss implications for practice and potential avenues for
future research, especially with respect to an informatics education
that regards itself as a pillar of a contemporary general education by
enabling students to become self-directed and responsible citizens in
a modern computerized world.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Rechentechnik hat beinahe jeden Bereich modernen Lebens verändert,
manchmal auf sehr diffuse und unscheinbare Weise. Schüler/innen
dazu zu befähigen, diesen ubiquitären Einfluss zu erkennen und zu
bewerten ist ein international proklamiertes Ziel einer sekundären
Informatikbildung. Zu diesem Zweck müssen sie von ihrem schulis-
chen Informatikwissen auch tatsächlich im Alltag Gebrauch machen.
Ausgehend von Theorien zu Lerntransfer, Variationstheorie sowie ex-
istierender Forschung zu Schülervorstellungen, untersuchen die drei
Studien dieser Dissertation auf naturalistische Weise die Denk- und
Lernprozesse von Schüler/innen über konkrete informatische Geräte.
Die erste Studie untersucht, wie Schüler/innen Technik differen-
zieren, welche Arten sie allgemein unterscheiden. Basierend auf 21
Interviews stelle ich eine Grounded Theory zu einer entsprechen-
den Taxonomie vor. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass Rechentechnik
tatsächlich keine vordergründige Kategorie für sie darstellt, was ent-
sprechenden Transfer erschweren würde. Die zweite Studie untersucht
direkter, wie Schüler/innen Rechen- von Nicht-Rechentechnik unter-
scheiden. Basierend auf 28 Interviews, einschl. der Teilnehmer/innen
der ersten Studie, stelle ich eine Grounded Theory entsprechender
Denkprozesse vor. Die Ergebnisse legen insbseondere nahe, dass
etliche Schüler/innen Rechentechnik unsachgemäß anhand inhärenter
Fähigkeitsgrenzen unterscheiden, was wiederum Transfer behindern
würde. Die dritte Studie untersucht daraufhin Lernprozesse von
Schüler/innen im Kontext einer Intervention, die die oben genannten
Punkte adressieren soll. Ich stelle vier sogenannte “kritische Aspekte”
vor, welche vor allem entsprechende Lernschwierigkeiten aufzeigen
sollen. Entsprechend haben einige Schüler/innen scheinbar Probleme
damit, Rechentechnik als gleichzeitig ökonomisch und leistungsfähig
zu verstehen, was wiederum seine Verbreitung und Auswirkungen
einschränkt. Die Analyse legt zudem erste Richtlinien für das Design
entsprechender Interventionen nahe.
Anschließend werden die Ergebnisse der Studien integriert disku-
tiert. Insbesondere stelle ich Lernziele und Aktivitäten vor, welche
eine Teilantwort meiner ursprünglichen Leitfrage bilden: was müssen
Schüler/innen lernen, um Rechentechnik im Alltag adäquat zu erken-
nen und zu bewerten? Ich diskutiere Implikationen für die Praxis
sowie potentielle weiterführende Forschung, vor allem im Bezug zu
einer Informatikbildung, die sich als Säule der Allgemeinbildung ver-
steht, indem sie Schüler/innen dazu befähigt, zu mündigen und ver-
antwortungsvollen Bürger/innen in einer modernen computerisierten
Welt zu werden.
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Part I
What is to be Learned?
1
å IT systems which include computers
and smartphones, but also large systems
like the Internet and social networks, have
found their way into almost all areas of life
and profoundly transformed society. Com-
puter applications can often no longer be
directly identified, but they function using
the same basic structures and must be crit-
ically evaluated by people to decide how
best to use them.
– Landesinstitut für Schule und Medien
Berlin-Brandenburg (2017: 40)
1 INTRODUCT ION
A teacher of mine used to say that we do not learn for school, but for
life. Ironically, he usually said it in a situation whose relevance for
the latter was particularly oblivious to us. Nevertheless, the phrase
captures a nearly timeless educational issue. It goes back, in fact, to the
1st-century Roman philosopher Seneca, who lamented that education
should adequately prepare students not just for purely academic
problems, but for their actual lives (Bartels 1992: 110). Since Seneca,
much has changed. An important driver of that change has been and
continues to be technology, and one kind, in particular, has altered
the nature of contemporary life like few others before it: computers.
This thesis aims to contribute to the question of what students need
to be prepared for a life that is pervaded on all levels by automation,
digitization and data processing.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. After a
brief excursion on the terminology that I will adopt throughout this
thesis, I will return to the above issue: what is it that every citizen
should learn in school, why should they learn it, and where does
digital technology fit into that picture? Subsequently, I will discuss a
fundamental challenge in that context, namely the tension between
the need for a lasting, sustainable education, on the one hand, and
the rapid change of everyday technology, on the other. This, in turn,
will lead to a first delineation of my research object, namely student
conceptions about such technology, and their role in related transfer
from school to everyday life.
1.1 terminology
In Germany, the scientific discipline studying the (automated) process-
ing of (digital) data and information is commonly called “Informatik.”
The corresponding school subject is usually called by the same name.
Common translations include “computer science,” “computing” or
“informatics,” but may carry somewhat different meanings depend-
ing on when and where they are used (see below). Morphologically,
“informatics” is closest to the German term and, like it, not directly
related to “computer.” Since such relations are a central focus of this
thesis (Chap. 2), I will adopt the term “informatics” for transparency
throughout.
To distinguish the discipline from its technical solutions and prod-
ucts, I will use the term “computing” to denote acts of data or in-
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formation processing. In particular, I will use “computing technology”
to refer to related technical artifacts, systems or devices – in short,
“things that compute.” Some alternative terms found in the literature
include “digital technology,” “computing system” or “information
and communication technology” (ICT).
The term “computer” will also play a central role throughout this
thesis, but I decided not to use it as a technical term for two reasons.
First, it carries a certain ambiguity, which I will discuss in more
detail in Sect. 2.2.2. Second, it appears to be perceived negatively in
parts of the research community. In Germany especially, the term
“informatics system” – usually defined as a union of software, hardware
and networking in relation to a specific application context – has
become widely established, and is often introduced and discussed in
direct opposition to “computer” (e.g., Humbert 2006: 5; Schubert and
Schwill 2011: 5; Stechert 2009: 36). I will return to this issue in more
detail in Sect. 7.4, where I will discuss it on the basis of my own and
other research.
In the context of secondary/K-12 education, many of the above
terms seem to be used differently and/or interchangeably in different
countries, and sometimes with normative rather than descriptive intent
(Hubwieser et al. 2015). In other words, different terminologies do not
necessarily imply different educational intentions. Therefore, unless
otherwise stated, I will treat the above names for the discipline and
school subject, on the one hand, and technical systems, on the other, as
largely synonymous when discussing educational research literature.
1.2 informatics and general education
What is it that people – everyone – should learn, and why? The
German reform educationist Klafki (2007) has formulated basic re-
quirements for a general education, which should be “education for
all, for self-determination, participation and solidarity;” foster “critical
reflection of [. . . ] the general, as in that which concerns all of us;” and de-
velop “all hitherto known dimensions of human(e) ability” (my transl.,
orig. emph.: 40; see also 52-54).
Subsequently, Klafki (2007) renders “that which concerns all of us”
in terms of “contemporary key problems”1 (my transl.: 56). Among
fundamental questions of peace, environmental protection and social
inequity, he also already names the dangers and possibilities of mod-
ern computing technology here (59-60). For all these, he argues, a
general education should foster “insight into everyone’s responsibility
in the face of such problems and the disposition to participate in their
mastery” (my transl.: 56).
1 Original: “epochaltypische Schlüsselprobleme”
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It may not be surprising, then, that in the German-speaking com-
munity especially, there has been a lively discourse about the general
educational value of informatics (e.g. Diethelm 2018; Döbeli Honeg-
ger 2016; Gallenbacher 2017; Koubek 2005; Schulte and Budde 2018;
Witten 2003). In full accordance with and sometimes direct reference
to Klafki, these authors all agree that the progressing digitization
and automation of modern society increasingly confronts people –
everyone – with situations and problems that require at least a mini-
mum of informatics education to cope, “to participate in society as an
autonomous, self-determined and also responsible citizen” (Schulte
and Budde 2018: 2). Naturally, the issue is not limited to Germany
alone. Based on a comparison of situation reports from 12 countries,
Hubwieser et al. (2015: 74) have identified “general education to par-
ticipate in society responsibly” as a proclaimed goal of informatics
education in Germany, Sweden, South Korea, India and Russia.
However, responsible participation in a digital society is a rather
abstract and intangible objective. In terms of the taxonomy proposed
by Anderson et al. (2014), it is best classified as a global objective. As
such, it provides “a vision of the future and a rallying cry for policy
makers, curriculum developers, teachers, and the public at large” (15).
Given the ongoing discourse about the proper status of informatics as
a general school subject (e.g., Bernewasser 2019), such a vision and
rallying cry serves a clear political purpose. It does little, however,
to inform the concrete design of teaching and learning activities. To
that end, global objectives “must be broken down into a more focused,
delimited form” (Anderson et al. 2014: 15).
Humbert and Puhlmann (2004) argue that
If the aim of education is to enable young persons to take
part in society in an active and responsible way [. . . ], then
the touchstone or the heart of literacy with respect to infor-
matics is whether someone understands the occurrences of
informatics in everyday life and society. It will be insuffi-
cient to merely have some internal knowledge of informat-
ics that cannot be linked to the world. (66)
Similarly, Bethge and Fothe (2013) posit that the general educational
value of informatics can be described by three basic experiences, the
first of which is “to discover, understand and evaluate informatics
systems and their consequences in various areas of life” (my transl.:
116). The minimum standards for lower secondary education proposed
by the German informatics association (Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V.
2008) also understand themselves as part of a general education (2).
Accordingly, all students should be enabled to, among other things
 recognize the basic structure of informatics systems in everyday
devices
6 introduction
 independently analyze and understand novel applications and
informatics systems
 evaluate the consequences of automation on the working envi-
ronment
(my transl. and emph.: 17-18)
Likewise, the ACM K-12 computer science framework (K-12 Computer
Science Framework Steering Committee 2016) describes several core
practices, including “recognizing and defining computational prob-
lems” (77-78), in relation to core concepts like “computing systems”
(89) or “impact of computing” (92). As a last example, the national
computing curriculum in England (UK Department for Education
2013) “aims to ensure that all pupils [. . . ] can evaluate and apply
information technology, including new or unfamiliar technologies” (1),
and are able to “recognise common uses of information technology
beyond school”(2).
These formulations are already much more concrete. In the terms of
Anderson et al. (2014)’s taxonomy they may be classified as educational
objectives. They describe “a student behavior [recognize, analyze, eval-
uate] and some content topic [computing technology] on which the
behavior will be performed” (16). Their taxonomy also outlines one
more level, however: instructional objectives. They, too, describe behav-
iors in relation to content but “have substantially greater specificity”
(16).
The line between educational and instructional objectives is thus
not clearly defined. Nevertheless, for the above formulations, I would
argue that they do not yet meet the necessary level of specificity.
Indeed, what do the above-described processes and practices look like,
specifically? What do students actually need to know and do in order
to recognize computing technologies in their environment? What does
it take for them to carry out an appropriate analysis and evaluation of
their consequences? Marton et al. (2019) even argue that
educational objectives may tell us – rather vaguely – what
the student on a certain level of their studies is expected to
be able to do, but not what is necessary for getting there.
[. . . ] The answer to the question “What is to be learned?”
cannot be given from the beginning; it has to be found.
(12).
Their account blurs the line between the means and the ends of
education. Accordingly, breaking down learning objectives to a level
that may productively inform instructional design is already partially
an empirical issue. What do students need to learn about computing
technology in order to adequately recognize and evaluate it in their
environment? This is my guiding question for this thesis.
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1.3 ideas and artifacts
As seen above, if a central goal of a general informatics education
is to enable students to recognize and evaluate the computing tech-
nologies in their everyday environment, we may ask what they need
to learn in order to get there. The issue is aggravated, of course, by
the rapid change that this environment undergoes. The computing
technology of yesterday bears little resemblance to that of today, which
will probably have changed again come tomorrow. Hence, what is
learned about these technologies runs the risk of quickly becoming
obsolete again. In the context of a sustainable general education, this is
obviously a major challenge. The knowledge, skills and competencies
that students acquire in school should, of course, still be relevant and
useful once they have graduated.
The established approach to this problem is to impart students with
the general concepts and principles that are common to all these differ-
ent technologies. In the German informatics education community, a
rather influential contribution in this respect has been made by Schwill
(1997). His call to base informatics education on “fundamental ideas,
principles, methods and ways of thinking” instead of “an incoherent set
of recent technology-driven developments” (orig. emph.: 285) has
become a guiding tenet for large parts of the community and a direct
motivation for several research efforts (e.g., Armoni and Ginat 2008;
Döbeli Honegger 2007; Modrow 2003; Zendler and Spannagel 2008).
Only recently, Modrow and Strecker (2016: 16-48) have proposed an
updated canon of fundamental ideas, which they regard as constitutive
for the discipline, and of general educational value.
Internationally, the now widely adopted notion of “computational
thinking” encapsulates very similar arguments. Not unlike Schwill,
Wing (2006) explicitly distanced her original proposal from concrete
technologies, calling for “ideas, not artifacts” (35). In their review,
Grover and Pea identify “abstraction” as the undisputed “keystone”
of computational thinking (2013: 39), and later explicitly emphasize
that “people can learn computational thinking without a machine”
(2018: 21).
At the same time, several articles on computational thinking open
with an anecdotal account of the ubiquity and societal impact of com-
puting technology, and derive from there the desire for students to
become skilled computational thinkers (e.g. Barr and Stephenson 2011;
Demir et al. 2018; Grover and Pea 2018; Guzdial 2008). In other words,
the learning of abstract concepts and skills is legitimized – at least
partially – by the existence and disruptive impact of concrete contem-
porary technologies. And while computational thinking purports to
be relevant well beyond the existence of actual technology by also
contributing to general problem-solving competencies, there is no
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denying that it also aims to “lift the hood on all-pervasive computing
devices” (Grover and Pea 2013: 40).
Considering how quickly such devices keep changing, general and
time-stable disciplinary concepts and procedures are undeniably nec-
essary to enable students to appropriately analyze and evaluate them.
However, as seen in the previous section, they may first need to actu-
ally be discovered. It is arguably impossible to analyze and evaluate
that which remains unseen. So we might further ask whether abstract
skills and principles are also sufficient here.
Grover and Pea (2018) assert, for instance, that computational think-
ing skills should be taught “in ways that equip students to apply
them in various contexts and domains” (22). Similarly, Schwill (1997)
explicitly discusses transfer in the context of fundamental ideas and
requires that they be identifiable in various disciplinary and everyday
phenomena. But what does it take for students to actually make that
transfer? After all, the fact that an acquired concept or skill is broadly
applicable and useful does not immediately imply that it actually is
broadly applied and used (more on that in Sect. 2.1). However, it
is precisely such an application of abstract knowledge to concrete
real-world situations that is at the heart of the educational objectives
described in the previous section.
Schulte et al. (2018) even speak of a perceived “dichotomy between
ideas and technology” (69). Technical concepts alone are insufficient,
they argue, because they can only tell us how a system works, but
never what it is good for. The notion is derived from the so-called
“dual nature” of technical artifacts, developed in the philosophy of
technology (de Vries 2016; Kroes and Meijers 2006) and technology
education (e.g., Frederik et al. 2011). As a consequence, Schulte
et al. (2018) propose to ground informatics education in the direct
interaction with and analysis of concrete technical artifacts in order to
combine both their structural and functional nature.
This can also be described as a pars-pro-toto principle;
students should be enabled to make inferences from a
small example to the whole - to transfer and generalize.
For planning teaching this means to ask which example
can be chosen that allows such generalization. (Schulte
et al. 2018: 67)
In full accord with Schulte et al. (2018)’s arguments, however, it stands
to reason that disciplinary concepts alone may not provide sufficient
guidelines for the selection of such examples. If these concepts are
taken to be the fundamental principles underlying all computing
systems, then they are, by definition, equally present in all of them.
According to Goldstone et al. (2018), a central aspect of concepts is that
they establish “equivalence classes” by making “superficially different
things alike” (277-8). As such, an abstract concept itself provides
little grounds to distinguish between its instances because any further
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difference between them is precisely what the concept is meant to
abstract away.
Indeed, according to Schubert and Schwill (2011), the selection of
concrete examples can apparently be arbitrary as long as they illustrate
the relevant disciplinary concepts:
Understanding requires a suitable selection of informatics
principles and methods, but the choice of tools remains
completely free. There is thus no binding to products in in-
formatics education. Instead, conveying working principles
with the help of systems and products is at the center, not the
other way around. (my transl. and emph.: 32)
Of course, when it comes to transfer, understanding systems and
products with the help of concepts, i.e., “the other way around,” is
precisely what is at stake. Schubert and Schwill (2011)’s implicit
assumption seems to be that all examples of a concept are equally
well-suited to foster this ability.
Nevertheless, some additional criteria have been discussed with
respect to “computer science in context.” The approach aims to teach
concepts and skills in relation to meaningful real-world contexts and
applications in order to let students experience their relevance in ev-
eryday life (Cooper and Cunningham 2010; Diethelm and Dörge 2001;
Koubek et al. 2009). According to Diethelm et al. (2011) the selec-
tion of such contexts should follow five criteria: multi-dimensionality,
breadth, depth, life world, and stability.
With respect to the first, Diethelm et al. (2011) immediately state
that “a context always has multiple dimensions” (my transl.: 102),
which arguably renders it moot as a selection criterion. The criteria
depth and stability primarily relate to the disciplinary concepts that
the context is meant to represent: “e.g. IPO model, protocol, interface,
algorithm” (my transl.: 102). With reference to the above argument,
however, this actually says little about what concrete context should
be chosen to exemplify them.
The final two criteria, breadth and life world, relate to a context’s
relevance. In particular, it should “exhibit a direct relation to and
scope of action in the living environment of students” (my transl.:
102). While this certainly goes beyond disciplinary considerations,
Knobelsdorf and Tenenberg (2013) have pointed out that the mere
presence of a technology or context in students’ everyday lives is likely
not sufficient to make it interesting or relevant in their eyes. Recently,
Nijenhuis-Voogt et al. (2018) have proposed that teachers may be in
a position to determine which contexts are relevant to their students,
but their results suggest that teachers, too, struggle to make such a
selection. Most tellingly, they report on a teacher who asserted that
“‘computer science is basically the only subject about everything’ implying
everything can be chosen as context” (orig. emph.: 4).
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In summary, there exists a certain tension in informatics education
between quickly changing technologies and abstract stable concepts.
On the one hand, too strong a focus on the former may result in
knowledge that quickly becomes obsolete again. On the other hand,
too strong a focus on the latter runs the risk that knowledge becomes
dissociated from its real-world applications and relevance. In order
to integrate both these perspectives, it has been proposed to ground
the teaching of concepts in concrete example technologies, artifacts
and contexts. This, in turn, gives rise to the question of how such
examples can be selected. The ubiquity of computing technology in
modern society provides a practically unbounded pool to choose from
and computing concepts, by definition, may not significantly limit
it. While some authors seem to assume that such a limitation is not
actually necessary, discussions about context-based teaching suggest
that students’ interests and perceptions should also be considered –
and, indeed, it is their perspective that will become my central object
of inquiry.
2 THEORY AND RELATED WORK
As outlined in Sect. 1.3, in order to link abstract concepts to their
real-world applications, it has been proposed to ground informatics
education in concrete example technologies and contexts, which gives
rise to the question of how such examples can be selected. A brief
glance at the nature of concepts has suggested that disciplinary consid-
erations alone may not be sufficient in that respect, and that students’
views and perspectives may have to be taken into account as well.
This chapter will provide a more detailed survey of the theory and
prior research related to these issues. A review of example-based
learning and knowledge transfer will show that related processes are,
indeed, often influenced by individual and situational factors, disposi-
tions and conceptions. Subsequently, I will review the literature on
student conceptions about computing technology, particularly com-
puters and programming. The chapter concludes with the formulation
of my research questions derived from those reviews.
2.1 examples, abstraction and transfer
In all likelihood, examples have been used in teaching and learning
since the dawn of humanity. In the context of the German educational
reform in the mid-20th century, educators Wagenschein (1965, 1997)
and Klafki (1964) developed a pedagogic approach that specifically
put “the exemplary” at the center of educational consideration.
Wherever we can talk about the exemplary, there exists a
relation between the general and the particular. [...] While
the particular is always a concrete “exemplar,” which you
can refer and point to – this wheel rolling downhill, this
calculation, this critique of historical sources –, the gen-
eral is always a purely conceptual relation: law, structure,
principle, term. (my transl., Klafki 1964: 443)
For secondary informatics education, Hubwieser (2007) directly refers
to Klafki and argues that the selection of subject matter should follow
the exemplary approach. Obviously, given the sheer quantity, ubiquity
and rapid change of computing technologies, it is impossible to present
and discuss more than just a tiny fraction of them in the classroom.
Hence, if education should be grounded in corresponding systems
and devices, an exemplary approach indeed is the only viable option.
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As indicated by the above quote, an example is always an example
of something. Its core idea is to point beyond itself, to make visible
something more general. When learning from an example, students
are expected to identify the general in the concrete in order to later be
able to apply it to other instances. The goal is to facilitate abstraction
and transfer.
The issue of knowledge transfer has been studied for well over
a century now. In their seminal study, Thorndike and Woodworth
(1901) have proposed the notion of “identical elements” that need to
be present in both the original and transfer situation. Accordingly,
transfer has been defined, for instance, in behaviorist terms as “the
carrying over of an act or way of acting from one performance to
another” (Woodworth and Schlosberg 1954: 734). Following the
cognitive revolution, Singley and Anderson (1989) reinstated identical
elements in terms of knowledge representations and defined transfer
as “[applying] knowledge acquired in one situation [. . . ] in other
situations” (1).
Based on a review of roughly a century of transfer research, Barnett
and Ceci (2002) have proposed a taxonomy for transfer constituted by
“two overall factors: the content–that is, what is transferred, and the
context–that is, when and where it is transferred from and to” (621),
where content lies on a continuum from specific to general:
A specific procedure might be characterized as a set of
particular steps described in terms of superficial features,
whereas a general principle might be characterized as a
deeper, structural, or causal understanding. (my emph.: 621)
According to Barnett and Ceci (2002), more general content better
facilitates far transfer, i.e., to contexts that are more distant from the
learning situation. Their taxonomy outlines several dimensions along
which this distance may be measured, including domain, location,
function or time.
A process closely related to transfer is conceptual categorization. It
denotes the basic cognitive act of identifying (categorizing) something
as a certain kind of thing. It is closely linked to concepts and a pivotal
component in thinking, reasoning and communicating (Goldstone
et al. 2018; Murphy 2004). According to Goldstone et al. (2018), a
“concept refers to a mentally possessed idea or notion, whereas a
category refers to a set of entities that are grouped together” (276). Of
course, entities may be grouped by virtue of being examples of the
same concept. In fact, the relation between concepts and categories is
so intrinsic that “whether concepts determine categories or vice versa
is an important foundational controversy” (Goldstone et al. 2018: 277).
With respect to transfer, a central function of categories is that they
facilitate inductive reasoning and generalization, i.e., “drawing con-
clusions about the category in general [. . . ] based on a few observed
examples” (Murphy 2004: 243). As mentioned already, categories and
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concepts form “equivalence classes,” which have the “ability to make
superficially different things alike” (Goldstone et al. 2018: 277-8). To
the extent that learning from an example amounts to learning the
concept that it represents, such learning can thus be described as an
inductive conclusion about all members of its category. From this
perspective, transfer requires the ability to appropriately categorize
superficially different entities as equivalent instances of the same
category in order to apply what has previously been learned about it.
Furthermore, categories may exist on different levels of abstraction.
For natural categories (as opposed to dot patterns or letter strings; see
Rosch 1975), Rosch et al. (1976) found that there exists a “basic level
of abstraction in a taxonomy” (383), which constitutes a focal point
for cognition. In particular, Rosch et al. (1976) observed that much
of human everyday communication tends to occur on this basic level
(dog, car). Above the basic level, categories tend to be regarded as
superordinate and abstract (mammal, vehicle), below as subordinate
and specific (poodle, jeep; see also Murphy 2004: 210ff).
These principles of categorization closely align with Barnett and
Ceci (2002)’s taxonomy for transfer: members of a category may differ
in certain “superficial features” but share “deeper, structural, or causal”
similarities (261). It is precisely those similarities that generalize across
all members of the category. More superordinate categories encode
fewer, but more abstract similarities, which in turn generalize to a
larger variety of entities (Murphy 2004: 223ff). In the terms of Barnett
and Ceci (2002)’s taxonomy, those entities may be contextually more
distant on several dimensions.
To the extent that education aims to promote transfer to various
everyday situations, i.e., “transfer that is far on many dimensions”
(Barnett and Ceci 2002: 632), these frameworks suggest that such
education should convey general content and abstract concepts rather
than superficial specifics. Indeed, the notions of fundamental ideas
(Schwill 1997) and abstract thinking skills (Grover and Pea 2013, 2018)
outlined in Sect. 1.3 seem to follow this exact line of reasoning.
A rather straightforward way to emphasize abstract content over
superficial features is to simply reduce the latter in the learning sit-
uation. Belenky and Schalk (2014) propose a taxonomy of learning
material along a dimension from idealized to grounded. Subsequently,
they apply their framework to parts of the literature and conclude that
grounding materials “in relevant contexts can help make content easier
to understand” (38) and may also have positive motivational effects.
However, grounded materials also appear to inhibit transfer “by na-
ture of being bound to a particular context” (40). Conversely, idealized
materials appear to foster transfer but “may actually make forming
the appropriate internal knowledge representation more difficult and
reduce the likelihood of activating helpful prior knowledge” (38-39).
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Day and Goldstone (2012) review similar evidence and summarize the
resulting dilemma:
On one hand, presenting information via concrete exam-
ples may lead to mental representations that are overly
“bound” to a particular context [. . . ]. On the other hand,
efforts to circumvent these problems by presenting infor-
mation abstractly, with minimal specific context, may seri-
ously impair the learner’s ability to accurately represent
the information at all. (158)
The problem arises because “encountering a principle instantiated in
just one context does not allow a learner to deduce which parts of the
context are essential details of an underlying concept” (Belenky and
Schalk 2014: 40).
Therefore, it has been proposed to let learners compare multiple
example contexts. Fuchs et al. (2003) succinctly summarize the under-
lying rationale:
To abstract a principle is to identify a generic quality or
pattern across instances of the principle. In formulating
an abstraction, an individual deletes details across exemplars,
which are irrelevant to the abstract category [. . . ]. (my
emph.: 294)
Abstraction may thus arise through decontextualization – the dele-
tion of context from content. Similarly, Burgoon et al. (2013) describe
abstraction in terms of “information reduction” and define it as “a
process of identifying a set of invariant central characteristics” (orig. emph.:
502). According to variation theory, such an identification of abstract
invariants is only possible before a background of particular differ-
ences (Lo 2012; Marton 2006, 2015). Other approaches have described
abstraction, for instance, in terms of structure mapping (Gentner 1983;
Schumacher and Gentner 1988) or schema induction (Catrambone
and Holyoak 1989; Cummins 1992; Gick and Holyoak 1983). These,
too, rest on the notion that in order to identify abstract structures or
schemas, learners need to compare at least two superficially different
instances, or “analogs.” Based on a meta-analysis of 57 experiments,
Alfieri et al. (2013) found that comparing multiple exemplars (as op-
posed to studying them individually, or studying just one) indeed has
consistent positive effects on concept learning and transfer.
Findings about category-based reasoning have also shown that more
diverse premises lead to stronger and more general inferences (Heit
2000; Rips 2001). Based on four experiments, Feeney and Heit (2011)
argue that “diversity effects occur, at least partly because diverse
premise categories cause participant to bring general and hence highly
projectible features to mind” (179). In other words, two highly dissimi-
lar members of a category tend to share fewer superficial features and
thus better emphasize their abstract similarities.
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However, Higgins (2017) also cites evidence suggesting that if ex-
amples become too dissimilar, learners may fail to notice any rel-
evant similarities among them at all (see also Gentner and Hoyos
2017). Moreover, Higgins (2017) investigates the effects of within- and
between-category comparisons on learning, i.e., comparing different
examples of the same category versus comparing examples to counter
examples. He concludes that the former highlights within-category
similarities, whereas the latter highlights between-category differences,
both of which are relevant to understanding but may be more or less
difficult to learn depending on the category itself.
Similarly, variation theory centrally posits that the variation across
presented exemplars should not be arbitrary but exhibit systematic pat-
terns based on so-called “critical aspects.” Lo (2012: 85-102) outlines
four such patterns. In particular, “contrast” and “generalization” are
analogous to between- and within-category comparison, respectively.
As an example, Lo (2012) describes the concept of triangle:
Contrasting triangles with what are “not triangles” (e.g.,
squares, pentagons, hexagons) allows the critical aspects
of triangles, such as the number of sides, to be separated
out. Students can then learn from sameness by looking
at different kinds of triangles (e.g., right-angled triangles,
isosceles triangles, equivalent triangles), and aspects that
vary within triangles can be discerned. (my emph.: 101)
In that sense, critical aspects may to some extent simply be those
that define the object of learning from a disciplinary or curricular
perspective, i.e., what students should learn about it. However, Lo
(2012: 103) adds that students also need to actually “experience the
pattern as intended” (more on that below).
While research on transfer has produced significant results over the
last century, some of its traditional assumptions and methods have
received substantial criticism in recent years (for reviews, see Day
and Goldstone 2012; Lobato 2006). Consider the following passage,
in which Gick and Holyoak (1983) discuss how some participants in
their control group, who only received one learning example, were
still able to induce and transfer an abstract schema:
Given the difficulty of schema abstraction from a single
analog [. . . ], one might ask how anyone could sponta-
neously notice an analogy between one initial analog and
a semantically remote transfer problem. [. . . ] Our sub-
jects may have often brought relevant prior knowledge
to the experiment. One subject in an earlier experiment
[. . . ] immediately mapped the story analog with another,
previously known convergence problem [. . . ]. (Gick and
Holyoak 1983: 32)
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The passage illustrates a central aspect of traditional transfer theory:
learning and transfer are regarded as two distinct processes. As such,
transfer is the application of previously acquired knowledge and does
not itself involve further change of that knowledge. In the words of
Barnett and Ceci (2002), educators need “to ensure that knowledge
is learned well in the first place” (612). Conversely, the influence of
prior knowledge on learning has usually not been classified as transfer
under this view.
However, Schwartz and colleagues have argued that “preparation
for future learning” (PFL) should equally be regarded as transfer
(Bransford and Schwartz 1999). For example, Schwartz and Martin
(2004) found no difference in immediate transfer between two treat-
ment groups A and B. However, when both groups were provided
with additional learning resources, group A performed significantly
better on the subsequent transfer problem. Schwartz and Martin (2004)
conclude that treatment A better prepared students to further learn
from the resources.
Moreover, Schwartz et al. (2005) propose to distinguish what is
transferred “out of” a learning situation from what is transfered “into”
another:
People always “transfer in” some knowledge to make
sense of a new situation. The challenge is whether we can
prepare them so they spontaneously transfer the “right”
knowledge. (32)
Taking an “actor-oriented perspective” (Lobato 2003, 2008), qualitative
analyses of students’ reasoning in problem-solving situations have
found that they indeed drew on a myriad of prior learning experiences,
some desirable and viable, some less so (Lockwood 2011; Roorda et
al. 2015; Thompson 2011). Lobato (2008) contrasts her approach to
traditional transfer research, which often “predetermine[s] ‘what’ will
transfer rather than making the ‘what’ an object of investigation” (292).
Consequently, she argues that much of the existing research may
seriously underestimate when and how people generalize what they
learn. From an actor-oriented perspective instead, any influence of
prior learning on any situation (including further learning) is classified
as genuine transfer (see also Lobato 2012).
One of the most pivotal challenges to transfer theory has come
from the perspective of situated cognition. In her seminal study, Lave
(1988) observed people during grocery shopping and compared their
arithmetic activities in those situations to their performances in classic
paper-pencil tests – and found virtually no relation between them.
Rather than applying their school-taught arithmetic knowledge in
everyday situations, Lave (1988) argues that people employ “qualita-
tively different practices of arithmetic in different settings” (63). She
harshly critiques the basic definition of transfer “as a process of taking
a given item and applying it somewhere else” (orig emph.: 37). Instead,
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knowledge and cognition are recast as malleable devices that take
shape only in situ (for a more recent review, see Roth and Jornet 2013;
for a discussion within tertiary informatics education, see Ben-Ari
2004; Knobelsdorf 2015). As such, situated cognition challenges a
fundamental distinction in traditional transfer theory, namely between
(abstract, stable) content and (superficial, volatile) context.
Reactions to this position have been diverse. On the one hand,
Carraher and Schliemann (2002) argue that if cognition is inherently
situated, then the notions of abstraction and transfer constitute an
ill-defined theory that should be abandoned altogether. On the other
hand, Anderson et al. (1996) have criticized several claims of situated
theorists as overstated and in violation of existing research, which
clearly shows that people do have a capacity to generalize prior learn-
ing to novel situations. However, Anderson et al. (1997) also highlight
several points in which cognitivist and situated perspectives align,
and acknowledge the latter’s “valuable service in emphasizing the
important contextual and social aspects of cognition” (20). Vosniadou
(2007: 57) argues that the two perspectives need to be integrated in
order “to account for all the empirical findings around the problem of
knowledge transfer.”
Building on DiSessa (1993)’s notion of “knowledge-in-pieces” and
adopting Lobato (2003)’s actor-oriented view, Wagner (2006) presents
an in-depth case study and subsequently proposes a framework for
“transfer-in-pieces” that incorporates both abstract and situated ele-
ments:
Transfer was not supported primarily by Maria’s ability
to state her rule in general terms. Rather it was by an
expansive set of underlying, context-dependent knowledge
resources and coordination knowledge that permitted her
to understand how her rule could be recognized as useful
and sensibly applied in varying circumstances. (Wagner
2006: 10)
According to Wagner (2006, 2010), salient “cues” that are recognized
in a situation may activate related “pieces” of knowledge. Those may,
in turn, cue subsequent pieces, which are eventually brought together
in a process of situated reconstruction (see also Hammer et al. 2005
for a very similar account). Consequently, a person might construe
two situations as “similar,” based on two very different processes
of situated reconstruction. Conversely, existing knowledge, even if
accurate and viable, may stay “inert” (Renkl et al. 1996) if it is not
activated by related situational cues. Standing traditional transfer
theory on its head, Wagner (2006) argues that “knowledge supporting
transfer must somehow account for (rather than overlook) contextual
differences” (orig. emph.: 6). Moreover, he renders abstract knowledge
not as a precondition for transfer, but as a consequence of it:
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[Maria] did not apply [her rule] to new situations because
it was abstract; she stated it more abstractly as she learned
how it was relevant and related to new situations. (Wagner
2006: 66)
Despite this radical redefinition then, Wagner’s account is fully consis-
tent with findings that learning from and comparing multiple exam-
ples promotes abstraction, as well as the notion that acts of transfer
may themselves constitute learning (PFL).
The works by DiSessa (1993), Hammer et al. (2005), and Wagner
(2006, 2010) all build on the constructivist notion that abstract structure
is not an objective feature inherent in a situation, but rather the product
of subjective and context-sensitive construction (Piaget 1929, 1971; von
Glasersfeld 1995). Consequently, “what experts consider a surface
feature may be structurally substantive for a learner” (Lobato 2003:
20). Several other recent accounts of transfer argue along the same
line (e.g. Jornet et al. 2016; Larsen-Freeman 2013; Lobato et al. 2012;
Nokes-Malach and Mestre 2013).
As already mentioned, in the context of variation theory, Lo (2012)
also asserts that the effectiveness of a pattern of variation “depends
to a great extent on whether [. . . ] students experience the pattern
as intended” (103); and Guo et al. (2012) define critical aspects as
those “that cause difficulty for students in the process of learning;
they might be superficial or structural” (255). Hence, what should be
varied across the examples depends not only on the abstract concept(s)
they should instantiate but also on learners’ individual perceptions
of them. Aspects that are irrelevant from a disciplinary perspective
may very well be critical in a learning situation (Pang and Ki 2016).
After all, students may need to learn that those aspects are not relevant,
especially if their prior understanding of the concept tells them other-
wise. According to Marton et al. (2019), critical aspects ultimately aim
to describe “what is to be learned,” which may have to draw on both
normative and empirical arguments.
In the wake of these theoretical shifts, there has been an upsurge
in transfer research on various individual and situational factors. For
example, Day and Goldstone (2012) and Lobato et al. (2012) discuss
perceptual processes; and Jornet et al. (2016) draw on work by Dewey
and Vygotsky to analyze transfer in terms of holistic sociocultural in-
teraction. In particular, several studies have investigated the influence
of motivation and disposition on transfer (Perkins and Salomon 2012;
Pugh and Bergin 2006), particularly goal-orientation (Belenky and
Nokes-Malach 2012; Bereby-Meyer and Kaplan 2005). Accordingly,
a motivation to master a subject may better promote transfer than
a motivation to demonstrate performance (for a related review, see
Jacot et al. 2015). Similarly, Malt and Sloman (2007) have reviewed the
literature on artifact categorization (as opposed to natural objects) and
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concluded that “the same sets of objects may be grouped in different
ways depending on the goals and contexts of the situation” (115).
In summary, the use of multiple, systematically varied examples
suggests a viable means to facilitate the induction, learning and sub-
sequent transfer of general principles. However, recent research also
strongly suggests that these processes are heavily influenced by in-
dividual, social and situational factors. The way in which learners
perceive presented examples may differ substantially from an educa-
tor’s intentions. Moreover, it cannot be taken for granted that abstract
knowledge, even if accurate and viable, will simply be “carried over”
to other situations. Instead, what is actually transferred “into” a
new situation may be subject to situational cues and context-sensitive
reconstruction.
In conclusion, grounding informatics education in concrete example
technologies and artifacts indeed appears to be a promising approach
to teaching related concepts, and enabling students to transfer them to
everyday situations. However, an informed selection of such examples
cannot be made solely on the basis of disciplinary considerations.
What is also needed is an understanding of students’ perceptions
and ideas in relation to those examples. How do particular features
of a technology influence their perception of the underlying concept
(structure versus surface)? How is it different from or similar to other
technologies in their eyes (perceived variability)? What features may
cause difficulty for them in related learning processes (critical aspects)?
2.2 student conceptions
The idea that teaching has to account for students’ subjective views and
ideas is, of course, not new. According to the theory of constructivism
briefly mentioned in the previous section (Piaget 1929, 1971; von
Glasersfeld 1995), learning is largely the result of context-sensitive de-
and reconstructions of subjective experience, rather than the direct
intake of knowledge. Therefore, the prior conceptions and dispositions
that students bring with them into a learning situation have a direct
impact on the learning process because they influence what aspects of
a situation are focused on, how it is deconstructed and understood,
and how this understanding is eventually integrated into the existing
conceptual structure itself. As “points of departure” (Duit 2007),
existing conceptions are thus necessary preconditions for learning
to take place at all. However, they may also be in conflict with the
subject matter and thus obstruct the intended learning process (for
some seminal discussions in informatics educations, see Ben-Ari 1998;
Pea 1986). Some learning may – and likely will – still happen in that
case, but it may not proceed along the desired path. From a PFL and
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actor-oriented perspective, these influences can already be classified
as genuine transfer, whether desirable or not.
Much work has focused on student conceptions and their implica-
tions for educational practice over the last decades. The most substan-
tial body of related research is found in the field of science education.
Brown and Clement, for instance, have investigated how student con-
ceptions influence example-based learning and transfer in the context
of Newtonian mechanics. They argue that examples should be care-
fully chosen because they “must make sense to the students, not simply
to the teacher” (orig. emph., Brown and Clement 1987: 14; Brown
1992) and that transfer may, in fact, involve conceptual reconstruc-
tion of the target situation, not mere application of abstract concepts
(Brown and Clement 1989). The latter, in particular, is consistent with
a situated transfer-in-pieces account. Other studies have found that
students may very well employ different conceptual frameworks in
different contexts (e.g., Mortimer and El-Hani 2014; Roth et al. 2001;
Teichert et al. 2008). This, too, is consistent with a transfer-in-pieces
account. Hence, different target contexts may “cue” alternative knowl-
edge pieces and conceptions instead of disciplinary ones such that
transfer of the latter is precluded. From an actor-oriented view, such
use of alternative models also constitutes genuine transfer, but not of
the knowledge that would be educationally desirable.
For informatics education, I have not found any direct research on
how specific student conceptions may influence example-based learn-
ing or transfer in the context of concrete technologies. Nevertheless,
there do exist some related lines of work, the review of which is the
purpose of this section. I will start with a brief review of student
conceptions about technology and informatics in general in order to
identify concepts that appear pivotal in their related thinking. I will
then focus on the seemingly most prominent one, namely computers.
From a transfer-in-pieces perspective, those may provide pivotal cues
for the activation of other related knowledge resources.
2.2.1 Technology and Informatics
In his introduction to the philosophy of technology, de Vries (2016) dis-
tinguishes four perspectives on technology: as artifacts, as knowledge,
as process, and as volition. Simply put, technical processes, informed
by technical knowledge, may utilize and produce technical artifacts –
all driven by human volition. Of those perspectives, de Vries (2016)
argues, the artifactual one is by far the most salient:
Ask a young child what technology is, and most probably
he or she will start listing examples of technical artifacts.
[. . . ] We may not see all that much of all the process behind
technology, but the outcomes of such processes, artifacts,
are everywhere. (11)
2.2 student conceptions 21
Studies conducted by DiGironimo (2011) and Rocha Fernandes et al.
(2018) support this. Each study qualitatively analyzed the technology
conceptions held by 20 middle-school students in the USA and Por-
tugal, respectively. Both report that an artifact-centered view was by
far the most common one. Hence, many students essentially regarded
technology “as a set or collection of tools, devices and machines,” par-
ticularly “computers, tablets, mobile phones and videogames” (Rocha
Fernandes et al. 2018: 1097; see also DiGironimo 2011: 1346).
Several other studies have directly built upon this perspective and
investigated what objects and artifacts students even categorize as
technical (Firat 2017; Jarvis and Rennie 1996, 1998; Rennie and Jarvis
1995; Solomonidou and Tassios 2007). These studies have consistently
shown that less advanced artifacts such as clothing or furniture, which
do not use electricity or exhibit some other kind of complex mech-
anism, are often not regarded as technical at all. Instead, students’
categorizations were often centered on “high tech” artifacts, again
particularly computers, modern media and ICT.
Of course, technology is a very abstract concept, i.e., a superordinate
category, similar, for instance, to plant or animal (Murphy 2004: 201).
Just as there are various different kinds of plant and animal, there are
also various different kinds of technology and technical artifact. Given
the apparent prevalence of computers in students’ related thinking, it
might be hypothesized that those also constitute a salient subordinate
category for many, which will be explored in more detail in the next
sections.
Impedovo et al. (2015) presented 57 students, aged 12 to 14, with
ten different sets of picture cards, each showing six different objects,
both natural and artificial. The objects in each set were specifically
chosen on the basis of a common abstract feature, e.g., “use of air for
movement” (38) as the common feature between a dragonfly, vulture,
helicopter, airplane, hang-glider and windmill. Students were then
asked which of the items in each set had something in common. In
most cases, they did not recognize the abstract feature and instead
chose a more “functional and contextual categorisation” (40). However,
the authors do not further discuss those functions and contexts.
For the discipline of informatics, several studies have found that
students often do not seem to have much of a notion of the field at all
or, if they do, primarily associate it with computers and programming
(e.g., Carter 2006; Greening 1998; Grover et al. 2014). Recently, Brinda
et al. (2018) and Henry and Dumas (2018) have reported lists of
middle-school students’ related associations. Their procedures differ
slightly. Whereas Henry and Dumas (2018) asked 84 Belgian students
to complete the sentence “Computer science is...,” Brinda et al. (2018)
asked 198 German students to freely list their associations with “the
22 theory and related work
digital world and computer science.”1 In both cases, computers and
programming were by far the two most frequent responses.
Based on a grounded-theory analysis of 37 college student inter-
views, Hewner (2013) has proposed three qualitatively different views
of computer science: the programming view, the theory view, and
the broad view. Under the programming view, computer science
amounts to just that, whereas other subfields like theory or hardware
architecture are at best supplementary to that activity. The other two
views differ, in particular, with respect to the role of computers. While
students with a theory view “would frequently emphasize that Com-
puter Science exists beyond actual physical computers” (109), students
with a broad view “struggled to articulate a division between using
Computer Science and simply using a computer” (110).
Also using grounded theory, Knobelsdorf (2011) has explicitly built
on the notion of computer use and investigated students’ related
biographies. She found that respondents with a high or low affinity to
informatics differed markedly in their attitudes towards the artifact,
essentially regarding it as either a wondrous and creative lucky bag,
or a useful but otherwise uninteresting tool, respectively. Moreover,
Knobelsdorf (2011) found that both groups, but especially low-affinity
students, tended towards a dichotomous view of the discipline in
terms of insiders and outsiders, who are distinguished primarily by
their levels of computer use proficiency.
In summary, students’ thinking about technology in general often
revolves around concrete technical artifacts – products, devices and
gadgets – with modern high-tech, computers and ICT at the very top of
the list. This thinking is also clearly reflected in their conceptions about
informatics, which have often been found to revolve around computers
as physical artifacts, or programming as an activity directly related to
them. Hence, with respect to transfer, computers – if recognized in
a situation – may provide powerful cues for the activation of related
disciplinary knowledge (Sect. 2.1). This raises the question whether
computers indeed constitute a coherent artifact category for students
and, if so, what artifacts are included in it and why.
2.2.2 Computers as Category
From a linguistic perspective, names for technical artifacts are often
very ambiguous (Malt 2010). One reason for this is that existing names
are often extended to include new technical developments, as the
following anecdote illustrates:
“Smart” phones today not only allow voice communication
but take photos and video, play music, browse the web,
1 As neither study was conducted in an English-speaking country, it is unlikely that
they indeed used the term “computer science.” However, neither report includes
original-language material.
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send and receive e-mail, edit text, assist in way-finding,
and launch a wide variety of other applications. A recent
television ad for one such phone features the company
CEO commenting, “It’s amazing we still call it a phone.”
(Malt 2010: 2)
The term “computer” has undergone similar developments. While its
original meaning as “a person who makes calculations” (OED Online
2019) has pretty much become archaic, its use as an artifact label origi-
nally referred to wardrobe-size machines, later to personal desktop
devices, then portable laptops and now sometimes tablets. Technically,
ever since the advent of integrated circuits, computers have come to
be embedded into countless other artifacts (Hüning 2019: 1-2). Those,
however, are hardly ever referred to as “computer,” despite being
“capable of receiving information (data) and of processing it in accor-
dance with variable procedural instructions (programs or software)”
(OED Online 2019). Depending on where one prefers to draw the
line then, the term can be interpreted on different taxonomic levels
as either a basic-level (desktop or laptop device) or a superordinate
category (any device that computes).
Brinda et al. (2019) have presented 490 German students, mostly
between 10 and 19 years old, with 23 “IT-related terms” and asked
them to freely combine those into categories. The results clearly
show the ambiguous nature of the used linguistic stimuli, as several
terms such as “computer,” “mobile phone,” “internet,” “program”
and “television” were often grouped into categories of those same
names, respectively. This suggests that many students are indeed
prone to interpreting the term “computer,” among others, on different
levels of abstraction.
Moreover, Brinda et al. (2019) identified various strategies that
their participants may have used, e.g., grouping by purpose, by place
of use, by part-whole- or by thematic relationships. Similarly, in
their review, Malt and Sloman (2007) have identified several features
that generally guide people’s decisions about the category status
of artifacts, including form, current function or originally intended
function. However, as mentioned already, they conclude that “the
same sets of objects may be grouped in different ways depending
on the goals and contexts of the situation” (115). For computers,
this issue may be especially prevalent. As illustrated by the above
anecdote, devices like laptops, tablets or smartphones are highly multi-
functional and often mobile. Hence, their actual functions, purposes
and places of use depend heavily on individual preferences and goals.
Moreover, for many newly developed software applications it makes
little sense to say that they were originally intended or even anticipated
by the designer of the physical artifact.
While the above-mentioned embedded computers usually perform
only a specific set of intended functions (Hüning 2019: 11), this em-
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bedding also makes them rather “invisible” (Weiser 1999). Using both
taxonomic meanings in a single sentence, Hüning (2019) colloquially
defines an embedded system as “a computer that does not look like a
computer” (my transl.: 11). According to Eisenberg et al. (2006), such
developments run counter to central educational goals:
When technology is invisible, it is deliberately placed out-
side the user’s awareness; thus, there is little reason to
communicate how the technology in fact works, and how
the user might extend or control it. (104)
From a transfer-in-pieces perspective, “invisible” computers may not
provide any salient cues that suggest their presence or activate related
knowledge resources. Indeed, it may often only be when they fail or
crash that the internal setup of such artifacts is inadvertently yanked
back into people’s conscious awareness (Buechley 2010; Hill 2010).
Around the turn of the century, Somekh and Mavers (2003), as part
of a larger national research project in the UK, used concept maps
to investigate where in their lives students saw computers and ICT.
As a comment on one of the maps, the authors describe “a monitor,
keyboard, tower, mouse and speaker” as “key identifying features”
of a computer system (417). Obviously, those are only viable with
respect to a basic-level interpretation of the term and may be partially
obsolete even then. More recently, Grover et al. (2016) have reported
on an online discussion amongst middle-school students about “What
is a computer?” While a third of the participants “argued that only
what we call a computer in everyday parlance, is a computer” (565),
the remaining two thirds maintained
that things like size did not matter, nor what we call a com-
puter, rather it was features and capabilities that defined
what is or is not a computer (566).
While this clearly suggests a more superordinate-level interpretation,
Grover et al. (2016) observed that there existed considerable confusion
and dissent among their participants about where exactly the line
between computers and non-computers should be drawn.
Mertala (2019a) has recently reported that indeed none of his 5- to
7-year-old participants apparently thought that computers could be
embedded into other technologies. However, the vast majority of his
subjects seemed to conceive of computers as either a “desktop” or
“laptop” device (60), which might explain those results. In contrast,
Robertson et al. (2017) report that, once told about computer chips,
their 5- to 8-year-old participants were quite able to name “a range of
devices, including tablets, phones, video cameras, traffic lights, clocks,
and watches” that they thought might also contain such chips (341).
In summary, categorizing a technical artifact, especially a mobile
and general-purpose computational one, is likely very sensitive to
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contextual and individual factors. Moreover, the term “computer”
is inherently ambiguous, as it may denote both a basic-level as well
as a superordinate category, and previous research shows incidents
of both kinds among students’ interpretations. When taken as a
basic-level category, it denotes a rather homogeneous set of artifacts,
primarily desktop or laptops devices, which may be comparatively
easy to identify based on visual features and linguistic conventions.
In contrast, when taken as a superordinate category, visual features
appear to lose their relevance for categorization and it becomes largely
unclear what kinds of artifact students subsume under it and how
they make those decisions. In accordance with the intrinsic relation
between categories and concepts (Sect. 2.1), results by Mertala (2019a)
and Robertson et al. (2017) show that students’ categorizations heavily
depend on their conceptions of what computers are.
2.2.3 Computers as Concept
Over four decades ago, Brunjes (1977) asked the question “What Is a
Computer?” and concluded that
no current definition will ever truly define what a computer
is because computers continually grow and change. [. . . ]
Experience will provide the best definition of all, or, if not a
definition, at least an understanding, which is really more
important! (85)
The primary goal of this section is to review such understandings of
computers. More precisely, my aim is to identify students’ related
conceptions that have a certain epistemological and explanatory power,
e.g., how computers work, what they can do, or what they are made
of. However, the above quote also immediately raises the issue of
rapid technological change again, which justifies the question whether
any such conception can indeed endure for a longer period of time.
Therefore, I will subsequently discuss the identified conceptions with
respect to how persistent they appear over time despite substantial
changes in contemporary technologies. For the time being, I will use
the term “computer” in a superordinate sense to denote any device
able to automatically process data or execute computations. As seen
in the previous section, however, such a definition has to be used
cautiously and I will return to it at the end of this section.
A preliminary search revealed that the related literature is dispersed
across multiple fields of research, without a common terminology or
publication forum. In light of this, the following review employed an
iterative procedure. Starting out with search terms like “conception”
or “mental model,” which were combined with terms like “computer”
or “robot” and entered into available search engines like WorldCat
or Google Scholar, an initial set of relevant publications was found.
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Subsequently, the cited and citing literature of those publications
was reviewed. This led to more relevant findings and, occasionally,
additional search terms, like “intelligent artifact,” which had not been
considered previously. The process was repeated until it stopped
yielding new relevant findings.
Determining a publication’s relevance consisted of two steps. The
first was a superficial survey including only the respective title and
abstract. In most cases, this was enough to determine that a publica-
tion did not cover a related topic. In particular, research on students’
misconceptions in programming was discarded in this step. Much
of such research focuses on specific algorithmic constructs and data
structures (e.g., Eckerdal and Thuné 2005; Kolikant 2001; Sanders
et al. 2006) rather than the computer as an artifact. Moreover, Qian
and Lehman (2017) already provide a recent review of related research
and their findings will be considered below.
The second step was performed after the search had been completed
and involved reading the full text. This revealed that still several of the
remaining publications were not relevant to the focus of this review.
For example, McKenney and Voogt (2010) report that children aged
4-7 primarily use computers to play games and search the internet,
that they are quite able to conduct these activities independently, and
generally exhibit a positive attitude toward the artifact. Hammond and
Rogers (2007) interviewed children aged 9-12 about their computer us-
age. They present a largely normative assessment of their knowledge
in that area, which was “confined to what they had acquired through
experience” and exhibited only “weak technical explanations” (10).
Oleson et al. (2010) conducted two studies, one in 1999 and one in
2009, in which they asked primary students to generate analogies for
“What is like a computer?” over the time of one minute. They report
that in 2009, participants generated somewhat but not significantly
more analogies. However, those included “51 unique responses that
were not found in Study 1” (1452). Analogies generated in 2009 more
often revolved around entertainment, whereas those ten years earlier
concentrated more on visual features.
These findings suggest that computers play an important role in
children’s everyday activities, that their interactions with them indeed
spawn a rich canon of related ideas, and that those ideas, in turn,
are likely to change together with the technology itself. However,
they provide little insight into the epistemological nature of their
conceptions.
Reports of relevant conceptions were documented in a spreadsheet.
Those for which evidence was found in at least three different publica-
tions were considered reliable findings. Utterances like “all computers
are giant machines” (Wolfe 1968: 38) or that there is a “chemical that
can make the computer work” (Hyson and Morris 1986: 22) were thus
disregarded. The result is a set of five distinct conceptions, which
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Source Sample Age Int. Omn. Mech. Wire Prog.
Wolfe 1968 ? grade 7 X X X
Mawby et al. 1984 20 8-12 X X X X X
Turkle 2005 >200 4-14 X X X
Hyson and Morris 1986 37 4 X
Hughes et al. 1987 102 6-12 X X X X
Denham 1993 292 9-14 X
Scaife and van Duuren 1995 80 5-11 X
van Duuren and Scaife 1995 230 5-11 X X
van Duuren and Scaife 1996 60 5-11 X
van Duuren et al. 1998 120 5-11 X X
Sheehan 2003 36 6-10 X
Jervis 2003 52 7-11 X
Jervis 2005 12 7-11 X X
Papastergiou 2005 340 12-16 X
Bernstein and Crowley 2008 60 4-7 X
Levy and Mioduser 2008 6 5-6 X X
Thuné and Eckerdal 2010 14 >18? X
Diethelm; Wilken, et al. 2012 23 13-14 X
Robertson et al. 2017 18 5-8 X X X
Mertala 2019a 65 5-7 X XTable 2.1: Evidence for computer conceptions found in reviewed publica-
tions. In cases, where a publication reported multiple studies,
sample sizes are given as sum totals.
will be presented in the following. The corresponding evidence is
contained in 20 publications, which cut across various research disci-
plines, including education, developmental psychology and sociology.
Table 2.1 provides a chronological overview and indicates the corre-
sponding evidence.
Computers are Intelligent
The conception that computers are intelligent, thinking or even con-
scious entities is arguably the most widely reported in the literature.
Generally speaking, it includes attributing to the computer some form
of mind or brain (human or otherwise) as well as various mental states
like motivations, intentions or even emotions. The computer is often
anthropomorphized and seen as some kind of volitional entity that is
better understood in terms of psychology rather than technology.
Wolfe (1968) presents one of the earliest accounts of this conception.
He presents a sample of quotes by seventh-grade children with virtu-
ally no prior computer experience whatsoever, illustrating their ideas
and beliefs about this technological novelty. Many of the quotes are
indicative of a conception that computers can think and the author
concludes that some children seemed to believe that “[c]omputers are
‘smarter’ than men” (37) and that the “computer is a replica of a man’s
brain” (38).
Over a decade later, Mawby et al. (1984) conducted individual in-
terviews with 20 children aged 8 to 12. When asked how a computer
works, several made references to a brain or mind. The authors con-
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clude, however, that many were unsure whether computers can think
and to what extent this thinking is similar to human thinking. Around
the same time, Turkle (2005) made very similar observations. She
studied over two hundred children, aged 4 to 14 and reports that
they often disagreed and discussed about the mental capabilities of
computers and whether they are truly alive. However, regardless of
what answer they finally arrived at, their discourse about comput-
ers was predominantly psychological rather than physical, including
aspects like intelligence, intentions, motivations and consciousness
(48-49). Further, she observed that the more the children interacted
with computational devices, the more elaborate and nuanced their
psychological discourse about them became (51-52).
Hughes et al. (1987) conducted semi-structured interviews with
over one hundred children, aged 6 to 12, on two different occasions
16 months apart. Among other things, they were asked whether they
thought computers could think, remember, want something or do
things by themselves. They found that the number of positive answers
to these questions significantly increased from the first to the second
interview occasion. However, on each individual occasion there were
no significant differences between the age groups. In accordance with
Turkle, this suggests that the observed effects are not due to children’s
cognitive development but rather due to their increased experience
with computers, as over the 16 months period, home computer access
among the subjects “rose from 7% to 40%” (29).
In a series of studies, van Duuren and Scaife further investigated
whether and to what extent children attribute various mental states
and cognitive features to computers and robots. They found that
subjects at all ages were prone to describing computers and robots
in terms of animate and intelligent behavior (van Duuren and Scaife
1995). They further investigated children’s willingness to attribute
a brain as well as various mental states to a person, a computer, a
robot and a doll. It was found that with increasing age (from 5 to
11), children became more likely to make such attributions to the
computer and robot (Scaife and van Duuren 1995; van Duuren and
Scaife 1996). It is unclear, however, if those differences are an effect of
age or, again, of increased prior computer experience, as this factor
was not controlled for.
However, more recent findings by Bernstein and Crowley (2008)
further support the hypothesis that computer experience is the relevant
factor. The authors presented 60 children, aged 4 to 7, with various
entities, including a calculator, a computer, a humanoid robot and a
rover, and asked subjects to rate them according to their biological
and intellectual properties. The ratings were found to be independent
of age, but positively correlated with prior experience. The lack of
prior experience could thus explain the findings reported by Hyson
and Morris (1986), who interviewed 15 four-year-olds with little to no
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prior computer experience, and report that “[t]he majority of children
did not believe that a computer can talk, get sick, go to sleep, or even
think” (24).
Recently, Robertson et al. (2017) interviewed 18 children aged five
to eight. Among other things, participants were asked whether they
thought computers could think or want something. The answers
were diverse. While several answered positively, others qualified their
answers by saying that computers might be “capable of wanting, but
could be prevented from carrying out their intentions” (orig. emph.:
342). Still others would deny such capabilities completely, sometimes
with reference to a computer’s programming (see below).
Taken together, these findings suggest that younger children, espe-
cially those who have had little first-hand contact with computers, are
initially undecided as to whether they can think for themselves or not.
As they become more engaged with the artifacts’ capabilities, their
cognitive features become more and more salient and their discourse
about them thus becomes more and more psychological.
Regarding the epistemological origins of this conception, Turkle
(2005) argues that children are by no means averse to physical explana-
tions (see below). However, computational artifacts may simply be too
opaque, too mentally challenging to be understood in physical terms.
“But children do not lack intellectual curiosity or inventiveness. They
turn to a way of understanding where there is more to say–that is, a
psychological way of understanding” (62). This argument is consistent
with findings reported by Levy and Mioduser (2008) that, with increas-
ing task difficulty, children became more likely to use psychological
explanations for a robot’s behavior instead of technological ones.
Finally, research on novice difficulties in programming also provides
some indirect evidence for this conception. In their review, Qian
and Lehman (2017) report on findings that “beginners often assume
the computer is intelligent like a human being,” which led to false
expectations about how the computer would execute their code (8-9).
Computers are Omniscient Databases
This conception can essentially be summarized as: computers know
everything, and they know everything by heart. The computer is seen
as a giant database containing a seemingly infinite amount of informa-
tion, including the answers to virtually all questions. Consequently,
it may not actually compute anything at all, but merely store and
retrieve data.
Again, some of the earliest pieces of evidence for this conception
can be found in the quotes reported by Wolfe (1968). The author
summarizes that some children apparently believed that “[c]omputers
contain in memory [. . . ] most of the facts known to man” (37), and
that, if you had a problem, “you just ‘ask’ the computer for the
answer” (38). Hughes et al. (1987) report on children who asserted
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that computers would know about crimes being committed or the
current whereabouts of relatives. On the first interview occasion,
“[t]he most commonly mentioned ‘good things’ about computers were
that they ‘help you’ or ‘tell you things’ (45 mentions)” (18). The
following comment by Mawby et al. (1984) is especially telling:
Too often, [children] spoke as if computers know specific
facts, such as the product of 23 times 45, rather than hav-
ing general algorithms that generate specific answers to
specific questions. Many of the younger children seemed
almost to view the computer as a natural object, which
“just knows” things and has the intrinsic ability to answer
questions. (30)
This question of whether children think computers produce answers
by computation or by just retrieving it from memory was further
investigated by van Duuren et al. (1998). The authors conducted
two studies, the first of which will be discussed in the context of
programming below. In their second study, they asked 20 adults
and 60 children, aged 5 to 11, how they thought a computer had
produced the result of a mathematical calculation. They found that 40
percent of the 8-year-olds and 45 percent of the 11-year-olds thought
the computer had had the answer already stored in memory, whereas
none of the 5-year-olds apparently thought so.
Work by Papastergiou (2005) illuminates the issue from a different
angle. She conducted a study with 340 students, aged 12 to 16,
regarding their mental models of the internet. The results show that a
total of 214 students (63%) seemed to believe that a single computer –
either the user’s own or a remote one on the network – stores the entire
internet (347-9). Papastergiou (2005) concludes that many students
apparently believed “that the capacity of a computer’s storage media
is unlimited” (349). Diethelm; Wilken, et al. (2012) also report on
students’ conception of the internet as “one big central computer”
(72).
Hence, it seems that at least some students are prone to concep-
tualizing computers as essentially giant databases. Under this view,
the storage capacities of computers may be virtually unlimited and
thus offer at least the potential for storing and retrieving every piece
of information in existence. Consequently, a single computer might
very well store the entire internet, while others may simply know
the answers to virtually all questions, without the need to actually
compute anything.
Computers are Mechanical
The conception of computers as mechanical devices pertains to their
internal hardware configuration, i.e, how they are built: with gears,
springs and levers. The inner workings of a computer may be likened
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to an intricate mechanism. Data and processes may exist as actual
physical entities inside the computer, move around and be stored in
physical places.
Reported evidence for this conception is not very systematic, but it
exists. Again, one of the earliest accounts is given by Wolfe (1968), in
which one of the children described how a computer works by way
of “[m]echanical hands” that move information around and literally
“write on the card” (36).
Mawby et al. (1984) also present several children’s quotes that
are indicative of this conception, likening them to a clockwork in
which “each part moves a different part” (12), or using terms such as
“engines” (18), “machinery” (20), or “little gears” (32). Interestingly,
some of these seemed to be blended with a conception of computers
as intelligent such that it is the mechanics that enabled the computer
to think. A similar blend can be found in Jervis (2005), where a child
asserted in an interview: “[they think] with little gears” (insertion in
the orig.: 10).
Turkle (2005) proposes a plausible argument for the epistemological
origin of this conception. She argues that many other devices and toys
that children interact with, e.g., wind-up cars or bicycles, can indeed
be understood in mechanical terms, in terms of moving parts, gears
and springs.
Children try to use the same kind of reasoning with com-
puter toys and computers. They try to understand how
these work in physical terms. But this turns out not to be
so simple. (61)
In their frustration, her argument continues, children may eventually
turn to a more psychological frame of explanation (see above). In
the study by Robertson et al. (2017), some children also described
a computer’s internal makeup by enumerating several “mechanical
components such as switches, buttons, and levers” (341).
Computers are Wire Networks
Under this conception the computer is seen as a network of different
components, e.g., chips, batteries, memory units or even various
fantasy elements, which are linked together, usually by wires or tubes.
The links may either be systematic or form a completely untraceable
tangle. The linked components themselves, however, often seem of
secondary import and largely remain black boxes.
Many of the quotes reported by Mawby et al. (1984) include refer-
ences to wires as the primary components of a computer’s internal
makeup (18, 19, 31). Again, some of them are examples of conceptual
blends such that computers “connect wires to make it think” (32), or
that programming means “putting wires together” (9).
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Hughes et al. (1987) also report that, being asked how a computer
works, a “substantial number mentioned various electrical compo-
nents, such as wires (27 mentions), electricity (16), batteries (9) and
plugs (6)” (24). Several also mentioned tapes, memory units or mi-
crochips, which had recently been introduced in class.
Denham (1993) conducted a series of three studies, in which she
analyzed children’s drawings of the inner workings of a computer.
The first two studies were a pilot involving 38 children about the
age of 12, and a replication of the pilot with 132 children, aged 9
to 12. Subjects were asked to imagine themselves shrinking in size
and entering a computer through one of its rear ports. “The question
posed was ‘What would you expect to see when you stood up and
looked around?’” (349) The produced drawings featured very similar
components as those mentioned above. “By far the most significant
were communication/links, transport, memory, and input/output
(I/O) functions” (349). Furthermore, older participants were more
likely to represent structured connections, whereas younger ones
tended to employ a disorganized “‘muddle’ of wire” (351). The third
study introduced constraints to the task. It involved 122 children
aged 9 to 12, who were “asked to imagine themselves programming
the computer to print their name on the screen” (351). Again, wires,
tubes and transmission links were the most frequent means by which
children conceptualized the letters arriving on the screen, sometimes
with a stopover at a memory unit.
Jervis (2003) also analyzed children’s drawings of the internals of
computers, in a study with 26 7-year-olds and 26 11-year-olds. Again,
wires were found to be central elements in many of the produced
drawings, and a substantial number “resorted to ‘tangled wires’ as
a metaphor” (15). Mertala (2019a) also asked children to produce
drawings of computers. Two thirds of the pictures included wires, but
only two participants actually drew the inner workings of a computer,
both of which amounted to “a square shape with wires inside” (60).
Robertson et al. (2017) report that when children were asked what is
inside a computer, “the most common answers mentioned batteries
and wires” (241).
In sum, the specific expression of this conception seems to be
strongly influenced by prior knowledge of computer components.
Younger children simply may not have heard of chips or memory
units (Hughes et al. 1987; Robertson et al. 2017). However, they proba-
bly do know about electricity, batteries and mains connections, and
Mertala (2019a) argues that his participants seemed very well aware
of the fact that computers require electricity to operate. A plausi-
ble reasoning might thus be that since computers are very complex
electric devices, they have to have some very complex wiring inside.
Without knowledge of what is wired to what, however, the wiring is
initially conceptualized merely as a wild tangle. As children learn
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more about the components inside a computer, like chips or memory
units, those may be incorporated into their conceptions. The wires
start to disentangle as they now connect specific elements.
Computers are Programmable
In its most essential form, this conception can be described as follows:
the behavior and capabilities of computers are determined by humans
and can be changed by humans. What these capabilities are and how
exactly one goes about changing them can, in turn, be constrained by
another conception of computers. However, this is not necessarily the
case.
Turkle (2005) discusses programming in the context of children’s
early attempts to understand the origins of a computer’s capabilities.
One 7-year-old explained: “People tell it everything. They put ideas
into the machine” (56). And an 8-year-old described a “special ‘feelings
cassette,’” which would enable a computer to have emotions (56).
Again, these are examples of blends: computers have ideas or feelings
by virtue of their programming. It is the origin of their capabilities,
whatever those may be. Turkle (2005) compares this to children’s
developing conceptions of animacy and aliveness:
In all of this talk about the machine’s origins, children are
struggling to develop the idea of an “outside push” for
psychological activity much as they struggle to develop the
distinction between inside and outside pushes for physical
motion. (56)
According to Turkle (2005), this distinction between “inside” and
“outside” pushes can ultimately form the basis for the distinction
between people and computers.
Findings reported by van Duuren et al. (1998) support this. In
their first study, involving 20 adults and 60 children aged 5 to 11, the
authors presented the subjects with a film featuring four robots that
were controlled by humans, and a fifth identical robot with a seemingly
autonomous behaviour. The authors then investigated to what extent
children were able to identify the robots’ loci of control as external
or internal. They found that while 5-year-olds were largely unable to
distinguish the different types of robot, the locus of control became
a more salient feature for children with increasing age. Furthermore,
those subjects that did distinguish between the two types of robot
were asked to justify this distinction. It was found “that the majority
of subjects in the oldest age groups who differentiated robot No. 5
from Nos. 1-4 also had an understanding of the programmable nature
of robots” (887-8). Similarly, van Duuren and Scaife (1995) analyzed
children’s stories about computers, robots and bicycles, and found
that, with increasing age, subjects became more likely to include words
like “program” or “programming” in their stories.
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It would seem that, as children grow older, they gradually come
to understand that a computer’s capabilities are not inherent in the
machine itself, but bestowed upon it by people in an act called pro-
gramming. It is not clear, however, whether children develop such a
conception entirely on their own. In the study by van Duuren and
Scaife (1995), some of the older children, who were most likely to
use terms like “program” or “programming” in their stories, had had
actual first-hand programming experience.
Sheehan (2003) asked 36 children, aged 6 to 10, to “draw a picture of
a person programming a computer” (75), and subsequently conducted
interviews with some of them. For the drawing task, many partici-
pants, especially younger ones, “immediately said that they did not
know what was meant” (75). Most interestingly, during the interviews
Almost half of the younger children said that they did not
know what a computer program was even though they
had happily detailed the programs they use on computers
only moments before. (77)
Observations by Hughes et al. (1987: 24), Jervis (2005: 20-23) and Levy
and Mioduser (2008: 352-3) also suggest that children rarely come up
with the idea of computer programming by themselves. Most recently,
Mertala (2019a) reports that hardly any of his participants seemed to
have an understanding of computer programming, and that those few
who did “had played coding games or had played with programmable
toys” (61). Hence, it may very well be that children need to actually
engage in programming or at least have to be told about it in order to
start conceptualizing computers as programmable devices.
Of course, the way in which students conceive of programming itself
is a somewhat complex matter in its own right. Where programming
is seen as the origin of a computer’s capabilities, it may be connected
to a conception of computers as a whole. The above accounts already
included examples of blends, where programming was conceived of
as “putting wires together” (Mawby et al. 1984: 9), or as inserting
a “feelings cassette” (Turkle 2005: 56). Some of the interviewed
participants in Sheehan (2003)’s study also “focussed on the physical
aspects of a computer in order to explain the production of programs.
They mentioned batteries, wires and chips” (78).
Thuné and Eckerdal (2010) conducted interviews with 14 university
students’ on their conceptions of programming. They present a hierar-
chy of five phenomenographic categories of description in which each
subsequent category “presumes the understanding expressed in the
preceding categories.” The lowest level conceives of programming as
essentially writing text, as communication in “a foreign language, the
computer’s language.” Hence, even this most basic conceptual level
would seem to imply a conception of computers as something that
can be programmed.
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However, younger children have been found to posses even more
limited conceptions of programming. For instance, Mertala (2019a)
reports that some of his participants associated the term with “watch-
ing programs” or “reading manuals,” probably due to their (Finnish)
linguistic similarities (61). Also, Mawby et al. (1984) observed that
children sometimes tended to overextend the act of programming to
include “anything entered into the computer at the keyboard” (10).
Discussion of Persistence and Change 2
Table 2.1 suggests that the conceptions presented above are rather
persistent across time. Indeed, for all five conceptions, the supporting
evidence spans at least several decades. Considering the extensive
changes in computing technology that occurred over this period, this
is indeed surprising. For example, computational devices keep shrink-
ing in size which arguably would make it increasingly difficult to
imagine them containing numerous wires, gears or levers. In contrast,
their functional capabilities have actually converged on some of the
above conceptions. Modern computers indeed appear increasingly
intelligent and omniscient, as they learn to understand and speak
natural language and are able to retrieve virtually any piece of infor-
mation from vast online databases. However, these changes do not
seem to be reflected in the findings reviewed here.
A possible explanation may lie in students’ understanding of what
even counts as a computer (Sect. 2.2.2). For the purpose of this re-
view, I have defined “computer” as any device that can be instructed
to automatically execute computations. Consequently, the studies
reviewed here include various devices like robots (van Duuren and
Scaife 1995), electronic toys (Turkle 2005), rovers and calculators (Bern-
stein and Crowley 2008), and of course desktop computers (Denham
1993; Mawby et al. 1984). Still, most of them were conducted at a
time that predates many modern types of computer. However, even
in the two most recent studies (Mertala 2019a; Robertson et al. 2017)
children seemed to primarily understand the word “computer” in a
basic-level sense, referring to desktop or laptop devices. Hence, it may
be that the reported conceptions are stable against new technological
developments simply because they do not apply to them.
Moreover, much of the existing research on students’ computer
conceptions, and consequently the review presented here, may be
subject to the same linguistic and taxonomic ambiguity discussed in
the previous section. Only a few of the reviewed studies utilized visual
2 Our original review paper (Rücker and Pinkwart 2016) predates the two most recent
publications included here (i.e., Mertala 2019a; Robertson et al. 2017). In the paper,
we originally argued that the conceptions of computers as mechanical and as wire
networks do not appear to have persisted. In light of this most recent evidence, this
section presents a revised interpretation and conclusion. The reader is invited to also
look at the original review paper for reference.
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stimuli (Bernstein and Crowley 2008; van Duuren et al. 1998) or actual
physical artifacts (Levy and Mioduser 2008; Scaife and van Duuren
1995; Turkle 2005; van Duuren and Scaife 1996). All other studies have
used purely linguistic stimuli by asking children about “computers”
or “a computer.”
Given that superordinate categories are often difficult for younger
children (Murphy 2004: 225), the apparent stability of their concep-
tions may thus be age-related to some extent. As can be seen from
Table 2.1, the majority of the reviewed research was conducted on
children at a pre-school or primary level. Only a few studies included
teenagers in the upper age range of their samples. However, the re-
sults reported by Brinda et al. (2019) and Grover et al. (2016) suggest
that secondary-level students are already quite able to also interpret
“computer” as a more abstract superordinate category.
In conclusion, while the five conceptions reported here appear
to have persisted for a surprisingly long period of time, it may be
that this holds only for younger children and only with respect to
a very limited set of artifacts, primarily desktop and laptop devices.
Older students may be more able and inclined to interpret the term
“computer” as a superordinate category that subsumes a much wider
range of artifacts. However, what artifacts those are and how such a
broader interpretation might, in turn, affect their related conceptions
still remains unclear.
2.3 research questions
Based on the findings and considerations laid out in the previous
sections, I am now in a position to formulate my research questions.
As shown in Sect. 2.1, perceived variability among examples plays an
important role in the induction and transfer of knowledge. This raises
the question of what similarities, differences and subordinate kinds
students regard as salient and meaningful in the context of technology,
a question that has so far received very little attention (Sect. 2.2.1).
q1: When are two technical artifacts similar or different for students?
q2: What subordinate kinds of technology do they distinguish?
Answering these questions may inform the selection of classroom
exemplars that aims to introduce systematic variation in order to
support learning and transfer. Moreover, it will shed light on whether
and to what extent computing technology already constitutes a salient
artifact category for students. This, in turn, will give some indication
to what extent they may be aware of its ubiquitous presence or how
disposed they are to even think about technical systems in terms of
computing concepts.
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Irrespective of whether computing technology already constitutes a
salient category for students, it remains an open question how they
would identify it (Sect. 2.2.2). According to the review presented
in Sect. 2.2.3, properties like cognitive behavior, electricity, complex
mechanisms or programmability might play a role in this process.
However, if and how this is indeed the case, is still unclear.
q3: How do students distinguish computing from non-computing
technology?
q4: What reasons, concepts and possibly misconceptions do they
employ in the process?
Insight into these processes may inform instructional designs that aim
to enable students to recognize computing technology in their envi-
ronment (Sect. 1.2) and thus promote transfer of related computing
concepts.
Hence, as a direct continuation of the previous questions, the issue
may then be approached from a more goal-oriented perspective. What
do students need to learn, specifically, in order to recognize and
evaluate computing technologies in their environment? In the context
of variation theory (Sect. 2.1), the question may also be restated as:
q5: What are the critical aspects of computing technology that stu-
dents need to discern and understand in order to appropriately
recognize and evaluate it in their environment?
Recall that such aspects may be derived partially from a disciplinary
or curricular perspective, and partially from an empirical one, partic-
ularly students’ conceptions and possible learning difficulties. Their
related conceptions are the subject of questions q3 and q4, which
may thus already inform the identification of critical aspects. How-
ever, learning difficulties may only arise in the context of intentional
learning situations meant to address precisely those conceptions.
Finally, if the objective is to enable students to discern and under-
stand certain critical aspects of computing technology, we may ask
how this can be made possible in the classroom:
q6: What situations and experiences can enable meaningful learning
about those critical aspects?
Note that this question still resides on a largely phenomenological
level by asking for conditions that can make learning possible (Marton
2015). Investigating how those may be created in an effective, efficient
and reliable manner would require subsequent research and is beyond
the scope of this thesis.

Part II
The Inquiry
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å The mind is not a book, to be opened
at will and examined at leisure. Thoughts
are not etched on the inside of skulls, to
be perused by any invader. The mind is a
complex and many-layered thing, Potter.
Or at least most minds are. . .
– Severus Snape
3 PARAD IGM AND METHODS
In this chapter, I will motivate and describe the research paradigm and
methods used in pursuit of my research questions (Sect. 2.3). They
are concerned with students’ conceptions of computing technology
and their role for related learning and transfer processes. Whereas
traditional research on transfer has frequently used experimental
designs to test hypotheses (e.g., Gentner 1983; Gick and Holyoak 1983;
Thorndike and Woodworth 1901), recent years have seen increasing use
of interpretive and ethnographic approaches as well (Jornet et al. 2016;
Lobato et al. 2012; Wagner 2006). Research on student conceptions, too,
has used both highly interpretive (Knobelsdorf 2011; Turkle 2005) as
well as experimental designs (Bernstein and Crowley 2008; van Duuren
et al. 1998). In their introduction to research methods in eduction,
Cohen et al. (2007) contrast the “scientific method” with “naturalistic
approaches” and outline how they are respectively rooted in positivist
and anti-positivist assumptions and, hence, different conceptions of
social reality (7-22).
3.1 naturalistic inquiry
Naturalistic inquiry denotes a research paradigm first described by
Denzin (1971) and later developed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as an
alternative to the otherwise predominant “rationalistic” (read: posi-
tivist) paradigm. In the following, I will briefly outline and compare
the basic assumptions underlying both approaches, and present my
rationale for choosing the naturalistic one for this inquiry. Subse-
quently, because the naturalistic assumptions are incompatible with
the commonly accepted quality criteria of validity, objectivity and
reliability, suitable alternatives are outlined instead.
3.1.1 Assumptions and Rationale
The paradigm of naturalistic inquiry was primarily developed in the
context of ethnography and thus operates under specific assumptions
that are tailored towards that field. Table 3.1 summarizes the “axioms”
for both the rationalistic and naturalistic paradigms as described by
Guba and Lincoln (1982). A detailed discussion of the origins and
meanings of these positions is beyond the scope of this section, but
Cohen et al. (2007: 7-22) provide a comprehensive account. Instead,
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Rationalistic Paradigm Naturalistic Paradigm
Reality There exists an objec-
tive, shared reality. Pro-
longed rigorous inquiry
will converge onto that
singular reality.
There exist multiple sub-
jective realities. Pro-
longed rigorous inquiry
will diverge as different
alternative realities are
uncovered.
Explanation
of Action
Effect probabilities are
linked to isolable causes.
Emergent phenom-
ena are attributed to
plausible preconditions.
Knowledge
Claims
Research produces
context-free general-
izations describing
nomothetic similarities
among members of a
homogeneous population.
Research produces
context-sensitive working
hypotheses describing
ideosyncratic differences
and similarities be-
tween members of a
heterogeneous group.
Role of Val-
ues
Inquiry is regarded as
value-free. Results are
expected to speak for
themselves.
Inquiry is regarded as
value-bound. Results
need to be assessed on
their basis.
Researcher The research is indepen-
dent from the people
conducting the inquiry
The researcher is interre-
lated with the field of in-
quiry. The research pro-
cess is interactive.
Table 3.1: Summaries of the axioms underlying the rationalistic and natural-
istic paradigms, as described by Guba and Lincoln (1982)
my aim here is to assess, which set of assumptions provides a better
“fit to the phenomena into which one proposes to inquire” (Guba
and Lincoln 1982: 237), that is, student conceptions and their role in
learning and transfer.
The first and probably most fundamental difference between the
two paradigms lies in their conceptions of reality (Table 3.1). The two
axioms are respectively in line with the ontological/epistemological
positions of realism and constructivism. The former generally assumes
that there exists a singular reality common to everyone, about which
objectively real knowledge may be acquired or at least pursued. In
contrast, the latter assumes that reality is the result of individual
perceptions and constructions such that different people construct
different things as subjectively real. Both these positions exist in more
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or less radical forms, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of
this section.
As seen in Sect. 2.2, the very notion of student conception and thus
the central focus of my inquiry, is deeply rooted within a construc-
tivist theory of learning. Related research is usually motivated by
the assumption that such conceptions, if not constitute reality, then
at least mediate an individual’s perception of and interaction with
the learning environment (e.g., Ben-Ari 1998). Moreover, as seen in
Sect. 2.2.3, there may exist a notable variety of different conceptions
among individuals. Related inquiry may thus very well uncover mul-
tiple, possibly conflicting views, rather than a broad consensus. The
naturalistic axiom better captures this situation.
The second set of axioms is related to the explanation of actions
(Table 3.1). While rationalistic research is often concerned with the
identification of isolable cause-effect relations, naturalistic inquiries
aim to provide holistic, plausible explanations for emergent phenom-
ena. The proper role of cause-effect models in teaching and learning
has been a matter of some debate. Biesta (2007), an outspoken critic,
appeals to constructivists when he argues that if teaching can be said
to have any effect at all, it is only by virtue of “the diverse ways in
which learners make sense of the situations they encounter” (9).
Undeniably, learning situations are often complex and multi-fact-
ored, where any one factor, intentionally or unintentionally, may or
may not contribute to or hinder said learning. A common approach
within the rationalistic paradigm is to identify, isolate and manipu-
late some of these factors in order to link them to observable effect
probabilities. However, student conceptions are inherently reflexive.
They have been cast in the role of preconditions for learning (Duit
2007; Hewner 2013), influences on the learning process (Taber 2014),
desirable learning objectives (Vosniadou 2007) and unwanted learning
outcomes (Holland et al. 1997). In this sense, they are themselves
both prerequisites and obstacles for their own development. They
are both cause and effect of learning. It seems impossible to position
them in relation to the cause-effect duality without simultaneously
neglecting one of the above roles that they play in the learning process.
Even Kvernbekk (2016), an advocate of causality, concedes that not all
educational phenomena are causal in nature (7). It stands to reason
that student conceptions are such a case. By instead regarding them
as emergent, holistic phenomena, the naturalistic axiom provides a
better fit.
The third set of axioms is concerned with the kinds of knowledge
claims that research in the two paradigms aims to achieve (Table 3.1).
In particular, they differ with respect to whether research can and
should produce context-free generalizations, or rather ideographic
working hypotheses. For the latter, generalization is assumed to
be impossible because the investigated phenomena are regarded as
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holistic (see above) and thus inseparable from the times and contexts
in which they occur.
In education, the role of generalizable knowledge has been a matter
of vigorous debate in the context of evidence-based practice. In
his seminal 1996-lecture, Hargreaves (2007) argues that educational
research should produce results that demonstrate
conclusively that if teachers change their practice from x
to y there will be a significant and enduring improvement
in teaching and learning (9).
In contrast, others have argued that prescribing practitioners to simply
replicate “what works” severely undermines the value of their profes-
sional judgment (Biesta 2007; Bridges et al. 2008; Hammersley 2002).
Elliott (2001) even argues that, since such judgment is always situated
and context-bound, it can hardly make any use of general knowledge
at all. In the social sciences, he asserts, general knowledge is at best
probabilistic and thus ultimately uninformative to any particular situa-
tion. Trying to find a middle ground, Kvernbekk (2011) acknowledges
the importance of situated judgment, but argues that there is no rea-
son why it should not also avail itself of general knowledge. Citing
Herbert et al. (2001), he states that “the use of general knowledge
implies judicious adaptation of this knowledge to the concrete circum-
stances” (Kvernbekk 2011: 529). This, in turn, closely parallels what
others require for the use of idiosyncratic, context-bound knowledge
precisely because it is idiosyncratic and context-bound, and thus in
need of judicious transfer (Lincoln and Guba 1985) or translation
(Hammersley 2002). From the perspective of educational practice then,
it seems difficult to generally prefer one kind of knowledge over the
other.
However, the theoretical frameworks discussed in Chap. 2 warrant
attention to the idiosyncratic. As seen in Sect. 2.1, processes of knowl-
edge transfer may be strongly influenced by various situational and
contextual factors. Likewise, as seen in Sect. 2.2, student conceptions
may also be highly context-sensitive. Therefore, research that aims to
produce decontextualized knowledge would appear incongruous to
these theoretical frameworks. The naturalistic aim towards idiosyn-
cratic knowledge provides a better fit in this case.
The fourth set of axioms is related to the role of values in the inquiry
(Table 3.1). While rationalistic inquiries usually strive to be value-free
and objective, naturalists assume their inquiry to be bound by the
values of both researcher and researched. Of course, if research is
focused on human thinking, the morals and values of the participants
may very well shape the inquiry. More importantly, for educational
research, values are nothing short of constitutive: “without normative
orientations, without decisions about what is educationally desirable,
without an articulation of the telos of educational practices, these prac-
tices simply do not exist” (orig. emph., Biesta 2010: 501). The present
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inquiry, for instance, is centrally motivated by a normative position
about what it means to be an educated citizen (Chap. 1). Someone
who does not share this position may very well regard this work as
misguided or irrelevant. By fully acknowledging this situation, the
naturalistic axiom provides a better fit.
The last set of axioms is concerned with the relation between the
researcher and the field of inquiry (Table 3.1). The rationalistic para-
digm holds that the two should be as independent as possible. The
researcher, who is likely to be biased and subjective, is regarded as a
possible source of error that needs to be guarded against. Hence, they
are removed from the research design as best as possible. In contrast,
the naturalistic paradigm regards the researcher and the field of in-
quiry as interdependent. Non-participant observation is impossible.
There will always be mutual interaction, feedback and influence.
As mental entities, conceptions are latent constructs that cannot
be observed directly, but whose investigation requires some form
operationalization (Borsboom et al. 2003). In other words, they may
only be observed indirectly through some form of interaction with
the corresponding individuals. Certainly, researchers may do so in a
very structured and depersonalized manner, e.g. a questionnaire, in
an attempt to remove themselves from the interaction as best they can.
As a consequence, however, they are less able to react to unforeseen
responses that may warrant a change in focus. Lincoln and Guba (1985:
192-5) argue that, when choosing a method of inquiry, there ultimately
exists a trade-off between precision and adaptability. The “human
instrument,” in the form of an observer or interviewer, will certainly
miss things or make mistakes, but is yet unchallenged in terms of
adaptability. If we see something unexpected, we pay closer attention.
If an answer is not comprehensive, we may rephrase the question.
Given the potential diversity and inconsistency of student conceptions
(Sec. 2.2), I would argue that such adaptability is indispensable for
this inquiry. By acknowledging the researcher as an intrinsic factor in
the research process, the naturalistic axiom better accommodates this
requirement.
In summary, I argue that if student conceptions and their relevance
in educational settings are the central objects of inquiry, then the nat-
uralistic paradigm provides a better fit than the rationalistic one. Its
assumptions are more appropriate when dealing with diverse, subjec-
tive, holistic and context-sensitive conceptual structures that cannot
be observed directly, but need to be interpreted through yet another
interactive process of reconstruction – this time by the researcher.
3.1.2 Quality Criteria
Just like any other inquiry, naturalistic inquiries need to be trustwor-
thy. The researcher has to “persuade his or her audiences (including
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self) that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to”
(Lincoln and Guba 1985: 290). Rationalistic inquiries usually do so
by adhering to the quality criteria of validity, objectivity and reliabil-
ity. If an inquiry is shown to sufficiently fulfill those, its results are
deemed trustworthy. However, these criteria are incompatible with
the naturalistic axioms outlined in Table 3.1. How should internal
validity be defined if there is no singular reality against which it
can be ascertained? How can ideographic working hypotheses ever
be expected to generalize (external validity) beyond their particular
context from which they are inseparable? What hope is there for
objectivity and reliability in an inquiry that takes the researcher, with
all their flaws, virtues and values, as an integral part of the process
and even appreciates their ability to flexibly adapt procedures along
the way? As naturalistic alternatives, Guba (1981) proposes credibility,
transferability, dependability and confirmability.
Credibility is the naturalistic counterpart to internal validity. Both
are concerned with truth-value: are the reported findings “real”? In
the context of multiple subjective realities, the researcher thus has to
demonstrate that their findings are adequate representations of reality
as experienced by the respondents. Since those experiences are inherently
inaccessible to any third party, the best one can hope to achieve is
that the reported claims are found to be credible. Measures that may
be taken to increase the credibility of an inquiry are summarized in
Table 3.2.
Transferability is the naturalistic counterpart to external validity.
Both are concerned with applicability: are the reported findings rele-
vant anywhere except their original context? Since the kind of ideo-
graphic knowledge produced by naturalistic inquiries is inseparable
from its context, its applicability to any other context ultimately re-
quires a judgment call based “upon the degree of similarity between
sending and receiving [...] contexts” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 316).
Recall the above discussion about situated professional judgment.
Since the receiving context is unknown at the time of the inquiry,
an a priori measure of this similarity is impossible. Hence, this task
ultimately falls to whoever might later be interested in making the
transfer. However, it is the researcher’s responsibility to provide rich
and comprehensive descriptions of the inquiry’s context in order to
facilitate such comparison and judgment. Related techniques are
summarized in Table 3.2.
Dependability is the naturalistic counterpart to reliability. Both are
concerned with consistency: are the reported findings the result of a
consistent methodology? In the context of multiple realities and adap-
tive procedures, however, consistency does not mean invariance, but
“trackable variance [...]: so much for error, so much for reality shifts,
so much for increased instrumental proficiency (better insights), and
so on” (Guba 1981: 81). Just as validity implies reliability, credibility
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Credibility
Prolonged engagement and persistent observation at a site to allow respon-
dents to adjust to the researcher’s presence and increase opportunities for
extended, authentic interaction.
Peer debriefing, by which intermediate findings are exposed to the critique
of other professionals, e.g., colleagues, who are not directly involved in the
inquiry.
Triangulation, e.g., of different data sources or methods, in order to cross-
check findings from different perspectives.
Member checks, by which intermediate and/or final results are presented
back to and evaluated by the original respondents who, after all, have the
most direct access to their own realities.
Negative case analyses, by which data that is found to be inconsistent with
current interpretations is subjected to in-depth review, either to find ways
to integrate it or to find justification for its disregard.
Transferability
Purposive sampling in order to deliberately (as opposed to randomly) choose
respondents that are expected to provide comprehensive or even contradic-
tory responses in order to maximize the possible range of realities that may
be uncovered, or to follow up on emergent discoveries.
Thick description of the study context, preferably in the form of case reports,
to allow recipients to judge the extent to which the context is similar to
their own and thus might warrant a transfer of findings.
Dependability
Triangulation (see credibility), assuming that if different approaches point
in the same direction, the case for consistency is also strengthened.
Stepwise replication by which two research teams conduct the inquiry in
parallel, but are still in constant exchange about their developing insights
and possible next steps.
Dependability audit in which another professional reviews the process of the
inquiry, documented in an audit trail, and evaluates the extent to which
the methodological steps taken are reasonable, rational and in accordance
with good professional practice.
Confirmability
Triangulation (see credibility), assuming that if different approaches point
in the same direction, this direction is harder to misrepresent or distort in a
way that does not arouse suspicion.
Practicing reflexivity by reporting findings in such a way that makes trans-
parent the researcher’s influence on the inquiry, including their values,
assumptions and mistakes.
Confirmability audit in which another professional reviews the results of
the inquiry, supplemented by an audit trail, and checks whether they are
reasonable, traceable and substantiated by data.
Table 3.2: Techniques to increase trustworthiness in naturalistic inquiries (cf.
Guba 1981; Lincoln and Guba 1982, 1985: 289-331)
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implies dependability. Hence, if the former is demonstrated, it ought
not be necessary to demonstrate the latter (Lincoln and Guba 1985:
317). Nevertheless, there do exist additional techniques specifically
designed to increase dependability (Table 3.2).
Confirmability is the naturalistic counterpart to objectivity. Both are
concerned with neutrality: do the reported findings indeed result from
the phenomena under investigation rather than any biases or covert
motivations of the investigator? As argued above, the investigator
is acknowledged as an inseparable part of any naturalistic inquiry.
However, this does by no means imply that they are at liberty to do
whatever they please. Unjustified courses of action, misrepresented
data or deliberately distorted interpretations are the downfall of any
inquiry. Hence, the justifiability, rationality and plausibility of the
reported findings need to be made transparent to a third party in order
to discourage or, at the very least, reveal any unsubstantiated claims.
Related techniques are summarized in Table 3.2. Like dependability,
confirmability is also implied by credibility. In other words, for any
claim to be accepted as credible, it should be substantiated by data in
a comprehensive and confirmable way.
3.2 grounded theory
As a paradigm, naturalistic inquiry is, in principle, agnostic about
specific research methods as long as they adhere to the assumptions
and criteria laid out in the previous section. Nevertheless, Lincoln
and Guba (1985) argue that, while naturalistic inquiry is not opposed
to quantitative methods, qualitative ones often present themselves
because they are “extensions of normal human activities: looking,
listening, speaking, reading” and are thus more naturally accessible to
the “human-as-instrument” (198-9). They specifically discuss groun-
ded theory and the constant comparative method as highly suitable to
naturalistic inquiries (204-8).
The term “grounded theory” was coined by sociologists Glaser and
Strauss (1967) to describe their approach to systematically and induc-
tively generate theory from empirical data. With it, they challenged
some of the positivist practices at the time, which focused almost ex-
clusively on the continuous testing and verification of existing “grand
theories” rather than the generation of novel theoretical insights (10-
15). Given that Lincoln and Guba (1985) also derive their propositions
from a central critique of positivism (14-28), it is easy to see why they
may be in favor of the approach.
Having been developed in the social sciences, grounded theory
methods (GTM) are specifically tailored to explore and explain social
processes (Glaser 1978: 93ff). According to Glaser (1978: 57), the object
of inquiry itself may be shaped empirically in a grounded theory
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study by initially asking: “What is this data a study of?” Subsequent
questions may then take more focused form, asking about specific
processes, problems and actions that participants are faced with and
engaged in.
Since its initial proposition, Glaser and Strauss’ approach has been
taken up by numerous other researchers. In particular, Charmaz
(2014), a major contributor to its further development, has proposed
an explicitly constructivist account of GTM, demarcating it from the
versions of both Glaser and Strauss, and Corbin (12-14). Charmaz and
Bryant (2016) summarize the differences as follows:
[C]onstructivists assume that conducting and writing re-
search flows from views and values and thus demand con-
tinual reflexive examination. In contrast to earlier versions of
grounded theory, constructivist grounded theorists also ac-
cept the notion of multiple realities, reject assumptions that
prior knowledge impedes constructing new theories, and
aim to understand difference and variation in the research
site(s) and/or among the research participants. (my emph.,
Charmaz and Bryant 2016: 350)
The consistency with the naturalistic axioms (Table 3.1) is strikingly
obvious. Hence, I will refer to Charmaz (2014) as my primary source
on GTM, which is not to say, of course, that other accounts should
be cast aside. Indeed, its core components are very similar across
different versions.
In general, GTM intertwine data gathering and analysis procedures,
such that subsequent data is gathered on the basis of emergent analyt-
ical insights. The concept is called “theoretical sampling” because it
is based on emergent theoretical concepts. Of course, a study cannot
start with theoretical sampling because, initially, there are no analyti-
cal concepts on which to base it (Charmaz 2014: 197-8). Reasonable
assumptions about the field of inquiry have to be made instead. More-
over, “sampling” in this case refers to data rather than people. The
primary question is not who to sample, but what. Naturally, this often
requires interacting with additional people, but it may also include
gathering different types of data, or changing the focus of the proce-
dure, e.g., by revising an interview guideline (Charmaz 2014: 199-200).
As such, theoretical sampling can be understood as a form of purposive
sampling (Table 3.2), where the purpose is theoretical saturation of the
emergent categories.
Theoretical saturation, in essence, denotes the termination condition
for a grounded theory study. It occurs when no new theoretical
properties, insights or relations are likely to be uncovered through
further inquiry (Glaser 1978: 53). Charmaz (2014) clearly demarcates
it from other forms of saturation in qualitative research, which usually
amount to repeated observation of similar patterns: “You are likely
to hear similar stories, if you engage in a repetitive process of data-
50 paradigm and methods
gathering” (213). Hence, theoretical saturation depends on theoretical
sampling and, again, stresses the importance of sampling different
data rather than merely different people via the same procedure. All
that being said, theoretical saturation remains a notoriously difficult
concept. There are no clear-cut criteria to identify it. Demonstrating it
ultimately requires “a considered judgment” (Charmaz 2014: 214).
The actual grounded theory data analysis consists of three core com-
ponents: coding, constant comparison and memo writing. For coding,
in turn, Charmaz (2014: 109-61) distinguishes two main phases: initial
and focused. Initial coding aims to stick as closely to the data as pos-
sible. Charmaz (2014) describes it as “[t]heoretical playfulness [that]
allows us to try out ideas and to see where they may lead” (137). It is
also called open coding (Glaser 1978: 56-61) because it stays open to
various analytical possibilities. It is inductive and generative in a raw
sense. Subsequently, coding becomes more focused as certain initial
codes are identified as significant, or merged into more abstract con-
cepts. Focused coding requires assessing and comparing (see below)
initial codes and deciding which best fit the data, provide analytic
precision and theoretical strength (Charmaz 2014: 138). Whereas ini-
tial coding is generative and divergent, focused coding converges on
increasingly abstract and theoretical concepts. The process is often
cyclic, however. Each decision made while moving from initial to more
focused coding is always treated as tentative and subject to further
analysis and comparison.
Comparison permeates grounded theory analysis. Glaser and
Strauss (1967) originally describe the constant comparative method
in complete conjunction with coding procedures (101ff). Data should
be constantly compared to other data and the codes assigned to it;
and codes should be compared to each other (Glaser 1978: 49-50).
Comparisons are used “at each level of analytic work” in order to
explore and “test your ideas” (Charmaz 2014: 132). It suggests itself to
combine it with techniques like triangulation and negative case analyses
(Table 3.2) in order to compare different data types and sources, or to
perform more in-depth analyses whenever a comparison reveals an
internal inconsistency in the emergent theory, or between theory and
data.
The third component in grounded theory analysis is memo writing.
Memos are informal notes written throughout the analysis process.
A memo can be about anything: a code, a chunk of data, an open
question, a sudden idea or insight – or a comparison between any of
those. Glaser (1978) describes memos as the “core stage [...], the bedrock
of theory generation, its true product” (orig. emph.: 83). They are the
central means by which ideas are explored, connected, documented
and made accessible for further comparison. During the analytical
process, memo writing may develop from jotting down mere snippets
and hunches, to fleshing out more grounded insights, to compiling
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fully integrated analytical accounts that eventually “will form the core
of your grounded theory” (Charmaz 2014: 191). Memos are where the
actual analysis takes place.
For the evaluation of grounded theories, Charmaz (2014) outlines
four criteria: credibility, resonance, originality and usefulness (337-
8). For the first two, she respectively asks, for instance, whether
the research has “achieved intimate familiarity with the setting” and
portrays “the fullness of the studied experience” (337). They are similar
to Glaser (1978)’s original criteria of fit and grab, and, taken together,
essentially capture the same notions as Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s
criterion of credibility. For originally, Charmaz (2014) asks whether
the results provide fresh, new and significant insights that “challenge,
extend, or refine current ideas, concepts, and practices” (337). It is a
prerequisite for her final criterion of usefulness. As a constructivist,
Charmaz (2014) takes a decisively pragmatic stance on the evaluation
of research, asking whether it can “offer interpretations that people
can use in their everyday worlds” or “spark further research” (338).
It builds on Glaser (1978)’s original criterion of work and essentially
regards grounded theories as tools to be judged by their pragmatic
relevance rather than their truth value.
The same holds for the analytic process itself. For the constant
comparative method, Glaser and Strauss (1967) note that it
is not designed [. . . ] to guarantee that two analysts work-
ing independently with the same data will achieve the
same results; it is designed to allow, with discipline, for
some of the vagueness and flexibility that aid the creative
generation of theory (103).
Charmaz and Bryant (2016) assert that “codes give you a way of
looking at your data,” while memos “record what you see – and help
raise questions about what you don’t see” (355). Codes, comparisons
and memos are either productive steps in the pursuit of credible and
useful theory, or they are not and thus will be revised or discarded. As
such, “the usefulness of our methods [will be judged] by the quality of
our final product” (Charmaz 2014: 337). In a grounded theory study,
the two are often inseparable.
In conclusion, GTM provide a set of principles and techniques to
inductively construct an explanatory framework from empirical data.
Its basic tenets, particularly in their constructivist version, are highly
compatible with naturalistic inquiry. Moreover, the method’s original
focus on process explanation fits my research questions, which are
concerned with students’ reasoning and learning processes (Sect. 2.3).
Therefore, GTM will serve as my central analytical tool set throughout
the studies presented in Chapters 4-6.
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3.3 learning study
Research questions q5 and q6 are concerned with goal-oriented learn-
ing processes. What do students need to learn, and under what
conditions can such learning take place in the classroom? Both ques-
tions are informed by the theory of variation and its notion of critical
aspects (Sect. 2.1). Learning study is a form of action research that
builds on those same theoretical notions (Lo 2012; Marton et al. 2019).
It combines elements of the Japanese lesson study and design-based
research in order to investigate learning processes in real classrooms.
For a lesson study, a group of in-service teachers jointly plan a
lesson on a shared objective, which is then taught by one of them in
their regular class, while the others observe. Afterwards, the lesson
is discussed, analyzed and, if desired, revised and taught again by
the next teacher in their respective class. The procedure originated in
Japan as a form of in-service teacher training. It specifically aims to
make tacit professional knowledge and student learning visible and
thus accessible to others (Murata 2011). Dudley (2014) particularly
advocates the selection of three “case pupils,” which should serve
as a focus during the lesson and be interviewed afterwards. The
cases should “typify different groups of learner,” for instance, with
respect to achievement, motivation or preferred learning style (8). The
approach is thus fully compatible with purposive sampling and the
naturalistic predilection to report case studies (Table 3.2). Moreover,
Dudley (2014) notes that it helps to zoom in on aspects that “would
otherwise have been filtered out” in the complexity of the situation
(4).
Educational design research is a form of interventionist research that
specifically aims to link educational theory and practice (McKenney
and Reeves 2012). Taking existing theory as its starting point, solu-
tions are designed, implemented, analyzed and revised in multiple
iterations. In addition to refining the practical solution itself, the anal-
ysis should also produce theoretical knowledge about the phenomena
under study. The focus often lies on one of the two, which McKenney
and Reeves (2012) respectively describe as research on and research
through interventions.
In educational research conducted through interventions,
the inquiry is focused on understanding the responses the
intervention engenders. [. . . ] Here, the intervention may
be viewed more as a means through which deeper insight
can be gained into certain phenomena related to teaching
and learning in authentic settings. (orig. emph.: 23)
It emphasizes the generation of theoretical understanding, design
ideas and principles, which then may be incorporated into subsequent
cycles. In contrast, research on interventions puts the emphasis on
“testing how (well) design ideas have been embodied or enacted” (24).
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Hence, various stages or iterations of the design research cycle may
alternate their focus in order to link theory and practice.
As a combination of lesson study and design research (Marton 2015:
258-65), learning study adopts the cooperative planning by in-service
teachers who are concerned with the same object of learning. The
teachers then take turns teaching their regular classes while the others
observe. In accordance with the design research cycle, the process is
accompanied by a researcher, and the lessons are analyzed between
iterations to revise the design and better understand student learning.
As already mentioned, it also builds on variation theory’s notion of
“critical aspects” which constitute “what is to be learned” about a
certain “object of learning” (Marton et al. 2019).
Obviously, implementing such a cooperative and iterative procedure
puts a heavy strain on resources, particularly the teachers’ time and
commitment. Marton (2015) very well concedes that, in the context of
everyday school practice, it may often not be possible to meet all these
requirements. At the very least, however, a learning study should
have a theoretical ground, the teacher doing the teaching
was involved in planning it, the students’ understanding
of the object of learning was explored somehow at the
beginning and the end of the pedagogical encounter (274).
He describes such approaches as “learning study in a wider sense”
(274). Of course, these should not be understood as a benchmark, but
as minimum requirements. Nevertheless, they aptly illustrate learning
study’s preference to rather sacrifice methodological strictness than
to lose its ability to operate under realistic conditions. In fealty to
its design-research roots, it strives “to explore, rather than mute, the
complex realities of teaching and learning contexts” (McKenney and
Reeves 2012: 15).
In terms of data gathering, the authentic classroom setting and the
selection of case students lend themselves to observation and inter-
viewing. Moreover, Marton (2015) suggests that lessons be recorded
for later inspection (261), and that students take pre-post tests in the
form of open-ended questions in order to investigate their initial and
subsequent understanding of the object of learning (261-4). All these
methods would seem to generate qualitative data.
In terms of data analysis, however, lesson study, design research
and learning study all seem equally agnostic about specific procedures
(Dudley 2014; Marton 2015; McKenney and Reeves 2012; Murata 2011).
This is easily explained by their intentional flexibility in order to
accommodate various research interests. To the extent that the research
is conducted through interventions, the use of GTM suggests itself to
construct corresponding theoretical insights. According to Charmaz
(2014), GTM can certainly be adapted to other forms of qualitative
study (14-17). In light of this and also due to their extraordinary
compatibility with naturalistic inquiry, I will aim to adopt GTM for
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data analysis in the context of the learning study to the extent that is
possible and useful. Specific procedures will be discussed in Chap. 6.
4 DOMA INS OF TECHNOLOGY
The aim of this chapter is to investigate research questions q1 and q2
about how students differentiate the realm of technical artifacts. Their
primary motivation stems from variation theory as well as related
findings suggesting that classroom examples should exhibit system-
atic variation in the eyes of the students (Sect. 2.1). As a secondary
motivation, the results may indicate whether and to what extent com-
puting technology already constitutes a salient subordinate kind of
technology for students (Sect. 2.2.2).
4.1 participants
The study was conducted in Berlin, Germany. In the Berlin school
system, primary levels usually do not include dedicated informatics
classes. Participation in extracurricular activities, if they are offered,
is voluntary. Students usually enter secondary schools with the be-
ginning of grade 7 (usually around age 12). In grade 7, many schools
offer a compulsory basic ICT course (one 45-minute lesson a week), in
which students learn to use common applications like email, office
software or markup languages like HTML. In grades 9 and 10, students
may choose to take a compulsory elective informatics course (2 lessons
a week), which then covers core computing topics like programming,
databases, networking or the history of computing. Students may
graduate after grade 10 to start an apprenticeship or go on to complete
their A-levels (Abitur) in order to be eligible for academic studies.
In the latter case, they may then elect the subject as one of their
basic or advanced courses (3 or 5 lessons a week, respectively). Here,
the aforementioned topics are generally expanded. Different pro-
gramming paradigms, software engineering techniques or aspects of
theoretical computer science are included. While advanced courses,
in particular, also aim to prepare students for a possible career in the
field, informatics classes at Berlin schools generally perceive them-
selves as part of a general education that aims to prepare students for
an informed and responsible participation in (an increasingly digital)
society (Sect. 1.2). Social contexts and implications of computing tech-
nology are therefore integral parts of the official core curricula at all
levels. A more detailed summary of the core curricula can be found
in Appendix A.
Sampling occurred in Spring 2016. The procedure was purposive
(Table 3.2) with the aim to increase the sample’s heterogeneity and
55
56 domains of technology
Table 4.1: Participants of the first in-
terview study
grade 5 7 9 11/12
P
male 2 2 5 1 10
female 2 2 3 4 11P
4 4 8 5 21
thus “the likelihood that the full array of multiple realities will be
uncovered” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 40). Prior research suggests that
age, gender, and curriculum choices are likely predictors for students’
ideas about (Jarvis and Rennie 1998) and attitudes towards (Ardies
et al. 2015; Sadler et al. 2012) technology. In the absence of a pre-
test, curriculum choices may also be a reasonable predictor for prior
knowledge in the area. Therefore, the aim was to sample a broad
range with respect to these three factors.
Twenty-one voluntary students from 5th to 12th grade (aged 9 to 17)
from five different grammar schools participated. Table 4.1 provides
an overview according to grade and gender. Five participants were
enrolled in compulsory elective or advanced informatics classes and
another three took part in voluntary after-school clubs related to
programming or robotics.
4.2 materials and procedure
Data were gathered through individual interviews. Charmaz (2014: 55-
108) specifically discusses interviewing as a method suitable to gather
rich data in grounded theory studies. They allow for both “flexibility
and control” (58) during the interaction with the participants. In
Lincoln and Guba (1985)’s terms, interviews can make good use of
the adaptability provided by the “human-as-instrument.”
Inspired by research on conceptual categorization in technology edu-
cation (Firat 2017; Impedovo et al. 2015), the interviews used a set of 33
unlabeled picture cards showing various technical artifacts in order to
facilitate categorization and similarity judgments, and to elicit related
reasoning. Based on the findings presented in Sect. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2,
the artifacts were primarily chosen on the basis of two criteria. First,
“simple” artifacts like furniture or clothing were excluded. Given that
such objects are often not recognized as technical at all by students,
it seemed unlikely that they would be suitable to prompt thinking
about even more specific subordinate kinds of technology. Second, the
artifacts should exhibit various relations towards computing. Three
types of artifact were distinguished here: (a) those, whose functions
critically rely on computing; (b) those that are merely augmented or
controlled via computing and (c) those that do not involve computing.
However, “basic-level” computers like desktop or laptop devices were
excluded. Eleven items were chosen for each type. Moreover, two
supplementary criteria were considered in the selection of the artifact
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(a) smartphone, pocket calculator, Playstation 4, Nintendo DS,
wireless router, mechanical calculator, Curiosity Mars rover,
industrial robotic arm, 3D printer, Zuse 1, Raspberry Pi
(b) traffic light, digital watch, electric toothbrush, ticket vending
machine, digital radio, digital camera, plasma TV, washing
machine, Tesla car, defibrillator, smart meter
(c) toaster, microscope, electric drill, fire extinguisher, lawn
mower, hair dryer, Swiss knife, old alarm clock, Geiger
counter, diesel generator, plasma lamp
Table 4.2: Artifact set used in the interviews. For the actual pictures, see
Appendix B.1.
pictures. In the end, the set should exhibit a notable visual variety
to deemphasize purely perceptual similarities. Finally, the set should
include items that students would probably know and recognize as
well as some that are likely unfamiliar to them.
Table 4.2 lists the selected artifacts and their classification according
to the three types outlined above. The actual pictures are reproduced
in Appendix B.1. Any such selection and classification can certainly
be debated. However, the study’s aim is not to test students’ abilities
to correctly recognize predefined criteria, but to inquire into their
individual conceptions. Hence, similar to purposive sampling, the
pictures mainly serve to elicit a broad range of thinking and reasoning
by providing a large variety of different stimuli. They do not serve as
normative testing criteria.
Accordingly, students were explicitly assured prior to the interview
that it was not a test of ability but instead wanted to find out about
their own ideas about technology. The interviews were conducted in
an unoccupied room at the participant’s school and outside their regu-
lar class hours. All interviews were conducted by myself. Participants
were not informed prior to the interview that it was conducted in the
area of informatics education.
At the beginning of an interview, the picture cards were laid out at
random on a table and the participant was given a moment to look
at all the items. Then they were asked to point out any that they did
not know or recognize. Subsequently, they were given the following
task: “I would like for you to try and sort these items into groups,
such that things that go together or have something in common are
together in a group. You may create as many different groups as you
like.”1 Students were prompted to explain their sorting (“Could you
please talk about what you are doing? What are you putting together
and why?”) and were occasionally asked to explain certain words
or ideas in more detail. Care was taken, however, to not introduce
any new words or concepts into the interview, or to give students the
1 All interview quotes were translated from German.
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time pieces and
everyday computers
public
things
belong together,
but I don't know why
household
appliances
things that can
save lives media
science
very practical
things
Figure 4.1: Groupings produced by an 11th-grade male student who partici-
pated in an advanced informatics course, together with assigned
category labels.
impression that their groupings were in any way wrong. After they
indicated that their sorting was complete, they were again asked to go
through their groups, to say what was now in them and why, and to
give each group a name.
In eleven cases, students were then also given a second task: “Would
it make sense to combine some of these groups into larger, superordi-
nate groups? If so, which ones?” Whether or not students were given
this second task depended primarily on how much time was still left
for the interview, as the time students took for the first task varied
considerably. Subsequently, the interview entered a second phase,
which will be reported in Chap. 5.
Two kinds of data were gathered during each interview: verbal and
visual. The aim was to allow for triangulation of these different kinds
both within as well as across participants. Only the very first interview
was audio-recorded and the student’s final groupings documented
via photographs. It immediately became clear, however, that this
method was inadequate, as non-verbal actions often contained critical
information. All subsequent interviews were therefore filmed. All
recordings were transcribed verbatim, including non-verbal actions
such as pointing to or moving an item. Groupings were extracted
as screenshots for easier reference and coding. Figure 4.1 shows an
example screenshot of the groupings produced by an 11th-grade male
student. All data were imported into maxqda 2018. For a detailed
documentation of the research data, see Appendix D.
4.3 analysis and interpretation
From here on, I will distinguish between groupings and categories.
Groupings are what students produced during the interviews. They
consist of the concrete artifact pictures present in the interview situa-
tion. Groupings are data. Categories instead are analytical abstractions
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meant to capture the conceptual similarities among items of a group-
ing as perceived by the students. Consequently, a category may be
represented by several groupings produced by different students and
those groupings may exhibit certain variations. For instance, a few
students included the plasma lamp among the “things that entertain
you,” whereas others who also produced this category did not.
In accordance with GTM, data analysis proceeded through several
iterations of initial and focused coding, accompanied by constant
comparison and memo writing. The analysis was carried out by
myself only. As counter measures, the memos were also used to
critically reflect on analytical decisions. Furthermore, peer debriefing
was implemented via close discussions with my supervisor/co-author
as well as occasional presentations of intermediate findings to other
colleagues of the work group, who were not involved in the study.
The dominant forms of coding used were Descriptive Coding, In
Vivo Coding, Concept Coding and Versus Coding, as outlined by Sal-
daña (2016). During initial coding, I primarily utilized Descriptive and
In Vivo codes in order to capture the broad range of terms and ideas
that the participants used to talk about their groupings. It quickly
became apparent that they would also often compare and juxtapose
various groups and artifacts in order to communicate their ideas. Ver-
sus Coding was used to capture these comparisons. As coding became
more focused, I then aimed to consolidate and structure the previ-
ously generated codes. This was primarily done by merging similar
codes or sorting them into a hierarchy. Many of the In Vivo codes
were subsumed under more conceptual terms during this process
(Concept Codes). Furthermore, I started distinguishing between codes
pertaining to category labels and those capturing associated concepts.
Category labels were usually noun phrases. Figure 4.1 includes the
category labels assigned to the shown groupings. Determining an
appropriate category label for a student’s grouping was, for the most
part, rather straightforward, as many students would themselves give
comprehensive names to their groupings at the end of the task (see
above). In some cases, however, usually involving younger students, it
was quite difficult. It was in those cases that triangulation between the
different kinds of data, both within and between participants, proved
indispensable. One 5th-grade girl, for instance, produced a grouping
containing, among others, the robotic arm, 3D printer, Raspberry Pi
and Geiger counter, which she described as having “something to do
with an engine” or a “car shop.” However, it seemed odd that neither
the lawn mower nor the car itself were part of this grouping. By
comparing it to similar ones produced by other students, I eventually
decided to code it as “industry” and to interpret the “car shop” as
a workshop or factory. Another case was a 5th-grade boy, whose
grouping containing “things where you can see something or hear
something” was eventually coded as “media.”
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#/21 categories #/11 superordinates
17 household appliances 3 “at home”
12 tools 2 technology
10 science 2 everyday technology
9 media 2 “very practical things”
9 traffic 1 public things
7 “things that can save lives” 1 outdoor things
7 “things that entertain you” 1 traffic
6 puplic things 1 luxury goods
6 industry 1 media
5 time pieces 1 household
5 “you can calculate with it” 1 “real technology”
5 things that look alike 1 industry
4 gaming consoles 1 science
4 gardening tools
4 “real technology”
4 measuring instruments
3 medicine
Table 4.3: Most frequently produced categories and superordinates. Num-
bers indicate how many students produced a grouping of the
respective category. Quotation marks indicate In Vivo codes.
In contrast to category labels, associated concepts capture ideas,
values or judgments that students associated with certain artifacts
or categories. They were often rendered as adjectives, for instance,
“expensive,” “cool,” “digital” or “important.” Many of these associated
concepts started out as In Vivo codes but were eventually subsumed
under more conceptual terms, for instance, “luxury.”
The eventual aim of the analysis was to identify more abstract
relations between the produced categories and to further sort them into
a hierarchy that would eventually represent a taxonomy of artifacts
based on the similarities and differences perceived by the students. In
this context, the above-mentioned Versus Codes were recognized as
powerful analytical elements. Four such codes were eventually chosen
as the central analytical codes forming the backbone of the grounded
theory presented in the following section.
4.4 results
First of all, it is worthy of note that all participants were capable of
fulfilling the given tasks and generally seemed to perceive them as
meaningful. During the first task, students produced on average 7.8 [4,
14] groupings, resulting in a total of 163, which were eventually coded
into 47 different categories. Every student who received the second
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task also produced at least one superordinate grouping. Table 4.3
provides an overview of the most frequent categories (at least three
cases), and all superordinates.
Figure 4.2 shows the taxonomy model that resulted from the analy-
sis. It divides technical artifacts into five broad categories, which are
established by four hierarchically ordered Versus Codes: (1) technol-
ogy versus non-technology, (2) everyday versus specialized, (3) private
versus public, and (4) luxury versus necessity. These juxtapositions
represent the core of the theory.
4.4.1 Technology vs. Non-Technology
Most participants readily recognized all presented artifacts as technical.
Considering that they were purposely chosen to be of a more complex
nature, this was to be expected. Nevertheless, some students would
still deny that some of the artifacts are technical and thus distinguished
between technology and non-technology. The most salient features
in this respect were electricity and the perceived age of an artifact, as
this 9th-grade student very aptly summarizes:
A technical device. What does that need? Well, it definitely
has to, yeah, run on electricity, I think. And what else? [...]
Yeah, also new things, which haven’t been around for a
hundred years or so. Yeah. That is technical, I would say.
Related categories are “mechanical things” or “vintage things,” and the
items that some students would deny a technical nature included the
alarm clock, the mechanical calculator, the Swiss knife, the microscope
and the fire extinguisher. Those do not use electricity. They do not
have “anything behind them.” They cannot be switched on and do
anything “by themselves.” They do not have any agency. They are
passive objects that are just there and need to be operated “by hand.”
Usually, if a participant described an artifact as old or “vintage” they
tended to regard it as less technical. However, the notion could also
entail a different conclusion when taken as evidence for development
and change. Under this view, artifact age can become the very symbol
of technological change. For instance, one student took the very fact
that cash registers (the mechanical calculator) look very different today
as evidence for technological development and thus included it in
her superordinate “real technology” grouping (see below), which
otherwise mostly contained highly advanced artifacts. Perceived
artifact age remains a salient features in this context, but it seems to
be interpreted quite differently.
Moreover, the concepts of technology and technical artifact are not
necessarily binary. Several students would qualify their judgments
with phrases like “really,” “less” or “hardly.” One student commented
on her superordinate “technology” category as follows: “Theoretically,
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Figure 4.2: Taxonomy model for students’ differentiations of technical artifacts.
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technology is in everything here. But some groups are less related than
others.” Technology in this sense is not a dichotomy, but a continuum.
Artifacts can be more or less technical and only once they cross a
certain threshold of perceived technology-ness, their technical nature
becomes worthy of note. The most salient factors influencing this
appeared to be the absence/presence of electricity and the perceived
age of the artifact.
4.4.2 Everyday vs. Specialized
The most general distinction within the realm of technical artifacts
that students made was between common everyday technology and
complex specialized or “real” technology. The former encompasses
artifacts that one knows and encounters every day, be that at home
or in public. The latter instead includes unknown or special-purpose
artifacts that only certain experts would know or use.
“Real technology” is an In Vivo code, produced by 9th-grade girl,
that I found accurately captures the connotations of that category.
It is not the consumer technology that you can buy in stores. It is
the cutting-edge technology used in industrial processes or scientific
research. It is complex and its use requires knowledge and expertise.
Science, medicine and the industry are the domains of “real technol-
ogy” and its most prominent representatives were the microscope,
Mars rover, robotic arm, Raspberry Pi and Zuse 1.
Most students, however, would not use the adjective “real” and
instead refer to this category simply as “technology” or “science and
technology.” Hence, in this context, the term technology apparently
had a different meaning from the one described in the previous section.
Here, it seemed to refer to an area of expertise rather than merely a
collection of artifacts. Technology in this sense is something that
certain people know about. Accordingly, statements like “I don’t know
much about technology” or “I am interested in technology” never
seemed to refer to everyday artifacts like a television or a toaster.
Everybody knows about those things and everybody uses them. “Real”
technology, however, is the domain of experts.
Since this category is in large parts defined as not being part of
everyday life, it often contained many of the items that students did
not know or recognize at the beginning of the interview, or would
occasionally misidentify. Therefore, in their categorization they of-
ten referred to visual features like “looks cool” or “looks complex.”
Sometimes, a student would even add an artifact to this category
precisely because they did not know what it was. However, the artifacts
were not categorized as “looking complex” or “unknown.” They were
categorized as, for instance, science or industry. Hence, categorization
seemed to involve a fundamental awareness of the functional nature
of artifacts, namely that they have a function and purpose: I may not
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know this artifact or its function, but it has to have one and there have
to be people who know about it. Those people are probably experts
like scientists, engineers or mechanics. Hence, in such cases, func-
tion apparently overruled physical appearance even though it was
unknown.
Finally, some students seemed to closely associate school with sci-
ence. The two categories never coexisted side by side and the former
was often redefined into the latter when, for instance, the Mars rover
was added:
Well, now, if you add this [the rover to the pocket calculator
and microscope], then it is more like research. And nature,
well, science. Natural science. Math. So, subjects that are
not really my thing (laughs).
Conversely, no student expressed a relation between school artifacts
and everyday technology. Such thinking would render school as a
place that is rather dissociated from everyday technology. This would
also be in line with the above-mentioned conception of technology
as an area of expertise. After all, school is a place where one may
(hopefully) acquire such expertise.
4.4.3 Private vs. Public
On the next level of differentiation, everyday technology is divided
into private and public. The former is comprised of artifacts one has
“at home” whereas the latter includes those found “on the streets” or
in public buildings. The most common categories related to the public
were “traffic,” which usually included the car, the ticket vending
machine and the traffic light, and “things that can save lives,” which
usually included the fire extinguisher and defibrillator, and sometimes
the traffic light or Swiss knife.
The distinction between public and private is closely related to the
distinction between indoor and outdoor, and the two were sometimes
hard to tell apart. Technically, the indoor/outdoor dimension resides
on a more superficial surface level. Indoor artifacts are the ones
you find inside buildings, particularly “at home.” Outdoor artifacts
are the ones you encounter outside, particularly “on the streets.” In
contrast the distinction between public and private is more conceptual
and focuses more on the notion of ownership. Public artifacts are
owned by or at least available to the general public. For instance, most
students associated “gardening tools,” like the lawn mower, with other
domestic indoor tools, like the drill, and some students even excluded
the car from the traffic category, precisely because it is private property.
Likewise, the defibrillator or fire extinguisher, although usually found
indoors, were often deemed important for public health or safety.
Hence, public artifacts seemed to carry a certain connotation of
importance or relevance. They are items that “everyone uses everyday”
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and may even “save lives.” In contrast, private artifacts may be very
valuable or useful, but only for certain individuals: “If somebody
does not have a garden, they also do not have this [points at lawn
mower].” In cases where the car was not grouped with other traffic
artifacts, it was usually counted among the “things that entertain you”
because “nobody needs such an expensive car.” Private artifacts may
be valuable or useful, but public artifacts are important and relevant
for everyone.
4.4.4 Luxury vs. Necessity
On the final level, private artifacts are distinguished with respect to
luxury and necessity. Categories associated with luxury included gam-
ing consoles, media or “things that entertain you.” Those associated
with necessity included household appliances and tools. The notion
of luxury seemed especially apparent for girls, who would often ex-
plicitly describe related artifacts, like the television, smartphone or car,
as expensive and non-essential. Boys generally produced the same
categories, but seemed to differ in their associations. They instead
used phrases like “for fun” or “to pass the time.” Their descriptions
of these categories seemed more matter-of-factly: those ones, you like
to play around with; those ones, you don’t. For girls, the distinction
seemed more affective and connected to value judgments and social
status.
The distinction between luxury and necessity does not constitute a
dichotomy but a continuum. Whereas “things that entertain you” are
solely meant for passing the time and having fun, the media category
already carries a certain notion of purpose. At face value, the two are
almost indistinguishable, but media are good for “communication” or,
more generally, the “sending and receiving” of information: “nobody
needs such a huge TV, but it’s still useful.” Household appliances, a
category produced by virtually all participants, still carry a notion of
convenience: “These are things that you actually don’t need either,
but they already have a better [...] more useful use.” They are “things
you need” or “should have” because they make life easier. Tools
then were referred to as “manual” and “practical.” They have lost
any sense of convenience, not to mention luxury. Accordingly, some
students seemed to associate “the household” with notions of work
and chores. Doing the household, like washing, cooking, cleaning or
making repairs, requires certain tools and appliances. Related artifacts
thus seemed to be associated with work, not fun.
Luxury and necessity artifacts also differ with respect to how techni-
cal they are (see above). Being “manual,” tools were often regarded as
less technical overall. They often contained the Swiss knife. In contrast,
media and entertainment artifacts were sometimes simply referred to
as “technology,” probably in the sense of high tech. While no student
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actually used that latter term, related artifacts were the ones most
frequently described as “digital” or “electronic,” again primarily by
girls. When asked, however, virtually no participant could provide a
viable definition for these terms. The following attempt was made by
a 5th-grade girl:
Well, for example, things that children always hold in their
hands, like mobile phones [points at smartphone] and
sometimes the Nintendo and XBox [points at Playstation].
That [points at TV], you could also put with the household.
But, for instance, the camera and all those things are more
electronic for me. Because you can find them at home and
they have a battery charger and all that.
For her, electronics are obviously connected to fun and play. Children
use these things! They are found “at home” but are distinct from
“the household” as they do not really serve any important purpose.
Having a charging cable, a battery or a display were the most common
attempts to explain what it actually means to be digital or electronic.
Students knew these terms from their everyday lives but they could
not explain their meaning: “Oh god. What do I understand by that?
Man, if you hear ‘digital’ you just know what it is.” The same 11th-
grade girl, who participated in an advanced informatics course, then
went on to say:
I don’t think you would usually call these things digital
[points at grouping with 3D printer, Mars rover, mechan-
ical calculator, Zuse 1, Raspberry Pi and robotic arm]. I
don’t know if they are digital. [...] I mean, I know these
from school and such. But a normal person, like in their
everyday lives, they don’t really know these things.
The indicated grouping was described by her as “research, but more
like the robotics-informatics part.” This was the only mention of
the discipline by a student. Her above statement also illustrates
that being digital and being called digital can well be two different
things. The artifacts that students know are called digital are probably
the consumer electronics sold in stores and advertised in the media.
Again, these things are fun, colorful, and usually expensive. Other
things that are digital might very well be found in the realm of “real
technology” – to which informatics seemed to belong for this student
– but in that case “digital” becomes, quite literally, a technical term,
i.e., expert language, whose definition is better left to those experts,
or to teachers at school. Recall the association of school and “real
technology” mentioned above.
Finally, the concepts of ownership and social status also played a
notable role in the distinction between luxury and necessity: “That
is like a really typical rich person,” as the same advanced-course girl
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summarized her grouping of “things that entertain you.” Another
very revealing comment was made by a 9th-grade girl, who described
the same category with the words: “And those are all things that we
own, or often own.” Her grouping contained, among other things, the
smartphone, Playstation, television and the car. These items usually
cost a lot of money and owning them is something special. They are
potential status symbols that signify affluence. Technically, household
appliances and tools, both categories that she had also produced,
are also things that one owns, but they may not be very suitable as
status symbols. Owning a toaster, a washing machine or a lawn
mower is hardly worth mentioning. Another interpretation could be
that household appliances and tools are, in fact, not usually owned by
children and young adults. They are owned by their parents, who are
usually the ones taking care of “the household.” The car, however,
seems at odds with that interpretation.
4.4.5 Negative Cases
The model shown in Fig. 4.2 and described above aims to capture
the most salient and meaningful features, similarities and differences
that students perceived among the presented artifacts, and most of
the produced groupings and categories were consistent with it (see
Table 4.3). Nevertheless, some were not, while others were occasionally
difficult to place. In the following, I will provide an analysis of such
negative cases (Table. 3.2).
Model-inconsistent categories, i.e., those that did not fit into the tax-
onomy at all, were in almost all cases based on a rather specific salient
feature, either physical or functional. The most common example is
the category “time pieces” which always included precisely the digital
watch and alarm clock. Other examples include “things with wheels,”
“things with a display,” “things that can take pictures” or “things that
can calculate.” The labeling pattern in terms of verbose feature de-
scriptions rather than unique names is noticeable here, suggesting that
these do not constitute meaningful taxonomic categories but rather
ad-hoc creations. In fact, such groupings rarely contained more than
two items and often appeared partial, i.e., there were usually other
items that also had the mentioned feature but were not included. For
example, two students produced “things with a display,” but neither
included the ticket vending machine nor the television, both of which
exhibit this feature rather prominently. Instead, such items were usu-
ally included in a model-consistent category, indicating that those
were, in fact, regarded as more relevant. Several model-inconsistent
categories also existed only temporarily and were later changed into
or subsumed by model-consistent ones, which would further sup-
port the interpretation that the latter were indeed perceived as more
meaningful.
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Finally, the creation of such inconsistent groupings occasionally
seemed to be connected to a notable effort, e.g., to group leftover
items. In those cases, students would comment their grouping with
phrases like “well, if I have to put this somewhere” or “I don’t know
where else I should put it,” indicating that these groupings may, in fact,
result from a perceived task-related pressure to group as many items
as possible, which led students to search for any similarity among the
items, meaningful or not.
In addition to model-inconsistent categories, there were two cat-
egories that sometimes appeared to cut across the model’s dimen-
sions and were thus difficult to place in it. Those categories were
“medicine” and “tools,” both of which sometimes seemed to violate
the everyday/specialized-distinction. For most students, medicine
belonged to the realm of science and was thus primarily associated
with specialized expert technology, whereas tools were usually seen as
more everyday artifacts that pretty much everybody knows how to use.
In some cases, however, students closely related medical artifacts with
“things that save lives,” which they knew from their everyday lives.
This association is easily explained as medicine is, after all, a profes-
sion that most people directly come into contact with. Everybody has
to see a physician sometimes and probably all students had seen an
ambulance or paramedic before. As such, medical artifacts certainly
are highly specialized and usually only used by certain experts, but
we also encounter those experts in our daily lives. Similarly, tools
would cut across the same dimension in cases, where students started
categorizing the robotic arm, Geiger counter or microscope as tools
and thus associated this category with science or the industry. In
doing so, they exhibited a broader conception of tools as not only
used for household repairs, but also by professionals like craftspeople,
mechanics, engineers or scientists.
In principle, such conceptions do not contradict the distinctions
proposed by the model in Fig. 4.2. They do illustrate, however, that
students may place certain artifact categories differently with respect
to those distinctions. In fact, the same phenomenon occurred quite
frequently on the level of individual items. Recall the car, for instance,
which was usually categorized as “traffic,” but occasionally as “things
that entertain you.” In other words, car, as a basic-level category, may
be placed on either side of the private/public distinction, depending
on whether it is seen as private property or part of public traffic. In
light of this, it seems surprising actually that this phenomenon did
not occur more often on the level of more abstract categories.
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4.5 limitations and discussion
With respect to naturalistic inquiry and GTM, the study reported
here exhibits two notable limitations. First, the study only used
purposive but no theoretical sampling. With the exception of the
superordinate grouping task, all participants were interviewed using
the same procedure and for all interviews the same kinds of data
were gathered. Therefore, I cannot claim theoretical saturation for the
results presented here. As indicated above, the study was conducted in
conjunction with another one (reported in Chap. 5). While a second set
of interviews was also conducted, due to limited time and resources,
it was exclusively devoted to the procedures of the second study.
Second, the study only implemented rather limited counterbalances
against possible interpretation biases, namely peer debriefing, trian-
gulation and negative case analyses, but no external review of the
interpretations in conjunction with raw data. In particular, an audit
procedure (Table 3.2) would have been desirable in order to ascertain
the justifiability of the category labels ascribed to the participants’
groupings as those provided an important foundation for the sub-
sequent generation of theory. Although the assignment of category
labels appeared rather straightforward in most cases, unconscious bias
or even outright mistakes may have gone unnoticed, which impedes
the dependability of the analysis and, consequently, the credibility of
the reported findings.
In fact, a rather remarkable aspect of the produced categories is
their apparent homogeneity. As described in Sect. 4.1, participants
were sampled deliberately diverse in order to allow for a greater range
of observations. In light of this, it seems surprising how similarly
students generally went about grouping the different artifacts. As can
be seen in Table 4.3, 117 groupings (72%) were eventually coded into
only 17 categories (36%).
The above-mentioned interpretation bias notwithstanding, there are
two other possible influences that might explain this homogeneity.
First, all students were recruited from Berlin grammar schools and
thus shared a similar socio-economic, urban background. It may very
well be, for instance, that students from more rural areas perceive
and categorize technical artifacts quite differently. From a naturalistic
perspective, such context-dependence is not a limitation per se, but
has to be taken into account when attempting to transfer the findings.
As described in Sect. 3.1.2, however, such an attempt cannot be made
prior to knowledge of a potential target context.
Second, the selection of artifacts may itself have contributed to the
apparent homogeneity of students’ categories. Medin et al. (1993)
have demonstrated that particular features of an exemplar might only
become salient in the context of other exemplars that it is compared to.
Hence, the distinctions and features that form the grounded theory in
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Fig. 4.2 may only be salient for students in the context of the very set
of artifacts presented to them in the interviews. However, the artifact
set was rather large and deliberately diverse such that any one artifact
could be compared to a number of different ones, which arguably
would have allowed many different features to surface.
In light of these limitations, I will now attempt to apply the pre-
sented findings to an external context in order to demonstrate their
transferability. As a target context, I will use the results reported by
Impedovo et al. (2015) briefly described in Sect. 2.2.1. The authors
presented 57 French students, aged 12-14, with ten different sets of
labeled pictures. Each set contained six objects, both natural and arti-
ficial, that shared a predefined abstract feature. Participants were then
asked to identify items in each set that had something in common.
While the core task of grouping related items is similar to the one
used in this study, there are also substantial differences. The present
design only used a single much larger set of unlabeled pictures. It
did not include natural objects and was not compiled on the basis
of a single common feature. There is hardly any overlap between
the artifacts presented in Impedovo et al. (2015)’s study and this one.
Moreover, participants in Impedovo et al. (2015)’s study should only
produce a single group for each item set, whereas the participants
in the present study were free to produce as few or as many groups
as they saw fit. Moreover, in France, “for 12-15 year old students,
technology education becomes a full school subject, oriented to convey
the existence of technical objects and the social organisations that
produce and use them” (33). Hence, the task designs, categorization
contexts and the educational backgrounds of the participants of the
two studies are notably different.
Table 4.4 reproduces the ten item sets used by Impedovo et al. (2015),
together with the respective most common groupings produced by
their participants. The right-most column contains my interpretation
based on the grounded theory presented above. I would argue that,
despite the substantial contextual differences, many of the groupings
are still interpretable on the basis of the taxonomy, lending credibility
to the claim that its proposed distinctions and categories are indeed
rather salient and meaningful.
Moreover, several aspects of the present results are consistent with
previous findings about student conceptions of technology (Sect. 2.2.1).
The general distinction between technology and non-technology on
the basis of electricity and artifact age is in line with previous findings
that less advanced, non-electrical and older artifacts are frequently
not regarded as technical by students (e.g., Firat 2017; Solomonidou
and Tassios 2007). The alternative conception, which instead renders
artifact age as evidence for technological change, seems consistent
with a more history- or progress-oriented conception of technology
(e.g., Collier-Reed 2009; DiGironimo 2011). The conception of technol-
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Item Set Most Freq. Grp. Interpretation
dragonfly, vulture, helicopter, airplane, hang glider,
windmill
helicopter, air plane, hang-glider traffic and transportation (Sect 4.4.3)
corkscrew, swing, nutcracker, elbow articulation,
scissors, wheelbarrow
corkscrew, nutcracker, scissors the elbow is most likely excluded because it is not technology, the rest
according to indoor vs. outdoor (Sect. 4.4.3), possibly indoor tools (Sect. 4.4.4)
sun, thermal power plant, food products, nuclear
power plant, hydraulic power plant, firewood
hydraulic power plant, thermal
power plant, nuclear power plant
technology vs. non-technology (Sect 4.4.1)
mobile phone, radio device, X-ray image, bat, mi-
crowave oven, satellite transmission
mobile phone, radio device, satel-
lite transmission
media and communication (Sect. 4.4.4); alternatively, specific salient feature
(Sect. 4.4.5) because all three artifacts were “equipped with antenna [sic] in
the representation” (Impedovo et al. 2015: 39)
flash light, bedside lamp, hand lamp, street light,
gas-discharge lamp, candle
flash light, bedside lamp, hand
lamp, street light, gas-discharge
lamp, candle
specific salient feature produces light (Sect. 4.4.5) or basic-level category lamp
as defined by this feature
electrical sander, washing machine, flat iron, vac-
uum cleaner, electric stove, electric drill
washing machine, flat iron, vac-
uum cleaner
Here, “50% of students made a link between all objects” (Impedovo et
al. 2015: 39), likely because all can be found at home (Sect. 4.4.3). The
shown subgroup appears to capture household appliances as distinct from
tools (Sect. 4.4.4). It is unclear why the stove is not included.
wasp’s nest, teepee, igloo, straw hut, termite
mound, nest of weaver birds
teepee, igloo, straw hut technology vs. non-technology (Sect 4.4.1)
sheep, silk worms, cotton field, flax field, automatic
power loom, cashmere scarf
Sheep, cotton field, silkworms Except for the loom, all these items likely fall into the no/low technology
category (Sect 4.4.1), which is not further differentiated by the theory pro-
posed here. In particular, it is unclear whether students would perceive a
distinction between natural and low-technology items as meaningful. In
principle, wool, carton, bread or cheese are all technical products, but their
natural origins are still rather salient.
plastic container, metal canned food, paper bag,
glass bottles, carton packaging, cream jars
plastic container, metal canned
food, glass bottles
block of butter, cheese, jar of jam, cow, bottle of
milk, slice of bread
butter, cheese, milk
Table 4.4: Item sets used by Impedovo et al. (2015: 38), together with the most common groupings produced by their participants, and my interpretation
based on the taxonomy presented in Fig. 4.2 and Sect. 4.4.
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ogy as specialized and professional (“real technology”) is consistent
with a more knowledge- and process-oriented understanding (Collier-
Reed 2009; de Vries 2016; DiGironimo 2011). Finally, technology as
entertainment essentially renders it as modern media and “hi-tech,”
which is by far the most pervasive technology conception found in the
literature (e.g., DiGironimo 2011; Jarvis and Rennie 1996; Rennie and
Jarvis 1995; Solomonidou and Tassios 2007).
The fact that these different conceptions occur in the taxonomy
in relation to different domains suggests that they are not mutually
exclusive but highly context-sensitive. This, too, is in line with related
research (Sects. 2.1 and 2.2). For instance, according to the theory of
conceptual profiles (Mortimer 1995; Mortimer and El-Hani 2014), an
individual may plausibly possess multiple technology conceptions
such that the predominant one might vary according to context, e.g.,
what kind of artifact one is faced with in a certain situation. In accor-
dance with situated accounts of transfer, comparing a gaming console
to a Swiss knife may thus “cue” a different technology conception
than comparing the console to an industrial robot.
4.6 summary and implications
The primary aim of this study was to investigate research questions q1
and q2 about the similarities and differences, and subordinate cate-
gories that students perceive among technical artifacts. The taxonomy
proposed in this chapter and depicted in Fig. 4.2 aims to answer
these questions. The similarities and differences that the participants
perceived among the presented artifacts are captured by the four hier-
archically ordered juxtapositions described in Sect. 4.4. They aim to
represent salient and meaningful distinctions that the participants per-
ceived among different kinds of artifact. It is those kinds, in turn, that
form the various subordinate artifact categories. Accordingly, the the-
ory divides technology into five subordinate domains: entertainment,
household, public, “real” and no/low technology.
The search for such distinctions and categories was motivated by
research on example-based learning and variation theory (Sect. 2.1),
according to which the examples presented during learning should
exhibit a notable and systematic variation. Hence, the proposed
grounded theory may inform such a selection of exemplars. According
to Lo (2012) students first need to discern the critical features of
an object of learning by contrasting suitable examples and counter
examples. As described in Sect. 2.1, such features may not be derived
from a purely disciplinary perspective but have to take into account
students’ individual perceptions of the object of learning, which will
be further investigated in Chaps. 5 and 6.
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That notwithstanding, for computing technology, it might be ade-
quate to contrast examples from only one of the proposed categories.
The idea is to avoid variation within features that are salient for stu-
dents but non-critical for the object of learning. Students might, for
instance, contrast different household appliances that vary with re-
spect to whether or not they involve computing in order to discern
the meaning and consequences it has for an artifact. What is the
difference, for instance, between a simple filter coffee machine and a
fully automated one? How was “the household” from fifty years ago
different from today and how did computing technology contribute
to that change?
In a subsequent phase, this pattern should be reversed in order to
generalize the object of learning. Now the goal is to let students see
its broad applicability by comparing exemplars that all contain the
concept in question (i.e, critical features are held constant), but vary
with respect to other, non-critical features. In this phase, it might be
adequate to select exemplars from several different of the proposed
categories. The idea now is to deliberately introduce variation within
features that are salient for students, but non-critical for the object of
learning. For computing technology, they might now compare digital
entertainment systems, automated tools and appliances, autonomous
cars, and “smart factory” applications in order to see and experience
various manifestations of it in notably different contexts.
The present study also suggests certain differences with respect to
students’ interest in and perceived relevance of certain kinds of tech-
nology. For context-based teaching (Sect. 1.3) it has been proposed to
select contexts that “exhibit a direct relation to and scope of action in
the living environment of students” (my transl., Diethelm et al. 2011:
102), i.e., contexts they are familiar with from their everyday lives.
However, Knobelsdorf and Tenenberg (2013) have argued that mere
familiarity may not suffice to make a technology interesting or relevant
for someone. The present results support that argument. After all,
it was domestic media and entertainment technology, arguably the
kind that students are most familiar with, that were most commonly
regarded as non-essential luxuries, particularly by girls. In contrast,
public technology, related to traffic, safety or health care, seemed to
carry much stronger notions of importance and relevance. Moreover,
“real technology,” i.e., precisely the kind that does not occur in every-
day settings, usually seemed to be what students referred to when
talking about their general interest in “technology.” Such observations
suggest that familiarity from everyday life is neither necessary nor
sufficient to make a technological context interesting or relevant in the
eyes of students.
Lastly, with respect to transfer, the central finding of the present
study is arguably the absence of computing concepts from students’
categorizations. While a few mentioned “chips” or “computers” dur-
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ing the interview, no one produced a consistent grouping based on
such concepts. Consider, in particular, the rather peculiar hybrid
category “time pieces and everyday computers” produced by the
advanced-course student shown in Fig. 4.1. Some students also re-
ferred to attributes like “digital” or “electronic” in the context of their
media or entertainment categories, but hardly anyone seemed to have
a viable notion of what those terms should mean. Again, it was an
advanced-course student, who described “digital” rather in terms of
her intuitive gut feeling than disciplinary knowledge: “you just know
what it is.” Moreover, the only explicit mention of informatics, made
by that same student, appeared to render the discipline as part of “real
technology” rather than her everyday environment.
Given the design and scope of this study, these observations cer-
tainly should not be overestimated. Nevertheless, as it stands, this
study provides very little evidence suggesting that computing technol-
ogy constitutes a salient artifact category for students, or that they are
particularly disposed to even think about their everyday environment
in terms of computing. The next chapter will investigate to what
extent they do so when explicitly asked for it.
5 WHAT IS BEH IND IT
The aim of this chapter is to investigate research questions q3 and q4
about how students distinguish computing from non-computing tech-
nology and what conceptions they draw on in that process. The
questions are motivated by research on learning transfer, particularly
the transfer-in-pieces framework, according to which transfer is the re-
sult of a situated process of reconstruction based on “cued” knowledge
resources (Sect. 2.1). Given the strong associations between informat-
ics, computers and programming found in the literature on student
conceptions (Sect. 2.2.1), computers and programs – if perceived in a
situation – may thus provide powerful cues for the activation of other
disciplinary knowledge resources. Therefore, the following study will
investigate how and to what extent students perceive these concepts
in technical devices.
5.1 participants
All participants were drawn from Berlin grammar schools. For details
on the educational context with respect to informatics, see Sect. 4.1
and Appendix A. Sampling occurred in two waves. The first wave,
conducted in Spring 2016, consisted of the same students who also
participated in the study reported in Chap. 4. Hence, the sampling
procedure was purposive with respect to age, gender and curriculum
choices. Twenty-one voluntary students, aged 9-17 from five different
grammar schools participated. For more details, see Sect. 4.1 and
Table 4.1.
The second wave was conducted in December 2016 and used the-
oretical sampling (Sect. 3.2) to further flesh out and corroborate the
analytic codes and concepts that had emerged until then. The design
also allows for triangulation between data obtained at different points
in time (Table 3.2). Only students with a background in informatics
education were interviewed in the second wave as those were found
to provide more rich and nuanced responses. Seven students from
grades 9 and 13 participated. The 9th-graders (2 males) were enrolled
in a compulsory elective course and came from one of the previous
grammar schools. The 13th-graders (1 female, 4 males) were enrolled
in an advanced course and came from a 6th school, a vocational gram-
mar school that enables students to complete their A-levels after 13
instead of the usual 12 years. Table 5.1 shows the combined sample
for both waves.
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Table 5.1: Participants of the sec-
ond interview study
grade 5 7 9 11+
P
male 2 2 7 5 16
female 2 2 3 5 12P
4 4 10 10 28
5.2 materials and procedure
The interviews used the same set of 33 unlabeled artifact pictures
described in Sect. 4.2 and reproduced in Appendix B.1. As already
mentioned, the artifacts were selected, in part, to exhibit different
relations to computing. Recall, in particular, that their purpose is to
provide a diverse range of stimuli, not a normative set of test items.
As before, students were interviewed individually and at first assured
that the interviews were not a test of ability but an inquiry into their
own views and ideas.
For the first wave, the interviews started with the free-grouping
procedure described in Sect. 4.2. Subsequently, students were given
the following three tasks: “Please put together into a group all the
things that you think (a) have to do with informatics or that a computer
scientist1 would know about, (b) are or contain a kind of computer, (c)
are or can be programmed.” The tasks were given in sequence such
that participants should start over at the beginning of each task. The
task order was varied across interviews. Participants were prompted
to explain each of their groupings, what they put together and why,
and to occasionally elaborate on certain concepts or ideas. Again,
care was taken to not introduce additional words or concepts into the
interview situation or to give participants the impression that any of
their groupings was somehow wrong.
The procedure was modified for the second wave of interviews.
The free-grouping task was omitted such that interviews started with
the three tasks described above. Subsequently, a second card set
was introduced showing 18 terms that were identified as relevant to
several students’ thinking during the first wave. The aim was to lift
their responses from concrete pictures to a more abstract linguistic
level and thus to allow for triangulation between data obtained via
different procedures. The terms used are shown in Table 5.2. Its layout
is not arbitrary and will be explained later in Sec. 5.4.2. The original
German terms are reproduced in Appendix B.2. The word cards were
likewise laid out at random. Participants were told that the terms came
from other students and were first asked whether all of them indeed
made sense to them. They were then asked to describe the relations
between the terms and were given the freedom to rearrange them if
they wanted. Occasionally, participants were asked to define a certain
term or to explicitly contrast two terms (e.g., program/software). The
picture cards remained on the table during that task.
1 The German word “Informatiker” was used here.
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electric electronic informatical
mechanical technical digital
program software
pre-program re-program
system
hardware
robot
engine circuit board computer
chip processor
Table 5.2: Word cards used in second-wave interviews. For the original
German terms, see Appendix B.2.
Again, both verbal and visual data were gathered during each in-
terview to allow for triangulation between different data types. As
described in Sect. 4.2, only the very first interview was audio-recorded
and the student’s groups documented via photographs. All subse-
quent interviews were filmed. All recordings were transcribed verba-
tim, including non-verbal actions such as pointing to or moving an
item. Groupings were extracted as screenshots for easier reference and
coding. Figure 5.1 shows example screenshots of the groupings pro-
duced by a ninth-grade girl. All data were imported into maxqda 2018.
For a detailed documentation of the research data, see Appendix D.
5.3 analysis and interpretation
In accordance with GTM, data analysis proceeded through several
iterations of initial and focused coding. The dominant forms of coding
used were structural coding, In-Vivo coding and concept coding as
outlined by Saldaña (2016). The coding was carried out by myself only,
but the entire process was accompanied by reflective memo writing
and close discussion with my supervisor. Additionally, peer debriefing
was implemented via occasional presentations of intermediate results
to uninvolved colleagues as well as an inter-coder judgment (see
below).
During initial, open coding, I aimed to stay as close to the data as
possible, using mainly concept and In-Vivo codes in order to capture
specific wordings or associations that students uttered in the context
of the three grouping tasks. Examples include “digital display,” “mak-
ing configurations” or “complicated.” During focused coding those
were sorted, further differentiated or merged in order to identify more
abstract patterns and relations between them. Using the constant
comparative method, these structures and resulting new codes were
treated as working hypotheses and constantly tested against the data
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(a) computers (c) informatics
(b) programming
Figure 5.1: Computer, programming and informatics groups produced by
Sara (see below) who participated in a 9th-grade compulsory
elective informatics course. Letters indicate task order.
and other codes. Where data was found to contradict the hypothe-
sized structure, negative case analyses were conducted. In the process,
patterns, codes and hypotheses were revised and refined with each
iteration, and coding procedures became increasingly deductive and
theoretical. The process was continued until eventually negative cases
were found to be negligible (for one such example, see the case report
for Urien in Sect. 5.4.3).
At that point, an inter-coder judgment was conducted with a total
of nine case transcripts and three independent raters. Four cases were
purposely selected because they contained ambiguous or otherwise
difficult passages in my opinion. The remaining five cases were
selected randomly. Each case was assigned to two raters. The raters
were supplied with a coding manual for the emergent analytical codes,
but were not informed about the hypothesized relations between them
until after they had coded the cases. In accordance with naturalistic
inquiry, the purpose of the judgment was not to obtain a measure
of reliability, but to increase the intersubjectivity of the analysis. As
such, it was used as a form of in-depth peer debriefing with the aim to
increase credibility (Table 3.2). Differences in the raters’ judgments
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were carefully analyzed in a group discussion, and led to a final
refinement of the theory and corresponding codes. All raters agreed
with the changes made.
5.4 results
First of all, almost all participants were able to carry out all given
tasks and generally seemed to perceive them as meaningful. Three
participants (a boy aged 9, and two girls aged 10 and 12) responded
that they did not know what informatics was and the same boy was
the only one who responded that he did not know what programming
was. Those participants did thus not produce corresponding groups.
Naturally, even among those who did have some notion of a particular
term, different understandings of them were notable. However, they
were eventually integrated successfully into the grounded theory.
For the term computer, I identified two understandings, which I
called “small computers” and “real computers.” The latter seemed to
be regarded as more capable than the former such that they enable
more complex functions. However, both these conceptions could very
well occur in a single participant. The concepts of capability and
complexity are discussed in detail in Sect. 5.4.2 and should make the
relation between these conceptions more comprehensive.
For programming, I identified two conceptions, which I labeled
“programming as writing code” and “programming as changing set-
tings.” The latter would, for instance, understand the selection of a
TV channel as an act of programming the TV. Only two of the younger
participants (two girls aged 10) consistently exhibited this conception.
Nevertheless, the availability of different settings on a device still
played a role for many other participants, but in the sense that it
required prior programming. The discussion in Sect. 5.4.2 as well as
the case report for Urien in Sect. 5.4.3 will further illustrate this.
Considering all instances in which any corresponding group was
produced, students grouped on average 12.8 items as related to in-
formatics, 12.3 items as a kind of computer, and 15.9 items as pro-
grammed or programmable. The difference between the first two and
the third is primarily located in the realm of embedded systems. The
digital watch, traffic light, TV, radio and washing machine were the
items that were most commonly grouped as programmed, but not
as computers or related to informatics. Given the strong association
between informatics, computers and programming found in the litera-
ture on student conceptions (Sect. 2.2.1), it seemed initially surprising
to find that it was not uncommon for students to assert that an item is
programmed or programmable, but deny that it is a kind of computer
or related to informatics. The reason for this, as I shall argue below,
lies in a perceived functional complexity that is too low to warrant
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Figure 5.2: Constraint model for student’s reasoning about computing in
technical devices
the capabilities of a “real” computer or the expertise of a computer
scientist.
Perceived complexity, perceived transparency, capability and “what
is behind it” are the four central analytical codes that resulted from the
analysis. They form the corner stones of the grounded theory shown
in Fig. 5.2. It describes conceptual constraints that act on students’
analytical and reasoning processes related to the identification of com-
puting in technical devices. The model does not represent the process
itself! Instead, the five nodes of the model should be understood as
placeholders or variables, and the goal of a related reasoning process
is to assign a value to each node such that all constraints are satisfied.
For the same device, different students may assign different values
to the model based on how they perceive the device’s function. They
may also arrive at those values in different ways. In the end, however,
the values have to satisfy the constraints that act between them.
A common entry point into the reasoning process is functionality,
which always takes the value of a concrete (partial) function of the de-
vice in question, e.g., “toasting a toast,” “playing a game” or “putting
something on a display.” This functionality, in turn, can appear more
or less complex to a student. Hence, the possible values for perceived
complexity can be understood as falling onto a scale from low to high.
A higher perceived complexity may impede the function’s perceived
transparency. A function is readily transparent to a student if they
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immediately have an idea of how it works. If not, the function appears
opaque, at least initially. Thus, perceived transparency can either be
immediate or delayed, but it has to be established at some point. The
most common possible values for capability and “what is behind it”
are shown as the dotted contents inside the two corresponding nodes
in Fig 5.2. These values, too, constitute analytical codes and represent
student conceptions. In the following, I will first provide more de-
tailed accounts of the model’s components, their possible values and
the constraints that act between them. Subsequently, I will provide
thicker, more contextualized descriptions in the form of three selected
case reports (Table 3.2).
5.4.1 Establishing Transparency
As indicated above, functionality lay at the heart of virtually all stu-
dents’ analytical and reasoning processes. Even statements about
visual features, e.g., buttons or displays, were usually made in relation
to their functions. What you see on a device is there for a reason. It
has function and purpose. The concept of perceived complexity then
describes how sophisticated, elaborated or complicated the function
of a device, or of one of its parts, appears to someone. The concept
of transparency, in turn, describes whether they believe they “see
through” this function, that is, whether or not they posses an explana-
tory model for it that they themselves are satisfied with. If they do not
possess such a model, the function initially appears opaque. Com-
plexity and transparency are thus inversely related. The higher the
perceived complexity of a function, the harder it is to “see through” it.
Complexity may impede transparency.
Coming up with a satisfactory explanatory model and thus establish-
ing functional transparency was a central part of students’ reasoning
processes. In many cases, they would readily provide such explana-
tions:2
alex19 : This [plasma lamp] is basically a touch screen. More or less.
You pull the electrons more or less toward you.
ben20 : Well, it [wireless router] could just be regulated by the wire
and this is really only a connection modem.
claire17 : Program a pocket knife? Well, you can’t. I mean, I don’t
know that you can program a pocket knife if it is just a regular
foldable one.
daniel14 : For the typewriter [means mech. calculator] I would think
that the kinetic energy is transferred directly, but not processed
further.
2 Student names are changed and run alphabetically by order of first reporting. Num-
bers indicate age.
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How correct or sophisticated these explanations are from a technical
perspective is of little importance here. The central aspect is that they
were sufficient in the eyes of these participants to explain the device’s
function without anything more “behind it” that makes it work. In fact,
these descriptions hardly contain anything that really does anything.
Electrons are pulled; energy is transferred; things are just connected
by a wire. These components do not act; they react. They establish a
direct causal chain between the device’s input and output, between
action and reaction. It is precisely when this causal chain appears
broken that the function appears opaque. In those situations, an
additional element needs to be inserted in order to complete the chain.
In doing so, students would often employ a very particular kind of
reasoning:
eric12 : And if the thing has a button then something has to be
programmed there.
frank15 : [Looking at smartmeter:] I wasn’t sure whether it couldn’t
just be a measuring instrument that somehow puts something
on the display. And without a processor that is somehow behind
it to calculate something. But I think there has to be something
behind it.
ginny16 : I’m thinking whether such a device, whether it could even
work without informatics. I don’t think so. The knowledge of a
computer scientist has to be in there.
hal14 : [The Geiger counter] looks a little like electronics, I would say.
And if it measures something, then there has to be something
inside it that processes the data and displays it.
ida12 : The maker programs it, I think. So you can even use the
mobile. Because otherwise it could not work.
The above statements all follow the same line of reasoning: the de-
vice is able to perform a certain function that, due to its perceived
complexity, was not immediately transparent to those students. As a
consequence, they reasoned that “there has to be something behind it”
because “otherwise it could not work.” The process is reminiscent of
an argument by contradiction: if the asserted element was not there,
then the device would not function, but obviously it does function, so
it has to be there. Or to put it in the words of Jane10: “I don’t know
how else it should work.”
In that way, “what is behind it” establishes perceived transparency,
either right from the start or by being inserted as a consequence of a
reasoning process. Concrete features that often did not appear readily
transparent to students and thus entailed such reasoning were buttons,
displays, timing, calculation and autonomy. Those that were more
readily transparent included simple movements like rotating a fan
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or blade, heating something, or doing “nothing” unless moved “by
hand.”
Of course, another way to determine “what is behind it,” even in
cases of more complex functions, is to simply know it outright. In
several cases, for instance, participants would state that they knew,
had heard, or were told that a device was programmed or contained a
computer:
karen10 : I took the mobile phone because it was told in school once
that a mobile is also something like a computer.
In those instances, the analytical reasoning process described above
was usually precluded. In one of the rare cases that a student would
still go through it, however, a conflict between prior knowledge and
analytical reasoning arose:lucas14 : Because it is a toaster. What else should a toaster do? And
yeah, my toaster has a microchip. I do NOT know why.
Lucas knew that his toaster had a microchip, but his explanatory
model for how a toaster works did not seem to require one. For all he
knew, a toaster would work just as well without a microchip, so he
had no idea what purpose it could possibly serve within the device.
This already ties into the notion that the capability of “what is behind
it” needed to be warranted in the eyes of students.
5.4.2 Warranting Capability
The concept of capability describes how students ranked “what is
behind it” with respect to what it is able to do. Different elements
have different capabilities. These capabilities, in turn, are dependent
on perceived complexity such that higher levels of capability need
to be warranted by a higher level of perceived functional complexity.
In other words, if students did not perceive a function to be of a
higher complexity, they generally did not assume an element of higher
capability to be “behind it” because it would have been unwarranted.
Recall Lucas’ above statement about the toaster. The function of the
toaster, as he perceived it, was not complex enough to warrant the
presence of a microchip, so he wondered “what else” it might do. He
tried, in vain, to come up with a warrant for why a toaster would
need the capabilities of a microchip.
From low to high, the model in Fig. 5.2 outlines three levels of
capability: (electro)mechanics, electronics and informatics. From left
to right, the three columns of Table 5.2 correspond to those levels.
Recall that the terms shown in Table 5.2 were taken from students
during the first wave of interviews and presented as word cards during
the second wave. Note that several of these terms eventually turned
into possible values for the constraint model shown in Fig. 5.2. As such,
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the three levels of capability and all connected terms are ultimately
founded on student utterances and conceptions, not necessarily on
technically correct definitions.
The lowest level of capability, (electro)mechanics, is related to elements
like engines, gears, electric wiring or even “nothing:”
frank15 : Here [points at plasma lamp], there is ultimately only elec-
tricity behind it. Same with the hair dryer. It just has an on-
button and a cold-button or so, I think.
marc14 : And engine [points at engine word card], I would say, be-
longs to the mechanical things. For instance a garden, um, shaver
[points at lawn mower]. You can just build an engine inside it to
make it run and shave the lawn.
nathan14 : But I think something like this [points at electric drill], it
has more to do with physics. If you push it in, then it turns.
These elements are extremely limited in their capabilities. Electric
current is routed through wires. Gears are turned by an engine or
even “by hand.” They can hardly do anything “by themselves” and
often only have two states: on and off. They enable precisely those
functions that students commonly perceived as less complex and read-
ily transparent. Items that were perceived as simple enough to only
warrant (electro)mechanical elements were generally excluded from
all three groups. Virtually no participant regarded the Swiss knife,
microscope, fire extinguisher, alarm clock, Geiger counter, electric
generator, lawn mower or electric drill as programmable, a computer
or as related to informatics.
The next level of capability is called electronics. This name was
chosen because electronics often featured very prominently in students’
descriptions. Several would say, for instance, that something had
to be programmed as soon as it was electronic or that computer
scientists had to do with electronics a lot. At the same time, virtually
no student could offer a viable definition for electronic or how it
differs from merely being electric. It is not so much a technical
term but a conceptual level of capability. Electronics can do things
that (electro)mechanics cannot. The case of Valerie in Sect. 5.4.3 will
illustrate this further. Also see the related report in Sect. 4.4.4.
Elements related to electronics are chips, circuitry boards, “small”
computers and programs. They have rudimentary cognitive capabili-
ties like timing, counting, conditional behavior and hardwired logic.
They may also afford a limited number of predetermined settings.
Functions that were seen as complex enough to warrant any of these
capabilities were usually seen as programmed or programmable:
omar19 : Traffic lights have a program, of course, for time keeping.
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paula17 : Or the smoke alarm [points at smartmeter], that it triggers
precisely if there is smoke.
quentin12 : Well, this [points at Raspberry Pi] is a chip and maybe
things are programmed on it. And a microchip is, for example,
in mobile phones and computers.
hal14 : [About the hair dryer:] That you can set different levels. For
instance, how strong or how warm. Also, um, data that are
somehow inside it and that need to be processed somehow.
Compare, in particular, Hal’s description of the hair dryer here to
that of Frank in context of (electro)mechanics on page 84. The dif-
ference lies in the perceived level of complexity. Frank perceived the
hair dryer’s function as only requiring electricity and an on/off or
hot/cold switch. In contrast, Hal perceived it as complex enough
(and somewhat opaque) to assume that somehow data needs to be
processed there. He subsequently included the hair dryer in both his
programming and computer groups, but not his informatics group.
With informatics, he associated “computers in general but, like, real
computers.” He further explained:
hal14 : Computers that only do small applications, I personally don’t
include. I mean, here, the system controls for a washing machine;
that can be done by an electronics engineer. That needn’t be a
computer scientist.
“Small” computers, fixed circuitry or immutable programming were
frequently given as reasons by students to exclude programmed items
from their (“real”) computer or informatics groups. More versatile
and complex functions are needed to warrant those. Eric, who had
been participating in an extracurricular robotics club at his school for
about two years, saw it this way:
eric12 : [In the club] we actually assemble these things in a casing
[points at Raspberry Pi, which he calls a circuit board]. And
then we connect a computer and deploy the program from the
computer onto it. And I think this thing then somehow knows
what to do. But I don’t think it has an internal computer.
He had had first-hand experience with a Raspberry Pi, or possibly a
similar device, and also knew that it can be equipped with programs,
but only one at a time, and you need to do it via a “real” computer.
He later described that the TV, digital watch and router also only con-
tained circuit boards and likewise excluded them from his computer
group. He explained that “these things [points at computer group] are
also programmed, but here [points at TV / previous programming
group] it is only certain cases.” As a counter example, he described
search engines, where “you cannot pre-program all the things that
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you can search for.” The following comes from Alex, an advanced
informatics course student:alex19 : [The robotic arm] mindlessly does its job. It won’t analyze.
It would need another robot to do that. That’s why it is less,
um, I mean it was programmed. So for programming, I would
have to move it more to this side [yes-side]. But it doesn’t
re-program itself, or accesses different programs when its envi-
ronment changes.
Like the “circuit board,” the robotic arm only runs a single program
that can only cope with specific pre-programmed situations. It is not
multi-functional and cannot adapt to new and unforeseen conditions.
It is here where the capabilities of mere electronic circuits, chips,
“small” computers and simple programs ended in the eyes of many
students. As mentioned already, the devices that were most frequently
subject to this reasoning were the digital watch, traffic light, TV set,
radio and washing machine, closely followed by the digital camera,
pocket calculator and industrial robot. The functions of these devices
were often not perceived as complex enough to warrant anything more
than a circuit board or a simple, fixed program.
The third and highest level of capability, informatics, lifts those
limitations. It is associated with “real” computers, software and larger
systems. These elements are highly complex and intelligent agents.
They are multi-functional, adaptable, can communicate via networks
or even exert control over other, less capable elements:rita14 : The smartphone, for example. It can do really many things.karen10 : And with the Nintendo, you can put internet things on it.
So, computer things, you can download.
hal14 : For instance, in the car, there is also a computer inside. At least
in the newer ones. That controls the system, the air condition,
whether it is safe.
paula17 : Computers are often inside things that require higher func-
tions. For instance, the gaming console or phone, or certain
systems in machines or cars. There’s a lot of built-in technology.
sara15 : Things you can occupy yourself with because they are not
too uninteresting for a computer scientist [see also Fig. 5.1].
Computers and informatics are inside more complex things. In the con-
text of these groups, participants’ wording would sometimes change
from electronic circuits and programs to computers, software and oper-
ating systems. The latter seemed to carry notions of higher complexity
and sophistication. This is how Tanya saw it:tanya14 : A software or so. Okay, no, with the washing machine that
would be a little difficult [removes it from informatics group].
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Later, however, she asserted that the washing machine is probably
programmed and included it in that group. For her, a program seemed
smaller and less powerful than a software. Similarly, chips and circuit
boards can be seen as less powerful than computers and processors.
The former may fit into a washing machine, the latter not so much.
Of course, informatics elements can do all the things that electronics
can – and then some. Corresponding items were thus virtually always
grouped as programmable as well.
Not all students distinguished between these last two levels of ca-
pability. In some cases, participants would readily generalize from
a previous group and state that “everything that is already there”
also belonged in another group. In a few cases, the three produced
groups were ultimately identical or almost identical. Those students
only seemed to distinguish between two levels of capability: (elec-
tro)mechanics and informatics. For them, “small” computers and
programs were, in principle, just as capable as “real” computers
and software systems. Hence, less complex functions were required
to warrant higher levels of capability. In the end, only five partici-
pants seemed to fall into this category, however, three of which were
advanced-course students. The only one of those five who had not
received any prior informatics education was Will, whose case is
reported in Sect. 5.4.3.
A last point worthy of note is students’ treatment of devices that they
did not know or recognize. In these situations, one of two things could
happen. The student would either speculate about a possible function,
based on the device’s physical appearance, thus fixing a value for
functionality, after which the reasoning process would continue from
there. Or the item in question would simply be put aside.
Another line of reasoning that we had originally expected to see
in such situations were overgeneralizations of the sort “computers
are probably in everything these days.” Surprisingly, however, such
statements were virtually non-existent among the participants. One
exception is the case of Urien reported in Sect. 5.4.3. The general rule
was that a student would exclude an item from their groups if they
were not sure about what it did, rather than to assume that it probably
contained a program or computer by default. In other words, when
in doubt, participants would assume the absence of computing rather
than its presence. This is, in fact, consistent with the grounded theory
proposed here. Based on the particular device’s perceived functional
complexity, students need to be able to come up with some kind
of warrant for why anything should be “behind it.” If the function
itself is unknown, its complexity is unknown as well, and there is
no basis for a corresponding warrant. In that case, critical values
in the constraint model are missing such that it cannot be satisfied.
Subsequent reasoning is precluded.
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5.4.3 Case Reports
In this section, I present three selected case reports in order to give
thicker, more contextualized accounts of the concepts and processes
described so far. Each case will be analyzed through the lens of the
constraint model described above and shown in Fig. 5.2. The groups
produced by the three case students are shown in Table 5.3.
Urien
Urien is 14 years old and attends 7th grade. In the previous year,
he participated in an extracurricular course, where he learned to
program with Scratch. He says of himself that he is interested in
informatics and that he might elect it later in school. This is a first-
wave interview, so Urien has just completed the free-grouping task
reported in Chap. 4. During that task, he put together the Rasperry
Pi and Zuse 1 because “both look like a chip” (specific salient feature,
Sect. 4.4.5) and described chips as “parts of the innards of computers.”
So I first ask him what things he associates with computers. He
responds that “you could associate almost anything with them because
a whole lot of things are controlled by computers: electric power
supply, gas supply, the train networks.” This is a rare case of a
broad generalized statement that we had expected to see more often.
Note, however, that it was not uttered in the context of concrete
artifacts but on a general linguistic level. Still, it is interesting that
his first association with computers seems to be the control of large
infrastructure networks.
Naturally, I then ask Urien to put together all the things that contain
a computer, which he immediately interjects with “or that are controlled
by a computer.” I agree and he starts to quickly put together various
items like the smartphone, gaming consoles, TV, radio and industrial
robot, among others. After a few moments, he asks: “Are parts of a
computer also OK?” I ask what those would be and he names “for
instance, calculation [points at pocket and mechanical calculator] or
the ability to keep time [points at digital watch and alarm clock]”
as well as “measuring things [smartmeter and Geiger counter] and
video recording [camera and Mars rover].” I ask whether all these
things indeed contain a computer, to which he replies: “Yes. Or
the computer uses a part of it.” His final group contains 20 items
and it seems impossible to say which of those he actually sees as
computers and which only represent parts. Overall, his grouping here
did not proceed according to establishing transparency and warranting
capability, but rather followed loose functional associations (negative
case). Nevertheless, it is obvious that a computer is fundamentally
multi-functional for him. It is “a device with which you can play
games, search for information, call friends.” Again, he references
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Urien Valerie Will
C P I I P C C I P
3D printer
alarm clock
Tesla car
Curiosity rover
defibrillator
diesel generator
digital camera
digital radio
digital watch
electric drill
fire extinguisher
Geiger counter
hair dryer
industrial robot
lawn mower
mech. calculator
microscope
Nintendo DS
plasma lamp
Playstation 4
pocket calculator
Raspberry Pi
smartmeter
smartphone
Swiss knife
ticket vending m.
toaster
toothbrush
traffic light
TV
washing machine
wireless router
Zuse 1Table 5.3: (I)nformatics, (C)omputer, and (P)rogramming groups produced
by three case students. The column order corresponds to the task
order in the respective interview. Dark areas indicate grouped
items.
networking capabilities. So from that perspective, computers clearly
fall on the informatics level of capability for him.
My next question asks him to put together things that can be pro-
grammed. The first two items he puts together are the plasma lamp
and defibrillator, neither of which were part of the previous computer
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group. He explains: “This can theoretically be re-programmed to
emit stronger or weaker electric shocks.” When he gets to the gaming
consoles, however, his reasoning changes: “Those can be programmed;
they even have to be programmed, so it’s even possible to play with
them.” Re-programming the voltage of the defibrillator is optional. It
is more like changing a setting. Playing video games, however, is a
more complex and not immediately transparent function to him that
requires programming. It is his only explanation for how the device
could work (establishing transparency). Henceforth, he groups items
that have to be programmed. Among the reasons he gives are cars
that “drive autonomously,” “the phases of the traffic light,” image
effects in the camera and the internet connection of modern TVs. All
of those functions are complex enough to warrant programming: “oth-
erwise, you could not do it.” In the end, the defibrillator and plasma
lamp are no longer part of his group. Nor are numerous items that
were previously part of his computer group, likely because they only
represented partial functions in the first place.
My last question asks him to put together things that have to do
with informatics. During the grouping, he makes frequent references
to programs and programming, so I ask him whether this is how
he decides. He states: “Yes. Things that have programs or run
programs.” I ask what he understands by the term informatics and he
replies: “Writing programs for things, testing them as well probably,
or changing them.” However, with the exception of the rover, his
informatics group is a proper subset of his previous programming
group. So I ask about the missing items, since he previously said they
had to be programmed, and programming is what he associates with
informatics. His explanation is the following:
Because they can’t run programs, but, no wait. Yes. But
only a single one, but no other programs. They cannot
vary. And this is also something that you could put with
informatics. Things that cannot only go in one direction,
but in multiple directions.
I ask who puts the programs into the other devices then, to which
he replies: “technicians.” Items running only a single program that
“cannot vary” do not warrant a relation to informatics or the involve-
ment of computer scientists in his eyes. His reasoning here clearly
distinguishes the the electronics and informatics levels of capability.
The latter calls for more complex, versatile or adaptable functions.
Given his initial associations of computers with concepts like control,
networking and multi-functionality (informatics capabilities), it is not
unlikely that the items he grouped here are ultimately the ones he
actually sees as proper computers as well.
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Valerie
Valerie is 18 years old and in grade 13. She attended a compulsory
elective informatics course in grade 11 and is currently in her second
year of the consecutive advanced course. She says that she is very
interested in informatics and can also see herself pursuing a career in
it. This is a second-wave interview.
In my first question, I ask her to put together all things related
to informatics. She starts with the smartphone, car and camera, and
excludes the hair dryer: “It is electric, but really informatics? I don’t
know.” She misses a warrant for why the hair dryer should need more
than simple (electro)mechanics. I ask why she grouped the other things
and she says: “Because all have electronics inside and run via certain
programs.” In the following, she makes several more references to
electronics and programming. Things she does not see as electronic
are excluded. I ask what her criteria are and she says: “Everything that
is controlled automatically and that is a little more complicated.” With
19 items, her final group is comparatively large and even includes
items like the electric toothbrush and the microscope. Apparently,
she saw them as “complicated” enough to warrant the presence of
electronics, programs, and consequently informatics.
Since programming was so central in her argumentation, I then ask
whether she would change anything if I asked her to put together
all programmable things. She adds the plasma lamp “on a hunch”
and says she would exclude the Raspberry Pi because it is only a
“component part.” Probably due to the conjunctive phrasing of my
question, however, she does not actually remove it. She also says:
For instance, I would probably add the hair dryer and
toaster. Because they are somehow programmed in a way.
Because, well, otherwise the toaster wouldn’t know how
long it should leave the toast at what setting. And how hot
it should get.
So the hair dryer is electronic after all, as is the toaster. Figure 5.3
shows what values Valerie may have assigned here to the constraint
model in the context of the toaster’s function. She perceives it as
complex enough to warrant the presence of programming. It needs
the ability to keep time and to remember certain predefined settings.
Otherwise it would not work (establishing transparency). I ask whether
that kind of programming would not also make the toaster informatics.
She laughs and says:
I don’t know. I found it rather too simple to really be
informatics. Of course, it is programmed in a way, but
then virtually everything that is electronic would have to
be. Because it has to be programmed in a way if it is
electronic.
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Figure 5.3: Valerie’s conception of the toaster
Despite the fact that electronics and programming were central for
her in the context of her informatics group, she is now hesitant to
include the toaster and hair dryer on the basis of this very argument.
Their perceived functional complexities suffice to warrant electronics
and programming, but not informatics. She also seems uncertain
about the proper relationship between electronics, programming and
informatics.
Next, I ask her to put together all things that are or contain a little
computer. This time, she actually removes the Raspberry Pi because
“it is not a whole computer but only a part.” Otherwise, her previous
group remains unchanged. Even the plasma lamp remains. I ask what
makes those things computers:
They are all controlled and, yeah, man [long pause]. Well,
it’s nothing mechanical that is inside and controls it, but
precisely the electronics. That’s why.
Mechanical elements obviously do not suffice to make these devices
work. They need the capabilities of electronics at least. So I again con-
front her with the toaster and ask why it is not included even though
it is electronic. She laughs, seemingly aware of the contradiction, but
stays with her decision to exclude it: “For me, the toaster and hair
dryer somehow do not belong there. I don’t really know why.” I ask
why the toothbrush, camera and radio are included, to which she
replies:
Yeah, well, those have considerably more complicated func-
tions than the toaster or hair dryer in my opinion. Because
some toothbrushes even have a timer by now and a digital
display.
I miss the opportunity to remind her that she also described timing
abilities for the toaster.
Instead, I present her with the word cards. She first states that she
would not distinguish between pre-program and re-program. Chip,
processor, circuit board and engine are all hardware for her, while
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program and system belong to software. I ask whether there is a
difference between the last three:
Well, software is the umbrella term, I think, and program
is one small part from which the software and the entire
system is composed.
While she herself never mentioned the terms software or system in
the context of her groupings, this description is consistent with the
notion that they convey a sense of higher complexity and capability
than a mere program. Of course, I also ask her to compare electric
and electronic. She states that everything electronic is also electric, but
not vice versa. The difference is that electronics are “more than just
on and off, but also have some program inside, some software.” My
last question asks her to compare electronics and informatics, which
she describes as synonymous. Everything informatical is electronic
and vice versa, which is, of course, in harsh contrast to her previous
reasoning about the toaster.
In the end, her three groups are almost identical, but the differences
are important. In particular, the toaster, even though it is electronic
and programmed to “know how long it should leave the toast at what
setting,” is still not complex enough to be a computer or related to
informatics. As such, it firmly marks her distinction between the
capability levels of electronics and informatics by remaining stuck on
the former. At the same time, everything electronic should also be
informatics according to her own definition. Ultimately, her abstract
ideas about these concepts are not consistent with her reasoning about
concrete instances of them.
Will
Will is 14 years old and attends 9th grade. He says he is very interested
in informatics and always wanted to participate in related courses or
extracurricular activities, but somehow never did. Apart from a basic
ICT course in 7th grade, he has thus never received any related formal
education. This is another first-wave interview and during the free-
grouping phase, Will put together the Raspberry Pi and 3D printer,
which he respectively identified as a main board and PC casing. As
parts of a computer, those obviously “belong together.”
So my first question asks him to group all things that are or contain
a kind of computer. He immediately joins the Pi and printer with his
previous media group, containing the smartphone, gaming consoles,
TV and camera. He then excludes his entire previous group of house-
hold appliances (toaster, toothbrush, hair dryer, defibrillator, washing
machine) with the words:
Well, the household appliances, I would not say. They are
also electric, but there is no computer inside.
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Figure 5.4: Will’s initial conception of the washing machine
He does not perceive their functions as complex enough to warrant
anything more than (electro)mechanics. Figure 5.4 shows a plausible
assignment of values that he might have made here to the constraint
model in the context of the washing machine. Its function of washing
clothes appears rather simple and immediately transparent to him. It
requires little more than electricity, and maybe an engine or pump, to
turn the drum or pump the water. So why should there be a computer
inside? That would be unwarranted. He includes several other items
but does not really explain why, until he revisits the washing machine:
Those things, in no way [puts washing machine and toaster
further aside]. Or? Oh, the washing machine also has a
[breaks off]. Yes, then, yes [includes washing machine].
I ask him to explain and he does:
Yes, it also has a display. And there has to be a computer
behind it to display it. Or not? Yes. A little computation
unit in any case.
Noticing the display on the washing machine has increased its per-
ceived functional complexity because it now has to be able to put
something on that display. This functionality, which does not seem
immediately transparent to him, has to have a computer behind it.
Otherwise it could not work (establishing transparency). Or to put it
in his own words: “It cannot be shown just like that, out of nothing.”
Figure 5.5 shows the new values he seems to have assigned here to the
constraint model after noticing the display of the washing machine.
Displays remain a central criterion for him and his final group
mostly contains corresponding items. Exceptions include the Mars
rover, which needs a computer because “it has many detectors and
such,” and of course the original computer parts (mainboard and
casing). Curiously, the ticket vending machine and pocket calculator,
both of which have displays, are not part of his group. Maybe he just
overlooked them? Unfortunately, I miss the opportunity to point them
out.
5.4 results 95
what is behind it
computer
Capability
logic and
computation
display something
high
Complexity
delayed
Transparency
has
initially
impedes
warrants establishes
enables
has
informatics
Figure 5.5: Will’s conception of the washing machine after noticing its dis-
play
Instead, I go on and ask him to put together things related to
informatics. He starts with the robots and the car, then adds the
gaming consoles, smartphone, TV and digital watch. I ask why and
he says:
Because I know that this is programmed a lot. I mean, for
all these things, a program has to be written. I know that.
Something like an operating system.
He now argues on the basis of prior knowledge rather than analytical
reasoning. This is also the first time the terms “program” and “system”
are uttered in the interview. They never played a role in the context of
his computer group. Nevertheless, he states that his main associations
with informatics are computers, programming and technology in
general. Of course, he includes “the computer,” referring again to the
Raspberry Pi and 3D printer. After having added the router because
it “also has a little built-in computer,” however, he asserts that he is
uncertain whether any kind of computer immediately has to do with
informatics. He says he does not include items that he is uncertain
about, so I ask which items those are:
I don’t know, the traffic light [pauses]. But yes, something
has to be switched there. There is also some system behind
it, otherwise the traffic light would not work.
He lacks explicit knowledge about the traffic light and thus falls back
to reasoning about perceived functional complexity in order to establish
transparency. He also says he is unsure about the smartmeter because
“I don’t really know what that is.” The device is unknown to him, so
he is unable to ascertain its functional complexity. Hence, he leaves
the smartmeter out of his group. He misses a warrant for why it
should belong there. The defibrillator is left out as well. Curiously,
the displays on both items did not change his mind.
My last question asks him to put together things that can or have to
be programmed. He now excludes “the casing,” but includes the traffic
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light, again referring to the system behind it. He then looks at the
remainder of his previous informatics group and starts to generalize:
Yes, actually, all these things have to be somehow [breaks
off]. Otherwise they would not function. They somehow
have to be [long pause].
I ask what they have to be. He seems to have lost his thought, but
asserts that he is sure that a lot of these things are programmed, after
all, “that is why I often decided [to include them].” His wording
above strongly suggests a process of establishing transparency: the
items “somehow have to be” programmed, “otherwise they would not
function.” This is interesting since he previously included many of
them because he knew them to be programmed. The current task to
specifically look for programming, however, seems to have prompted
him to do a double-check and indeed find a warrant for his decision.
He is again unsure about some items, like the toaster, hair dryer and
toothbrush, and whether those “actually have to do with program-
ming” and not “rather with mechanisms:”
For instance, the toaster. That the current heats the wires,
so the bread is toasted. I don’t think that this has to do
with programming.
His explanatory model for the toaster’s function does not require
anything more than a wire heated by an electric current. It does
not warrant the capabilities of a program. However, he includes the
defibrillator, which he was unsure about in the context of informatics,
because it offers “different settings.” This time, the smartmeter also
ends up in the group.
In the end, his three groups are very similar. Apart from the “PC
casing,” the discrepancies only pertain to items that he said he was
uncertain about at some point (traffic light, defibrillator, smartmeter),
or where he apparently did not consistently apply his own grouping
criteria (displays on ticket vending machine, pocket calculator and
smartmeter). The defibrillator and smartmeter offer the only pieces
of evidence suggesting a distinction between the capability levels of
electronics and informatics. He had no trouble grouping them as pro-
grammed, but was unsure about their status in relation to informatics.
However, both items were previously part of his computer group as
well. Moreover, programs and “little computation units” seem to be
on the same conceptual level as computers, software and operating
systems for him. At no point did he refer to any capability limits
of the former. So while his case may be slightly ambiguous, Will’s
distinction between the capability levels of electronics and informatics
does not seem nearly as robust as that of Urien or Valerie.
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5.5 limitations and discussion
As described in Sect. 3.2, grounded theory studies aim for theoretical
saturation, whose assertion requires careful consideration. As a neces-
sary prerequisite, the second wave of interviews utilized theoretical
sampling. Only informatics students were sampled as they were pre-
viously found to provide higher quality responses, and an additional
data gathering procedure based on preliminary analytical concepts
was introduced to elicit different kinds of responses.
According to Charmaz (2014), saturated analytical categories are
not only “robust” against “the range of variation within and between”
them (213) but are, in fact, able to define and explain it. Here, it is
my hope that the above accounts, particularly the case reports, have
demonstrated that the proposed grounded theory is able to capture
and explain a broad range of variation within students’ reasoning
about the computational status of technical artifacts. To that extent, a
case for theoretical saturation can be made.
However, the study did not use a judgment of theoretical saturation
as a termination condition. Instead, data gathering ended after a preset
number of interviews, determined by available time and resources.
While there is always the possibility that further data gathering may
uncover new analytical properties, this limitation weakens the claim
for saturation.
In particular, the three proposed levels of capability may partially be
an artifact of the repetitive task design, which always only asked for
informatics, computers and programming. It may be that sampling
additional data about specific, hitherto identified properties, for in-
stance, “networked things” or “things with an operating system” may
further flesh out those properties or even reveal additional capability
levels. If that were the case, capability as an analytical category would
not yet be theoretically saturated.
Nevertheless, with respect to previous research, the three identified
levels appear to already encapsulate all of the five conceptions pre-
sented in Sect. 2.2.3 in some form or other. While programmability
was an explicit part of the task design itself, the results clearly show
that students generally conceived of computers as programmed or pro-
grammable devices. The two conceptions related to mechanical and
electrical entities are captured by the (electro)mechanics level of capabil-
ity. On the one hand, students very well understood that computers
generally require electricity and may contain mechanical components.
On the other hand, those properties were not sufficient to determine
the computational status of an artifact. On the contrary, something
that was seen as only containing (electro)mechanical elements, like
wiring, gears or engines, was neither programmable nor a computer
and certainly not related to informatics in the eyes of most students.
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Instead, categorization often revolved around seemingly cognitive
capabilities, like timing, remembering, conditional behavior, adaptabil-
ity or autonomy, which align with the two conceptions of computers
as intelligent and knowing entities. Moreover, such functions were
often not immediately transparent to students. This is consistent
with observations made by Turkle (2005) that computing machinery
often appears “opaque,” leading to a “cognitive dead-end” (61). In
the present study, participants’ way out of such a dead-end was the
postulation of an additional element in order to establish transparency:
there has to be something behind it, otherwise it would not work.
Lastly, with respect to artifact categorization, average computer
group sizes of over 12 items strongly suggest that many participants
readily interpreted the term as a superordinate category that covers
much more than desktop and laptops devices. Arguably, the exclusion
of precisely those artifacts from the picture set (Sect. 4.2) may have
encouraged this. It is certainly possible that, if they had been present,
some students might have sorted only those as actual computers. Still,
this does not invalidate the observation that many apparently also
possessed related conceptions that subsume a much broader range
of artifacts, and are certainly able to interpret the term “computer”
accordingly. This is consistent with the findings reported by Brinda
et al. (2019) and Grover et al. (2016) discussed in Sect. 2.2.2.
However, not all computers appear to be created equal. In contrast
to “real” computers, “small” ones may not warrant an association
with informatics due to perceived limitations in their computing capa-
bilities. In other words, while the present results support the notion
that students strongly associate informatics with computers – a consis-
tent finding of previous research (Sect. 2.2.1) – the converse may not
hold. Not all things that students regard as a kind of computer are
necessarily associated with informatics, and we should probably be
cautious how to interpret general statements about such relations.
5.6 summary and implications
The aim of this study was to investigate research questions q3 and
q4 about how students identify computing technology, and what
concepts, reasons and possibly misconceptions they employ in the
process. The grounded theory proposed in this chapter and depicted
in Fig. 5.2 aims to address these questions.
Students’ categorizations generally revolved around function and
seemingly cognitive behavior. In accordance with Grover et al. (2016)’s
findings, visual features seemed of lesser import. Indeed, they only
appeared relevant if and when they suggested a certain functionality.
The decisive factor in judging an artifact was “what is behind it” that
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makes it work. The more complex a device’s function appeared, the
more (computationally) capable was the element that drives it.
Apart from explicit prior knowledge about an artifact, students’
reasoning about “what is behind it” often followed a process of estab-
lishing transparency and warranting capability. In short, “what is behind
it” needs to be capable enough to explain the perceived function, but
no more than that. In that context, capability could fall on one of three
identified levels: (electro)mechanics, electronics or informatics. The
first was usually seen as completely unrelated to computing what-
soever. In contrast, the last was usually associated with prototypical
computing concepts, like networking, software systems and “real”
computers. The middle level, electronics, sits between these two and,
as I shall argue below, should probably be regarded as educationally
undesirable.
The central motivation for this study stemmed from research on
transfer of learning, particularly conceptual categorization and the
transfer-in-pieces framework (Sect. 2.1). The underlying assumption
was that identifying (categorizing) computing technology, particu-
larly computers and programming (Sect. 2.2.1), may cue other related
concepts. Indeed, such effects frequently occurred. Many students
spontaneously referred to disciplinary concepts that were not intro-
duced by the interview task, e.g., networking, chips or data processing
(see also Table 5.2). Programs and programming, too, were mentioned
by several students before they were explicitly introduced by the task
design (e.g., Valerie and Will; Sect. 5.4.3). However, the present results
also suggest two aspects that may be detrimental to transfer processes
as intended by educators.
First, and in further accordance with situated accounts of transfer,
this study provides evidence of students’ conceptions and reasoning
being reshaped in the context of concrete artifacts. Recall Will who
immediately and categorically excluded all household appliances from
his computer group, apparently because they were household appliances.
On the one hand, this suggests a somewhat undesirable conception
about the computational status of household appliances in general.
On the other hand, a closer look at individual devices, particularly the
washing machine, prompted Will to reconsider. Also recall Valerie,
whose reasoning about concrete electronic devices, particularly the
toaster, was inconsistent with her own general understanding of the
concept. Most tellingly, she stood by her decision even when she
seemed to become aware of the contradiction herself. For both stu-
dents, particular cues in the contexts of these artifacts (displays for
Will, overall perceived complexity for Valerie) led to a kind of thinking
that ultimately took precedence over the direct application of abstract
conceptions.
Second, the conceived capability level of electronics arguably runs
counter to the very idea of general computing concepts that “all of
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these systems are based on” (Brinda and Diethelm 2017: 654; see also
Sect. 1.3). In cognitive terms, such concepts establish a conceptual
equivalence between those systems and it is, in turn, precisely this
equivalence that facilitates generalization and transfer across them
(Sect. 2.1). In the eyes of students, however, such an equivalence may
not always be given. Instead, electronic components like “circuitry
boards” or “small computers” may constitute a less capable kind of
computing technology, to which certain concepts, like networking
or adaptability, are not applicable. As described above, embedded
systems such as the traffic light, TV or washing machine appeared to
be particularly susceptible to this kind of thinking.
At this point, the reader may object that embedded computers often
are, in fact, designed to only provide a limited set of functions (Hüning
2019: 11-13). However, those functions are merely products of a design
process, the result of human intentions (de Vries 2016). There is no
a priori limit to human intention. Therefore, if we want students
to adequately identify and evaluate current and future computing
technologies as well as their potential consequences, a conception that
renders many embedded systems as inherently incapable of certain
computing functions is arguably detrimental to that goal.
6 SMALL BUT POWERFUL
The aim of this chapter is to investigate research questions q5 and q6
about the critical aspects of everyday computing technology that
students need to learn about in order to adequately recognize and
evaluate it, and the conditions facilitating such learning. As indicated,
those questions are centrally motivated by variation theory’s notion of
critical aspects, which constitute “what is to be learned” about a certain
“object of learning” (Marton et al. 2019). Recall that such aspects can
only partially be derived from disciplinary considerations and also
have to consider students’ prior conceptions (Pang and Ki 2016) and
related learning difficulties (Guo et al. 2012). Prior conceptions have
been the subject of the previous chapters. Learning processes and
difficulties will be the subject of this one, and will be investigated by
means of a learning study (Sect. 3.3).
6.1 preliminary considerations
The study was planned to be conducted in Berlin, Germany. For
details about informatics in the Berlin school curriculum, see Sect. 4.1
and Appendix A. The guiding educational objective for the interven-
tion presented in this chapter was to enable students to recognize
and evaluate computing technology in their everyday environment
(Sect. 1.2). In that context, the Berlin core informatics curriculum for
lower secondary levels states, for instance, that, by the end of grade
10, students should be able to “describe everyday informatics systems
and their typical components” as well as “critically evaluate [their]
impact on society and everyday life” (my transl., Landesinstitut für
Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg 2015: 16-17). Therefore, the
intervention was designed for a 10th-grade compulsory elective course.
From a curricular perspective then (see also Sect. 1.2), it stands
to reason that the ubiquity and impact of computing technology
already constitute two critical aspects. After all, those are precisely
the aspects that students should become aware of and understand
according to the above objectives. The findings presented in Chap. 5
suggest that another critical aspect may be computing capability, and
that, in principle, it remains the same for all kinds of computing
technology. Therefore, the initial intention of the intervention was to
enable students to understand the capabilities, ubiquity and consequences
of computing technology throughout society.
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Moreover, embedded systems may provide suitable examples to let
students experience and discuss these aspects in the classroom. First,
with repsect to “ubiquitous” computing (Weiser 1999), embedded
systems may well represent the very essence of that aspect. They
are virtually everywhere. Second, and for the same reason, embed-
ded systems are a central factor in how computing technology has
been changing modern society. Bohn et al. (2005) even argue that
“visions [of ubiquitous computing] expressly propose to transform
society by fully computerizing it” (2) and subsequently discuss various
social, economic and ethical consequences (see also Friedewald and
Raabe 2011). Third, the finding presented in Chap. 5 suggest that
embedded systems are particularly susceptible to being underesti-
mated by students in terms of their capabilities, which I have argued
may be detrimental to an appropriate evaluation of precisely those
consequences.
The core curriculum explicitly lists “physical computing projects” as
a possible means to explore everyday computing systems (Landesin-
stitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg 2015: 23). Several
related platforms and activities have been developed and proposed
in recent times, and at least some are also motivated by a goal to
broaden students’ conceptions of computing in society (e.g., Bergner
and Schroeder 2015; Przybylla and Romeike 2014). Here, the findings
presented in Chap. 5 also already suggest certain design principles
related to that goal. Essentially, students should understand that even
“small electronic circuit boards,” like maybe an Arduino or Raspberry
Pi, do have the same basic computing capabilities as “real” comput-
ers. Hence, they might explicitly create projects with capabilities that
are often only associated with the latter such as performing multiple
functions or connecting to a network. Another important factor might
be that the used platform is able to act independently from any “real”
computer. Hence, using another computer as the only available power
supply, or systems like Scratch-for-Arduino1 that require the board
to always stay connected to a host computer, might pose or even
create conceptual obstacles. Students might (correctly!) perceive the
“real” computer as critical for the board’s operation or as constantly
“telling” it what to do, thus diminishing its perceived capabilities. Re-
call Eric (page 85) who, despite having worked with a related platform
for about two years, still did not have a viable understanding of its
capabilities.
Based on these considerations, I prepared a very rough outline of a
lesson sequence around a physical computing project in the context
of embedded systems and the Internet of Things (IoT). The outline
is shown in Table 6.1. The card sorting in the beginning is based on
the interview procedure used in Chap. 5. It is meant to serve both
as a problem-oriented introduction to the topic as well as a covert
1 http://s4a.cat/, retrieved on February 28, 2020
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1 Informatics in Everyday Life
Students work in groups. Each group receives the same set
of unlabeled picture cards showing various technical devices.
Students sort the cards according to their computational nature
(e.g., programming, computers, informatics). Subsequently,
they present, explain and discuss their choices. The concept
“embedded system” is introduced and defined.
2 Embedded Systems
Students implement a physical computing project. They are
free to decide what kind of system they want to create, but
it should be something that may have an application in real
life. The examples from the card sorting task may serve as
inspiration. Subsequently, students present their projects to the
class and describe what real-world context it was inspired by.
3 The Internet of Things
Students extend their prior projects such that they connect to
a wireless network and communicate with a server. Students
discuss what benefits and risks the network connection brings
with it. The concept “Internet of Things” is introduced and
defined.
4 Reflection and Conclusion
Students recall the initial card sorting activity and discuss if
they would approach it differently now. They should realize
that, potentially, any kind of device could contain an embedded
computer and be connected to a network, even though its
perceived complexity may not immediately suggest it.Table 6.1: Preliminary outline of an intervention design
pre-test to draw out students’ related prior conceptions. Subsequently,
they should create their own embedded computing projects based
on real-world contexts, connect them to a network and evaluate the
implications. Apart from the card sorting, the plan is kept deliberately
vague in order to give sufficient room to the teachers to later bring
in their own ideas and to cooperatively revise and adapt the plan to
their specific learner groups (Sect. 6.3).
One additional aspect that I predetermined, however, was the physi-
cal computing platform that should be used for the projects. As argued
above, it should facilitate and exhibit high computing capabilities as
best as possible. For that purpose, I chose the Raspberry Pi Zero W2
for the intervention. It is relatively inexpensive, has integrated WiFi,
runs a full-fledged Linux system and is thus highly configurable and
capable of multi-threading. In preparation for the study, I configured
2 ARM-based mini-computer; for specifications, see https://www.raspberrypi.org/
products/raspberry-pi-zero-w/ (retrieved on February 28, 2020).
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a stripped-down embedded operating system for the Pi that allowed
it to be connected to an external PC via USB, and to be programmed
via the Arduino integrated development environment (IDE).3 For the
IoT-part of the lesson sequence, I also implemented a server applica-
tion that the Pi could connect to and communicate with, as well as a
small library for the Arduino IDE that simplifies this communication.
For more details on these software projects, see Appendix C.1. I had
originally planned to also implement a multi-threading library for
the IDE, which I could not realize, however, due to limited time and
resources.
6.2 participants
The study was conducted in the school year 2017/18 in Berlin, Ger-
many. Three male teachers (henceforth, A, B and C) participated.
Teachers A and B worked at a grammar school located in a well-
situated area of the city. Teacher C had only recently completed his
training prior to the study and worked at a grammar school with a
notable migration background. Each teacher led a compulsory elective
informatics course in its second year (grade 10). Hence, all participat-
ing students were around 15 years old and had already completed at
least one school year of prior informatics education. I will likewise
refer to the courses as A, B and C, corresponding to the teacher that
taught the course. Both schools organized their lessons in doubles,
meaning that for all courses, the two lessons per week were taught as
a single unit. I will henceforth refer to these units as “blocks.”
Courses A (18 students, incl. four girls) and B (14 students, incl. one
girl) were taught in parallel, that is during the same time in adjacent
classrooms. Teachers A and B also planned their courses together and
usually covered the same topics during the same period. In grade
9, both courses had dealt with introductory programming concepts.
Students had programmed turtle graphics and Lego robots. Basic
state machines had been introduced with Kara.4 The first topic in
grade 10 had been networking and related protocols, which were
simulated with Filius.5 After that, the parallelism between the courses
was proken for the purpose of the study. Teacher A continued with
the intervention, while teacher B taught cryptography, and then did
the intervention.
3 https://www.arduino.cc/ (retrieved on February 28, 2020)
4 Swiss learning software, allowing students to “program” a ladybug using state
machines (www.swisseduc.ch/informatik/karatojava/kara/index.html, retrieved
on February 28, 2020).
5 German learning software that allows to set up and simulate computer networks in an
entirely virtual environment (www.lernsoftware-filius.de, retrieved on February
28, 2020).
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In grade 9, Course C (18 students, incl. 10 girls) had been introduced
to basic programming concepts with Scratch. Students had designed
their own games or animations, and also programmed a PicoBoard6
with it. Basic concepts of computer graphics were covered as well.
In grade 10, prior to the intervention, the course had covered an
introduction to the history of computing, followed by basic coding in
Python.
6.3 lesson planning and revision
During October 2017, I arranged for a total of four meetings with the
teachers, each lasting about 90 minutes. Teachers C and B could not
attend the first and third meeting, respectively. During the meetings,
the preliminary lesson plan (Table 6.1) was fleshed out in detail. The
teachers were encouraged to bring in their own ideas, to criticize and
revise the proposed plan in order to make it viable for themselves
and their courses. Together, we discussed and decided on specific
activities, assignments, time frames and required materials. Between
the meetings, I would prepare these materials and then present them
to the teachers for review in a subsequent meeting. By the end of the
fourth meeting, the sequence plan outlined in column A of Table 6.2
had been prepared.
The sequence was originally planned for six blocks, but was ex-
tended to seven even during the first iteration (see the case report for
Adria in Sect. 6.5.3 for details). The teachers liked the idea of the card
sorting as an introductory task, and proposed to have students hand in
pictures as a homework assignment. Those were then supplemented
by 18 additional examples, which were specifically selected to cover
the different domains of technology presented in Chap. 4: entertain-
ment, household, public and “real” technology. The same holds for
the selection of IoT-examples in the last block. The no/low-technology
category was excluded from both tasks. All instructions and support
materials related to the Raspberry Pi, Arduino IDE and available hard-
ware components were presented via an online learning management
system (LMS) hosted by the Berlin administration for education. See
Appendix C.2 for a detailed documentation of the lesson materials.
The sequence was implemented once by each teacher. I will refer to
each iteration as A, B and C, corresponding to the teacher and course.
Hence, teacher A taught course A during iteration A, and likewise
for B and C. The time-line is shown in Fig. 6.1. Based on iterations A
and B, the lesson plan was revised, resulting in columns B and C of
Table 6.2, respectively. However, as can be seen from Fig. 6.1, iterations
B and C partially overlapped. Hence, the revisions for iteration C had
to be made on rather short notice on a per-week basis. In the context
6 https://en.scratch-wiki.info/wiki/PicoBoard, last retrieved on February 28, 2020
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Iteration A Iteration B Iteration C
1
As homework, each student hands in two pictures of „technol-
ogy“ taken from their daily lives. In class, students sort pictures
as “informatics,” “possibly informatics” and “not informatics.”
Corresponding criteria are discussed and documented. The term
“embedded system” is introduced.
Students research “embedded system” on-
line.
Students read a
text on embedded
systems.
Students define “embedded system” and how they are similar
to or different from “normal” computers. The Raspberry Pi Zero
W is introduced. Students identify its components.
2 Students follow instructions in an online LMS to create an exam-
ple project with the Raspberry Pi and Arduino IDE.
The teacher ex-
plains analog-
digital converters.
Students receive a work sheet on the struc-
ture of Arduino programs and common
instructions.
3 Students work in groups to create their own embedded projects
with the Raspberry Pi and a set of available components.4
5 -
Students continue to work on their
projects.
6
Students finish their projects and present them in a gallery walk.
7
Students connect their own projects to an online server to send
messages, log sensor data or remote control the Pi. The term
“Internet of Things” is introduced.
Students work in triplets. Each group receives a description of
an IoT-system. Each student receives a role card for either an
entrepreneur, a lawyer or a hacker. Each group discuss their
system and then place it on a coordinate system based on how
useful and how dangerous they perceive it.
Table 6.2: Overview of the sequence plans for all three iterations. Numbers
indicate blocks.
of design research, these revisions could also be regarded as part of
the results of the study. However, due to the limited time between
the iterations, especially between B and C, they could not be based
on systematic data analysis, but resulted from further discussion with
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Figure 6.1: Time-line of the three iterations of the learning study. Dark areas
indicate vacation times.
the teachers. Therefore, I report them here as part of the procedure
rather than the results.
6.4 data gathering and analysis
All lessons were observed by myself. Observations were first docu-
mented in a handwritten protocol and then typewritten in more detail
as soon as possible after each block. Various lesson products, e.g.,
sorted cards, student projects or white-board contents, were docu-
mented via photographs. See Fig. 6.2 for an example.
For each course, three case students were selected with the aim
to have them represent different levels of performance or motiva-
tion (Dudley 2014). Their selection was based on the corresponding
teacher’s assessment. Case students were observed more closely and
were also interviewed at several points during the sequence. On each
occasion, they were asked what they had liked or disliked about that
day’s class, what they had found interesting and what they thought
they had learned that day. If applicable, other questions, e.g., based on
another student’s response in a previous interview, or on a noteworthy
situation that had occurred in class, were included at the interviewer’s
discretion. Two of the three case students were usually interviewed
after each block.
The teachers, too, were interviewed after each block. They were
asked what they thought went well, where they saw problems with
the current lesson design, and how it might be improved. These
interviews were originally meant to serve as a basis for the subsequent
design revisions, and have certainly informed that process. However,
due to the above-mentioned reasons, the teacher interviews were not
analyzed systematically in the course of this study. All case student
and teacher interviews were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim.
In principle, it would have been desirable for each teacher’s iteration
to also be observed by the other two (Sect. 3.3). However, this was not
possible due to the teachers’ own schedules. Instead, all observations
and interviews were conducted by myself only. While this limited
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Figure 6.2: Photograph of the white-board from the first block of iteration
B. It shows the card sorting criteria for “informatics” (left), “not
informatics” (upper right) and “possibly informatics” (lower
right) proclaimed by the students. Picture converted to black-
and-white for readability.
the amount of data that could be collected, it also reduced external
interference in the classroom situation and provided an opportunity to
establish individual rapport with the participants, particularly the case
students. It was my hope that the six (seven) weeks of the intervention
would allow for sufficiently prolonged engagement (Table. 3.2) for the
students to become accustomed to my presence in class, and to feel
comfortable with being interviewed afterwards.
Additionally, for iterations B and C, a delayed questionnaire was
included for all students to fill out three weeks after the final block.
First, it asked students whether ot not they had ever worked with a
Raspberry Pi or the Arduino IDE prior to the intervention. Second, it
asked students to recall the card sorting from the first block, if they
might approach it differently today, and if so, how. Third, it asked
about the “most important or most interesting” thing they would say
they learned “about computers and informatics” during the sequence
and, fourth, when they learned it. The questionnaire is reproduced in
Appendix C.3.
All data were imported into maxqda 2018. For a detailed documen-
tation of the research data, see Appendix D. The coding and analysis
was conducted by myself. However, code structures, intermediate
findings and further steps were constantly discussed with my super-
visors. The analysis started with a deductive approach, based on
variation theory’s notions of the “intended,” “enacted” and “lived
object of learning” (Marton 2015). They respectively describe learning
intentions, observed actions and actual student learning (see also van
den Akker 2010). Identifying the latter is, of course, already a highly
interpretive process.
Therefore, at the end of this phase, a dependability audit was
conducted (Akkerman et al. 2008; Lincoln and Guba 1982; Table 3.2).
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Three uninvolved colleagues each received the coded data from one
iteration, together with a coding manual describing the deductive
categories outlined above. The auditors were tasked to assess the
assignments of codes to data, to what extent they were comprehensive
and justified. That is not to say that coding structures could not be
further refined or revised after the audit. It was meant, however, to
establish an intermediary base line for dependability from which to
progress. The audit revealed only minor inconsistencies and mistakes,
which were all addressed accordingly.
Subsequently, the analysis aimed to relate “observed learning” (or
lack thereof) to observed classroom situations, activities and intentions
in order construct a more conceptual understanding of those relations.
The process was informed, of course, by prior considerations about
critical aspects (Sect. 6.1), particularly my own previous research
(Chaps. 4 and 5). As a counterbalance to this influence, the analysis
utilized inductive techniques from GTM, particularly open and focused
coding, constant comparison and reflective memo writing (Sect. 3.2).
Hence, analytical codes, whether derived from prior work or induced
by data, were likewise treated as working hypotheses and continuously
compared to other codes and data. In essence, I did non assume that
the three critical aspects outlined in Sect. 6.1 would necessarily suffice
to adequately render students thinking and learning processes.
Indeed, in the course of the analysis, a fourth critical aspect emerged,
namely low threshold, while others were slightly revised. For instance,
consequences were further differentiated into global and situated, depend-
ing on their scope. Moreover, capability was recast as high capability
to emphasize its juxtaposition to low threshold. The only aspect that
survived the analysis unchanged is ubiquity. I will, of course, de-
scribe those four aspects and their relations, particularly between low
threshold and high capability, in more detail below.
Again, recall that critical aspects aim to describe “what is to be
learned” (Marton et al. 2019), and may be both normatively and
empirically motivated. Accordingly, the constructed model of critical
aspects is ultimately a hybrid product, comprising both elements of
what students should learn as well as what they apparently need to
learn in conjunction (Sect. 2.1). The former have been derived from
educational objectives and curricula (Sect. 1.2), the latter from both the
previous (Chap. 5) and present study. In accordance with the quality
criteria for naturalistic inquiries (Sect. 3.1.2) and grounded theories
(Sect. 3.2), the model’s main purpose is to provide a credible and
useful framework for the analysis of students’ thinking and learning
in relation to everyday computing technology.
To strengthen that claim, after the analysis had been completed, a
confirmability audit was conducted (Akkerman et al. 2008; Lincoln
and Guba 1982; Table 3.2). A written draft of the results, including
the constructed model, was handed out to the same three colleagues,
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together with the complete maxqda-file, including all raw data, cod-
ings and memos as well as several mind maps that had been created
in the process. The auditors were tasked to assess whether the model
indeed provides a fitting and useful rendering of the data, whether
the proposed interpretations are plausible, and whether quotes are
reported appropriately.
All three auditors generally certified that the presented findings
and interpretations are plausible and adequately related to the data.
The audit mostly revealed minor issues regarding clarity of style
or ambiguous formulations, which were revised accordingly. Two
auditors proposed alternative interpretations for concrete situations.
After a discussion with those auditors, the first turned out to be a
misunderstanding, while the second was incorporated into the report.
Specifically, the second auditor suggested that Adria’s (Sect. 6.5.3)
enthusiasm about the “difficult” keypad is connected to her conception
of informatics as dealing mostly with “complicated” things. It is
worthy of note that this interpretation, although initially overlooked,
is in fact consistent with the propsed critical aspects, particularly the
juxtaposition between low threshold and high capability. For details, see
Adria’s case report.
6.5 results
This section is structured as follows. I will first provide a largely
descriptive account of the model of critical aspects that resulted from
the analysis. Here, I will present excerpts from the data only to the
extent as to make the aspects and their relations comprehensive. Sub-
sequently, I will present more detailed accounts of concrete classroom
and learning situations related to those critical aspects. Here, I will
already use the model in a more analytical fashion. On the one hand,
the discussed situations can thus be understood as providing further
empirical support for the model. On the other hand, I hope to convey
in this fashion that it does, in fact, provide a useful framework to
analyze students’ learning in those situations. Lastly, I will present
three selected case reports, one from each iteration. I will trace each
student’s trajectory through the intervention and, as before, analyze
their thinking and learning (or lack thereof) with the help of the crit-
ical aspects, and with reference to the learning situations described
previously. All quotes were translated from German. All student
names are changed.
6.5.1 Critical Aspects
Fig. 6.3 shows the model of the four critical aspects low threshold,
high capability, ubiquity and consequences as well as relations between
6.5 results 111
high
capability
powerful
versatile
networked
small
cheap
economical
low
threshold
benets
risks
systems
applications
contexts
ubiquity
conse-
quences
si
tu
ated
g l ob
a
l
Figure 6.3: Four critical aspects of computing technology in everyday life.
them that resulted from the analysis. The newly emerged aspect
low threshold describes that computing technology can be very small,
cheap and economical (e.g., IBM Research 2018). This accessibility is
a central prerequisite for its ubiquity. Computing technology fits into
virtually everything, both physically and economically. The aspect high
capability describes its extensive functionality. Computing technology
is potentially very powerful, multi-functional and networked. This is
the second prerequisite for its ubiquity. The fourth aspect describes
the consequences of computing technology, both positive and negative.
These may either be situated in the sense that one particular system
may be beneficial or risky, mainly for the people using it; or they may
be more global or societal, possibly reaching people who are not in
direct contact with the system at all. Situated consequences follow
directly from the high capabilities of computing technology. Global
consequences are more far reaching and thus less direct. In fact, they
may be rather intangible or even an emergent result of the ubiquitous
use of computing technology across various domains.
The idea that computing technology has, in principle, very high
capabilities seemed to be rather intuitive for many students. Modern
entertainment and communication systems hardly posed a challenge
for anyone during the initial card sorting task. Televisions and gaming
consoles were clearly informatics. The car and space satellite, too,
rarely spawned disagreement. The reasons that were given in this
context included, for instance, the processing of “information” or
terms like “control system,” “software” or “internet access.”
However, the idea that such powerful technology can also be rather
small and cheap (low threshold) seemed considerably less intuitive.
Only very few students initially sorted devices like the fridge, heating
or electric drill as informatics. The washing machine and wind turbine
left several students in doubt as well. In course A, one group put
aside various devices as intrinsically “uninteresting,” and a student
in course B categorically excluded “normal household appliances”
112 small but powerful
and everything that is “not so complex.” The arguments for this
included that devices that can work with “just electrics,” “purely
mechanically” or via “physics” probably would not contain computers
or programs because they could “make do without them.” It seemed
as if many students regarded the use of computing technology as an
unwarranted expenditure in these cases. Why use it if you could do
the same with just a bit of circuitry or mechanism? Conversely, there
were instances in which students would regard devices as “electronic”
or “programmed” but also as rather limited in their capabilities. Such
devices would be “not complex enough to do several things” and their
programming should be kept “as simple as possible.” They do contain
computing technology, but it is not a very capable kind.
For several students then, the two critical aspects low threshold and
high capability seemed to be in conflict with each other: if it is powerful
and versatile, it surely is expensive and demanding; but if it is small
and cheap, it probably cannot do much. The lightning bolt in Fig. 6.3
is meant to symbolize this conflict. The two case reports for Adria and
Carim in Sect. 6.5.3 will illustrate it in more detail.
As outlined above, several students assumed the presence of com-
puting technology only if they had a concrete reason for why it should
be there, while entire domains like “household appliances” might
not even be looked at in any detail. Of course, such thinking signifi-
cantly limits its potential ubiquity. In the follow-up questionnaire, two
students from course B described their original approach to the card
sorting as follows:
I looked for input options. If I found any, I grouped the
device as informatics. Devices for which I could imagine a
kind of automated maintenance or regulation, I grouped
as possibly informatics.
[I looked for] rather obvious things, if informatics features
were necessary. Objects that would also work without them,
I decided for not informatics.
And this is how they say they would approach the task after the
intervention if they had to do it again:
I would probably already group things as informatics for
which I would regard some kind of informatics extension
as useful.
Some things I grouped as not informatics, I would group
as possibly informatics because embedded systems can be
almost anywhere.
They described their original approaches as based on visible or even
obvious features. Now they seem to think slightly differently. Instead
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Figure 6.4: Students’ approximate judgments of IoT-systems during the last
block. Figure shows a schematic overlay of all placements from
all three iteration.
of a concrete justification, their reasoning has shifted to potential
extensions and generalizations. They seem to have developed at
least some understanding that computing technology may also be
present in situations where it cannot be directly perceived at first
glance. With respect to ubiquity this arguably constitutes a desirable
insight. At the end of the sequence, some students would even flatly
state that, “in principle, anything can be informatics.” While from a
disciplinary perspective, this may be a slight overstatement, I would
argue, nevertheless, that such a disposition is by far more desirable
than the categorical exclusion of entire device domains like kitchen
appliances.
Concerning the consequences of computing technology, in the final
block, students discussed various IoT-systems and then placed them
in a coordinate system depending on how useful or dangerous they
regarded them (Table 6.2). The respective descriptions mainly outlined
the systems’ functionality, but not any direct weak points or abuse
scenarios. Fig. 6.4 shows a schematic overlay of all system placements
extracted from photographs taken during the three iterations. While
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it represents little more than broad approximations and certainly does
not allow any meaningful quantification, it clearly shows that almost
all items were placed in the upper right quadrant: rather useful, but
also rather risky. Hence, it seems that students were quite able to
discern not only the systems’ benefits, but also their potential risks.
This is what a student from course B said about the television:
Personal data is at risk, but no material damage and no
risk of injury.
Bodily injury usually had the highest relevance for students, followed
by material damage. Loss of information and privacy seemed least
critical for many. In Fig. 6.4 this may be most notable in the placements
of the car, whose potential for bodily injury may have been the most
salient among the examples.
Fig. 6.4 also shows that different students may very well judge the
same system differently (e.g., fridge, wind turbine and door lock).
Apart from the above-mentioned kinds of risks, another reason for
this may lie in different foci on either situated or global consequences.
The following are excerpts from the observation protocols from each
of the iterations:
A: [The group’s] risk assessment [of the wind turbine] is rather
high, as is its usefulness. It saves time and money, but also has
the potential for considerable material damage, for instance, if a
hacker “switches off every turbine.” According to Adria [see
case reports], the public power supply could be jeopardized.
B: [The group judges] the wind turbine as rather useful but also
rather dangerous. A hacker could turn off or even “destroy” the
turbines, which would incur considerable “financial damage.”
C: [A student in the group] describes the wind turbine as largely
“not dangerous for us humans” but certainly as a lucrative target
for hackers, e.g., via black mail.
The approximate placements of the wind turbine are respectively
marked with A, B and C in Fig. 6.4. All three assessments mainly
describe material consequences (time, money, property), but only the
group in A explicitly draws a potential connection to their own lives:
a power outage not only concerns the proprietor of the wind park
but also the general public. It has societal, more global reach. In
contrast, the student in C explicitly precludes this. She regards the
wind turbine as “not dangerous for us humans.” It’s consequences are
limited to the situation of whoever owns or operates the wind park.
I strongly suspect that this is the reason why group C regarded the
turbine as markedly less dangerous. Although the group in B also
does not describe a direct connection to their own lives, they do not
explicitly preclude it either. Moreover, they do seem to describe a
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most vivid version of material damage, namely the turbine’s outright
destruction.
In sum, the perceived consequences of a technical system seemed
to be highly influenced by individual perceptions, dispositions and
values. How important are material property or privacy to me? Am
I myself affected or only others? Does this make a difference to me?
How these various factors jointly entered into the actual processes of
assessment, however, could not be reconstructed from the data.
6.5.2 Learning Conditions
Making the Connection
One of the most surprising observations of the study was made in the
context of an exam, which took place after the third block of iteration
A. The date was set by the school and could not be changed. At that
time, the concept of embedded systems had been introduced and
students were in the middle of their project work. The networking
capabilities of embedded systems and the “Internet of Things” had
not yet been discussed. However, as outlined in Sect. 6.2, the entire
previous lesson sequence had revolved around networking. The exam
was designed by the teacher, and its first part thus covered networking
protocols, client-server architectures and routing procedures. In the
second part, students should first provide a definition for embedded
systems and then describe possible ways to embed a computer into
three given objects: a bicycle, a backpack and a perambulator. Of the
42 produced descriptions, only two contained a vague reference to
networking in the form of a remote or app control. Given that the
entire previous lesson sequence as well as the first half of the exam
itself dealt with nothing but computer networks, this absence of the
concept here was indeed surprising.
Part of the phenomenon may be explained with the above-mentioned
conflict between low threshold and high capability. Two students explic-
itly stated in their definitions of embedded systems that they would
not be capable to communicate with other systems. A third student
asserted that they were “only designed for small, simple tasks.” It
seems that these students, at least, still held the conception that small
and cheap embedded computers may not be capable of networking.
In many cases, however, it seems much more likely that students
simply regarded the two topics of “networking” and “embedded
systems” in the same way they were presented both in class and the
exam: as two separate and independent topics. A transfer from one to
the other was not asked for – and did not take place.
The following excerpt is taken from an interview with a student of
the same course after the final block:
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S: [We have seen] a few new systems so to speak, how it all de-
velops and progresses. That it is all controlled via the internet.
And that you get a new perspective on it a little.
R: Was that new for you?
S: No.
R: You knew that already?
S: That it is dangerous and risky, I knew that.
R: Would you say that you think differently about technology now,
or did nothing change there?
S: Well, a little differently. [. . . ] For example, that I know a little
better what happens exactly when the system is connected to
the network.
He already knew that computational systems in general come with
certain risks attached (consequences) and are often connected to the
internet (high capability). However, despite the fact that the entire previ-
ous sequence dealt with nothing but networks, today’s “new systems”
(novel examples, see below) still opened up a “new perspective” for
him and apparently furthered his understanding of “what happens
exactly when the system is connected to the network.” Learning about
abstract concepts and learning to connect them to concrete situations
and systems are not the same thing.
In the previous section, I argued that students seemed quite able
to discern potential risks of the presented IoT-systems, even though
the descriptions did not explicitly include them. Of course, the task
directly asked for such an assessment. In particular, the hacker and
lawyer role cards contained explicit instructions to look for possible
weak point and abuses of the system. So while students generally
seemed able to complete that task, this is what a case student from
course C said after the block:
[We have] talked about whether certain technical devices
are dangerous or useful and to what extent that is. And
I have learned that behind things that are beneficial in
everyday life, like a television because we use it every day,
that there are also bad things in a way.
It seems that it had never occurred to her that some everyday technolo-
gies might also come with “bad things” attached, until today’s lesson
explicitly prompted her to do so. It was exactly such a prompt that
was absent from the exam in course A. It stands to reason that most
students likely would have had no difficulties to include networking
capabilities into their descriptions, had the task explicitly asked for it.
The case reports for Adria and Bill in Sect. 6.5.3 will provide two more
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elaborate examples of how little disposed some students may be to
even think about computing when there is no one around to demand
it.
All participating students had already completed at least one school
year of informatics education (Sect. 6.2). Presumably, many already
knew something about everyday computing technology. In fact, several
previously covered topics, like robotics, programming or networking
seem immediately relevant for the potential capabilities and conse-
quences of embedded systems and IoT. However, it seems that students
may simply fail to make a connection between their existing abstract
informatics knowledge and concrete technologies. Of course, once
students leave the classroom, there is little educators can do in this
respect. Hence, it may be all the more important to systematically
foster these connections in class.
Examples: Novel, Extreme, Real
At various points during the lesson sequence, students were con-
fronted with examples of embedded systems: the card sorting in the
first block, the IoT-systems in the last block, and of course their own
various project ideas. In that context, three properties were identified
as relevant for students’ perceptions of and learning related to such
examples: novel, extreme and real.
As described in Sect. 6.3, the examples presented in the first and
last block were specifically chosen in order to represent different
domains of technology and thus illustrate the ubiquity of computing
in society. This is what four students from course B described in the
questionnaire as “the most important or most interesting” thing they
had learned during the sequence:
That some informatics is in many devices of which you
would not expect it.
Many devices have embedded systems.
How versatilely embedded systems can be used.
Integrated systems are inside more devices than expected.
First of all, these statements indeed suggest desirable learning out-
comes with respect to the critical aspect ubiquity. The first three
students also answered the follow-up question about when in the
sequence they had learned this:
First block
last lesson with assigned roles
After we evaluated the classification of the objects.
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They describe (activities of) the first and/or last block, in which
the above-mentioned examples from various contexts were sorted,
assessed and discussed. It seems that at least some of those were new
or even unexpected to them. Which those were, however, could not be
reconstructed. There are two considerations that need to be observed
here. First, it is important to consider the relation between concept
and context. An example has to be novel as an example of computing
technology. Recall the student already quoted in the previous section
who asserted to generally know that networking, as a concept, entails
certain risks, but for whom “a few new systems” provided novel
contexts for it. Naturally, if the system (the context) is itself novel to a
student, then it will also be a novel example of computing technology.
However, even a familiar device can be novel in that respect if the
student was previously unaware of its computational nature. Second,
it is also important to distinguish novelty from diversity. On the one
hand, a more diverse set of examples arguably increases the overall
chance that it also contains instances that are novel for students.
On the other hand, selecting diverse, but only familiar examples,
whose computational nature was already apparent to students, while
technically consistent with variation theory and thus probably also
beneficial for learning in other respects, may not be able to facilitate
learning about the ubiquity of computing concepts and technologies.
The second criterion, extreme, describes that examples should in-
clude expressions of the different critical aspects that are as extreme
as possible. When teacher C asked during the first block what things
could not be made computational, a student replied: “paper” and
gave as her reason that no computer could be built into it. None of
the examples included paper, however (although all were printed on
paper, of course). It rather seemed as if she regarded paper as a sort
of conceptual lower bound. Paper is so thin that it virtually has no
volume at all. If there is anything you cannot build a computer into, it
surely is paper! The relevant critical aspect is low threshold. However,
with respect to RFID chips in libraries and integrated systems on a
millimeter scale (IBM Research 2018), embedding computing technol-
ogy into paper is certainly possible. No such example was mentioned
in class at that point. It is possible, however, that corresponding exam-
ples may very well enable downright disruptive experiences. If even
that is possible, what else might be?
During the last block, a student from course B commented on the
IoT-door lock: “Such locks are fatally insecure. You just have to hack
them!” It seemed as if he had encountered such systems before and
apparently associated them with extreme risk. The relevant critical
aspect is consequences. Only moments later, however, he exclaimed:
“Man, does this really exist? Brutal!” If he had indeed seen such door
locks before, then maybe it was just in the movies? It seems he had
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not believed that anyone would actually go and build such extremely
risky devices. But if even that exists, what else might?
The situation is slightly different from a novel example in that the
notion of an IoT-door lock seemed already familiar to the student.
He just did not believe it actually exists. Similarly, the other student
came up with the idea of computational paper herself, but then sim-
ply discarded it as impossible. In that sense, the above situations
also depended on the perception of realism (or lack thereof). Each
description of an IoT-system contained a link to a real website, where
a corresponding system was described or advertised. It was probably
this link that showed the above student that such door locks “really
exist.” There were also other situations where students seemed to
doubt the realism of some of the examples or even their very own
project ideas. One case student, whose project was to build a parking
assistant for a (toy) car, was asked in an interview if she thought such
a function would “in reality” also be implemented “with such a small
computer” or somehow differently. Her answer: “I don’t know. I
think you could do it that way.” Of course, you could do it that way.
She herself was doing it that way. But she seemed uncertain about
how realistic her project actually was and if, at the end of the day, it
was really more than just some contrived classroom gadget.
The above situations about the paper and door lock also illustrate
that there may be a certain tension between the criteria extreme and
real. The more extreme an example seems to be, the less realistic
it might appear. Hence, it may be important to explicitly address
and counteract this effect. The best classroom example may be of
little value if students discard it as fictitious or unrealistic. A sim-
ilar dependence also seems plausible for novel examples, although
no corresponding situation could be observed. If students assume
that classroom examples bear little resemblance to actually existing
technologies, it stands to reason that knowledge and insights from
one domain are only insufficiently transferred to the other.
The Technology Behind It
In the questionnaire, three weeks after the final block, a student from
course B described as the most important thing he had learned during
the sequence:
How a Raspberry Pi works. All the places it can be found.
Another said he would now identify informatics devices as follows:
Not just according to appearance, but I would look how
the device works, what electronics are built into it and
whether a Raspberry Pi could be present.
In relation to the ubiquity of computing technology, the Raspberry Pi
apparently became a kind of reference object for these students. In the
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interview after the first block, a case student from course C described
the following, when asked what about the Raspberry Pi or embedded
systems she found “most interesting or maybe even surprising:”
Well, that it is so small. And so many things, for in-
stance, the memory card and that many things can be
programmed into it. [. . . ] That really astonished me.
Why did that astonish her?
Because it is, so to speak [breaks off]. I don’t know how
it was done, but it is so small and you don’t have to carry
it. I mean, it is easy to carry so to speak. I mean, I don’t
know.
She struggles visibly to put her thoughts about the small and yet so
versatile Raspberry Pi into words. Again, the situation illustrates the
conflict between the low threshold and high capability of computing
technology that many students seemed to perceive. Their combined
occurrence in the form of the Raspberry Pi was simply astonishing for
her.
In another situation of iteration C, two students were visibly sur-
prised when the Raspberry Pi immediately resumed the execution of
the program they had written a week ago, even though they had not
even opened the IDE again. They did not seem to expect that the Pi
could operate autonomously and independently from a “big” com-
puter (high capability). Likewise, a student from course B was visibly
surprised when the teacher numbered the clock speed of the Pi with
1GHz. Here, too, the conflict between low threshold and high capability
seemed to be at play: wow, that small thing clocks 1GHz?! Here, too,
the Raspberry Pi apparently enabled a meaningful experience that
challenged this conflict. The case report for Carim includes another
situation of that kind.
During the intervention, the Raspberry Pi was the central illus-
tration of the computing technology “behind” embedded systems.
The students analyzed its components and found that it essentially
possesses the same as any “normal” computer: processor, memory,
USB- and even display port. They held it in their hands and directly
experienced how small and light it is. During the project phase they
saw that it can be used to do all sorts of different things and that it
“even has internet access.” In the context of computing technology,
the Pi’s properties, its size, weight and functional range thus became
reference values for some students. As such, it had a direct impact on
the conceptions that they developed about computing technology in
everyday situations.
Hence, in corresponding lessons, it may be important to choose a
hardware platform that combines the two critical aspects low threshold
and high capability as best as possible. While the Raspberry Pi Zero
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W seemed to be a promising choice here, I do by no means claim
that it is the best. There certainly exist other platforms that fulfill this
criterion equally well and there will probably be others in the future
that do so to an even greater extent. In contrast, however, platforms
with notably less performance and memory, a bigger size and without
network connectivity may not make for good reference objects in the
context of embedded computing technology, and probably would not
have enabled some of the experiences described above.
6.5.3 Case Reports
Adria
Her teacher described Adria as a good and interested student. In an
extracurricular club, she has worked with Arduino before and she
possesses above-average programming skills.
During the card sorting task, Adria works together with two other
girls and a boy. They discuss vividly. The statement “that is more
mechanical” leads to the exclusion of a typewriter. One of the girls
proposes to generally group kitchen appliances as “maybe.” Similar
approaches could be observed with other students. It is indicative of a
conception of computing technology that does not have a low threshold.
At one point, Adria flatly states: “technology is not informatics.”
This explicit dissociation is interesting. It suggests that she does not
regard her informatics knowledge as particularly relevant for everyday
technology.
Later in the block, the students discuss how a non-informatics sys-
tem could be turned informatics. Propositions include “building a
chip into it” and “programming” it. One student asserts that even hid-
den computers must have a display. After all, even washing machines
and microwaves have one, so her reasoning. Conversely, she might not
suspect anything without a display to contain a computer. Another
student describes a digital watch as an example of how simple buttons
can control more complex functions. Adria replies that it always has
to be more than one button, however, because “it is not worth it to do
just one button.”
In the interview after the block I first ask Adria what she has learned
today:
Well, I did not know that there exist any embedded systems.
[. . . ] And, um, we thought about whether [. . . ] there are
informatics devices or non-informatics. You don’t consider
that in your daily life. You don’t really think about it.
Despite her prior experience with Lego robots and Arduino, she has
never heard of “any embedded systems” before. She has not yet
thought about where in her daily life informatics might play a role.
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This is very consistent with her prior statement: “technology is not in-
formatics.” It seems that she has not made, if not explicitly precluded,
a connection between informatics and everyday technologies (making
the connection). I also ask her to elaborate on her statement about the
“one button:”
The thing is, if you only have one button, you can [. . . ]
do the same as [. . . ] with a mechanical watch. And like,
informatics is made to somehow maybe do something with
multiple buttons, do a large variety of things. [. . . ] It does
not pay off. You have the same thing, just in informatics.
Informatics does not pay off (low threshold) unless you want to do multi-
functional or versatile things (high capability). The conflict between the
two aspects is clearly visible in her reasoning.
Adria is absent during the second block, so she misses the intro-
duction to the Arduino IDE and how to work with the Raspberry Pi.
Because of her prior experience with such systems, however, this is
not a problem. In the third block, she forms a group with two other
girls and they start to plan a temperature control unit for a heating.
Adria’s statement, “The keypad is difficult? Then we take that for
sure!” illustrates her self-efficacy. It may also indicate, yet again, that
she primarily associates informatics with complicated things. How-
ever, the girls spend so much time discussing their plan that by the
time they want to start with the hardware, all keypads are already
taken. They switch to individual buttons.
In the interview after the block, Adria says that she likes the project
work and, in particular, the group work. I ask what exactly she likes
about it:
It’s like, if one thinks about informatics, one thinks about
writing programs and somehow things, developing pro-
grams, so that things work without anyone having to push
a button or manually configuring something. And that’s
why it’s different from what we did in the last lessons.
Like working with servers and networks.
Until now, her primary association with informatics seemed to be soft-
ware development, as opposed to “manual” work. She also contrasts
the project work with the purely virtual network simulation (Filius,
see Sect. 6.2) of the previous lessons. Again, this is interesting in light
of her prior experience with robots and Arduino. Did she not regard
the hardware, the physical “technology,” as part of the discipline? It
would be consistent with her prior statement.
During the remaining project work, Adria’s overall interaction with
the IDE shows her experience with it. She independently installs a
missing library and implements a switch-statement to distinguish
measuring intervals. However, the planned time for the project turns
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out to be too short. Thus, the teacher spontaneously decides to prolong
it and thus postpone the presentations until block six (Table 6.2). This
gives Adria’s group time to complete their work and she states: “Now
we are completely relaxed.”
Their final project essentially consists of a button, a temperature
sensor and a light-emitting diode (LED). Once the system is switched
on via the button, the LED lights up at a certain temperature. Unfortu-
nately, the girls have little opportunity to test the design at different
temperatures, which frustrates them a little. It also makes the presen-
tation rather unspectacular, as they cannot really show the system’s
function. The criticism they receive from some students because of
that, they disregard as unjustified.
Due to the extension of the project phase, the final block is delayed
until the new year. Its first half is plagued by technical issues. The
browsers on the student PCs do not display the server website correctly.
Several IDEs keep crashing. The students seem less motivated than
usual, maybe because this is their very first lesson after the holidays.
Only about half of the groups manage to connect their projects to the
server and have the Raspberry Pi send a message to it. Adria’s group
is the only one I observe to also log sensor data.
In the subsequent discussion of the IoT-systems, Adria’s group
receives the wind turbine (see also Sect. 6.5.1 and Fig. 6.4). One
student of her group asks: “Do you think it is easier to hack because
it is on the internet?” I cannot hear the answer, but the question itself
shows that she is not at all certain about the potential consequences of
connecting a system to a network. Adria refers to the public power
grid. Hence, she sees consequences that do not just concern the
operator of the wind park, but potentially even her own life.
In the final discussion, the teacher refers back to the initial card
sorting and a student observes “that you can turn almost anything into
informatics” (ubiquity). The teacher remarks that one should “keep
one’s eyes open” and “think whether one really wants that.” In the
final interview after the block, Adria says that she found it “really
cool again” and that she did not know “that this Pi had already been
online.”
[I have leaned] that it is really easy to read data and give
commands. And that it really is not difficult. I thought it
would be more complicated.
The networking capability of the Raspberry Pi had a lower threshold
than she expected. She does not mention the technical difficulties of
the lesson. I again remind her of her statement about the “one button”
and ask whether her opinion has changed there:
Yes, it has a little. It depends on what it is built into.
Because one button can, of course, make a huge difference.
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You can, of course, switch on the whole system with one button.
[. . . ] Then the button is important. But if you want to do
just one thing with the button [. . . ] then it won’t be so
necessary.
She has experienced, probably also in the context of her own project,
that very complex systems and processes can hide behind one incon-
spicuous button. With respect to the critical aspect ubiquity, this is a
desirable insight. However, she still holds on to her original opinion.
If “just one thing” should be done (capability), then informatics is not
necessary (threshold). The conflict between the two aspects still exists
for her. I also ask if her view of everyday technology in general has
changed somehow:
Sort of. But I don’t think it changed that much, because I
already knew that many things transmit data.
Most likely she “already knew” on an abstract level that informatics
has high capabilities and far-reaching consequences for “many things.”
Whether she actually perceived those in concrete everyday situations,
however, is doubtful. Despite her prior experience, she had never
heard of “any embedded systems” before. Technology and informat-
ics were two explicitly distinct domains for her, and anything with
“just one button” was uninteresting anyway. Hence, Adria’s learning
process likely consisted primarily of making a connection between her
existing informatics knowledge and concrete technologies. The lessons
have prompted her, maybe for the very first time, to consciously think
about where in her daily environment informatics concepts may be
relevant. “You don’t consider that in your daily life. You don’t really
think about it.” Exactly what new knowledge she has acquired here
is thus hard to put into words for her. The compatibility between the
low threshold and high capability of computing technology remains a
conceptual hurdle for her until the very end. Consequently, she still
limits its ubiquity: only if “necessary.”
Bill
His teacher described Bill as a middle-rate student who occasionally
lacks motivation. The last time he programmed anything was about
a year ago in 9th grade. He does not have any prior experience with
Raspberry Pis or the Arduino IDE.
During the first block, Bill is sick and thus misses the card sorting
task and discussion about what everyday technologies contain infor-
matics. The second block starts with a short recap of the Raspberry
Pi and its components. After that, Bill and a classmate start working
on the example project. After about 15 minutes, the LMS fails. The
instructions are no longer available. Some students already have some
experience with electronic circuits, however. Together with a printed
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circuit diagram and some support from the teacher, three of the six
groups still manage to assemble the components correctly and deploy
the example program. Bill and his partner are not among them. Nev-
ertheless, he does not seem frustrated. In the interview after the block,
he states:
I didn’t really know how I should do this, but that is OK. I
had support. So, everything is fine actually.
And although he missed the last block, he does not feel overtaxed:
I had to catch up on things. And actually I got everything
quite well.
I ask him to compare the Raspberry Pi with a “normal, big computer”
and whether one could do more or less than the other. He puts them
on the same level and describes the Pi as “just a small compressed
computer.” There is no evidence of a conflict between low threshold
and high capability.
The third block starts with a wrap-up of the example project. The
LMS is available again, so the students can complete the assignment.
After that, the actual project work starts. Bill keeps working with the
same partner. They want to implement a burglar alarm, consisting of
a light barrier and a buzzer. By the end of the block, they have already
come pretty far assembling the components.
Asked what he has learned today, he says in the interview that he
did not know “that these circuits are used for normal street lights.”
He refers to the example project, in which a light sensor was coupled
with an LED such that it would light up when it is dark. The set-up
was described in the context of an automated street light. In a later
interview I return to this issue and ask how he had previously thought
such street lights would work:
I didn’t really ask myself how that is. I was just like, it’s
dark outside, light turns on when it is dark. It was just
natural for me. I did not ask myself what is behind it.
He almost describes technology like a natural phenomenon here,
whose function is such a taken-for-granted part of his environment
that he never wasted a conscious thought on “what is behind it.”
The idea that it contains a little computer does not seem to pose
any difficulties for him, however. He also regards his own project
as quite realistic in the context of a department store alarm. Again,
he does not seem to see a conflict between low threshold and high
capability. Consequently, the ubiquity of computing technology is at
least plausible for him. He has simply never thought of it before
(making the connection).
After the correct set-up of the light barrier, Bill and his partner
spend the better part of their project time with programming. It is
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difficult for them. Bill occasionally updates the project documentation,
which he finds “quite amusing [. . . ] like a little technician.” At the
end of the project work, the light barrier and buzzer work as intended.
The two students also construct quite an elaborate cardboard model
of a department store, complete with visitors and store fronts. This
commitment not only impresses their fellow students. Their teacher,
too, praises it, although he describes their project as “not THAT
elaborate, circuit-wise.”
In the interview I ask Bill how many Raspberry Pis he thinks would
be needed to control all six class projects at once. He says: “it surely
would also work with one.” He seems to regard the Pi as quite
powerful and capable of multitasking (high capability), but when asked,
he cannot really give a reason why.
This time, the first half of the final block runs without technical
issues such that all groups manage to connect the Pi to the server,
send messages, log data or even remote-control the Pi. Bill and his
partner, too, manage to log the analog UV-value of the light barrier on
the server, which is displayed there as a graph in real time.
In the subsequent IoT-group work, Bill’s group receives the car,
which is immediately described as “sensible” and “very practical.”
However, the students also see substantial risks. One asserts that “the
entire traffic could be paralyzed.” Hence, the car affects not only the
people inside it, but also third parties. Eventually, it is located in the
very upper-right corner of the coordinate system: extremely useful,
but also extremely risky (extreme examples, global consequences).
In the final discussion, the teacher notes that the students have to
“consider [these issues] on [their] own in the future.” On the white
board, there are also three pictures of devices that students initially
sorted as rather not informatics: hair dryer, lawn mower and fridge.
The last has appeared again today as an IoT-version. The teacher asks:
“How would you rate this now after the lessons?” A student responds:
“Essentially, all [these things] can be informatics” (ubiquity). Another
amends: “If you want it” (consequences). In the final interview I ask
Bill what he has learned today:
I also had these photos, I had photos with me. It was said,
it is all not informatics. I had a hair dryer, I think, and a
small alarm clock. Everyone said, no, it’s not informatics.
Now I learned, yes, it is informatics.
He refers to the homework assignment for the first block, which he
missed. So why does he think differently now?
Well, because of this, I mean. That it can be informatics.
That it all fits into it. That I wasn’t aware of this.
He was not aware of the low threshold of computing technology, that
it virtually “fits into” anything. As a consequence, he also was not
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aware of its ubiquity, which may even include hair dryers and alarm
clocks. I also ask, which IoT-system he found most exciting:
The most exciting one was the car. Because, yeah, I found
it was the most extensive. I mean, restructuring the whole
traffic. And that it is planned to do it like this.
Maybe he is a little bit biased towards the system of his own group.
However, his description shows that the global consequences of the
system impressed him very much, as well as the fact that it is actually
planned to be implemented like this. He sees the car as extreme and
real, and it may have been precisely this combination of properties
that has made the example so exciting to him.
Three weeks later, in the questionnaire, Bill states as the most
important thing he has learned about “computers and informatics:”
That it can be used so versatiley in everyday life.
In the follow-up question about where he has learned this, he describes
the last two blocks, particularly the project presentation, in which he
“saw other projects,” which “showed [him] other possibilities.” Since
he missed the first block, it was mostly in the last two that he came
into contact with different example applications and systems (novel
examples). On the question of how he would now approach the card
sorting, which he never actually did himself, he flatly writes: “sort
everything as informatics” because “any device [. . . ] can be connected
to WiFi and controlled remotely.”
Bill may not be an exemplary informatics student. Programming
is still a challenge for him. Much like Adria, he had never before
thought about whether various everyday technologies might contain
informatics. Their presence and functions were simply “natural” for
him (making the connection). In harsh contrast to Adria, however, the
general compatibility of the low threshold and high capability of comput-
ing technology is no issue for him at all. The small Raspberry Pi can
essentially do the same things as any big computer, it is very versatile,
and practically “fits into” anything. Consequently, the ubiquity of com-
puting technology is a clear matter for him in the end: “everything”
and “any device” can be informatics.
Carim
Carim was chosen as a case student rather by chance after one of his
class mates had declined the interview. He instead referred to Carim,
who was willing to step in.
During the card sorting in the first lesson, Carim works together
with three other students. Their sorting primarily revolves around
“displays” and “settings.” When asked, they say that things with both
these attributes are clearly informatics. Things that only have settings,
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are possibly informatics. Things that are only electric or mechanical
are not informatics. Again, this is an expected approach, indicative
of a conception of computing technology that does not have a low
threshold.
In the following discussion, the teacher refers to the IPO model,
which was introduced in a previous lesson. Things that work accord-
ingly are then defined as informatics. Things that do so only partially
or not at all, are possibly or not informatics, respectively. This is an
interesting situation in which, under direct guidance from the teacher,
a previously introduced, abstract concept is used as a criterion for
concrete systems (making the connection). It ultimately confirms the
approach of Carim’s group: things with settings, but without a display
fulfill the IPO model only partially. They afford input, but no output
and are thus only possibly informatics. The viability of this approach
is certainly questionable, especially as the four students seem to have
a rather limited conception of what counts as input and output.
In the second half of the block, the students read the text on embed-
ded systems (Table 6.2, Appendix C.2). Subsequently, a corresponding
definition is recorded on a flip chart, as well as similarities and differ-
ences between embedded and “normal” computers. At the end, the
teacher hands out some Raspberry Pis and the students identify its var-
ious elements: a USB- and HDMI-port, a memory card and, eventually,
also the processor.
In the interview after the block, I ask Carim what he has learned
today and he says that he now knows “how washing machines and
all this are operated.” Apparently, he did not know that such de-
vices might contain computers (novel examples, ubiquity). I also ask
what about embedded systems or the Raspberry Pi he found most
interesting or surprising:
Well, I found it surprising that such small computers, so
to say, have just as many functions, or almost as many
functions, as a big computer. That they are built into
everything. You don’t have to pay much money for it. For
such a small computer. That surprised me very much.
He describes the interplay of low threshold and high capability. The
fact that such small and cheap computers also have such versatile
functions really surprised him.
In the next block, the students work on the example project. Many
struggle with it. Problems related to hardware and programming are
supplemented by motivational issues. Many students do not read
the descriptions properly. Some already struggle with navigating the
LMS. Carim and his partner initially seem rather motivated and even
work through the break. After having completed about half of the
assignment, however, they simply stop and instead start to surf on the
internet. Hardly any group manages to complete the assignment. The
conclusion is rescheduled for next week.
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Due to organizational issues, the third block starts 15 minutes later.
Carim is still late for class. In the first half, the example project is
wrapped up and the general structure of an Arduino program is
discussed in some more detail. In the second half, the teacher first
introduces the hardware components that are available to the students
for their projects. After that, each group should write up a plan for
their project: what it should do, where it could be used and which
components are needed for it. The teacher decided to include this
assignment in response to the difficulties of last week. Carim and
his partner plan for a “hazard sensor,” which essentially consists of a
motion sensor and a buzzer.
In the interview after the block, Carim criticizes the assignment on
the example project, because everything was “given” there. In contrast,
he looks forward to creating their own project: “If we continue like
this, I think that it will be fun.” I also ask what he has learned today:
I have learned that there are many sensors that can be
connected to this Raspberry Pi. I mean, I didn’t think that
such a temperature sensor and all that exists. And yes,
that is what I learned, that it can be connected and that
so many more things can be done with it than what we did
already. [. . . ] Such a small circuit board. I didn’t think it
was so extensive.
Again, he describes the interplay of low threshold and high capability,
this time in direct relation to the Raspberry Pi (the technology behind
it). The various hardware components, particularly the temperature
sensor, showed him how versatile “such a small circuit board” can be.
Shortly after, I ask him whether he thinks that such an alarm device
(his own project) would “in reality” also work with such a “small
computer” or rather “somehow differently:”
I think it also works with such a circuit board. [. . . ] Right.
And then it is connected to a big control center.
What control center?
Well, all these small circuit boards have a manufacturer. I
think somehow that it is all controlled from this big control
center. And that it is held intact this way.
In the context of contemporary smart home solutions, this description
is actually very close to reality. Maybe he already knows such systems
from home? It would be problematic, however, if what he wants
to say is that such “small circuit boards” cannot run autonomously
(capability). After all, the Raspberry Pi is almost always connected
to the “big” computer as well. Unfortunately, it is impossible to say
which of these two explanations is the right one here.
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In the following week, class is canceled due to a school-wide event.
The week after, it thus starts with a short recap. The teacher recalls
the term “embedded system,” holds up a USB-cable and asks: “What
do we need this for?” Carim comes forward and says: “To connect the
small computer to the big computer.” Another student says that they
should build “something that can be useful in everyday life.” Then
the project work begins.
For Carim and his partner, it largely proceeds without notable issues.
Once, I observe them working through the break again. After they
have successfully set up the motion sensor, they make an LED light
up when it registers motion. However, they do not have enough time
until the presentation to also set up a button that can turn the system
on and off. Carim, in particular, is visibly frustrated by that. He seems
to have had ambitions for the project.
The first half of the final block is again plagued by technical issues.
The school network is so slow that even loading a simple website on
the student PCs is sluggish, not to mention the LMS. Many students
seem unmotivated. Nevertheless, all groups manage to connect to the
server and at least send a message from the Pi. Two students also
manage to log sensor data and afterwards present it at the interactive
white board in front of the class, where the data is displayed in real
time. Some students are visibly impressed by this.
The subsequent IoT-group work spawns new enthusiasm. The stu-
dents discuss vividly about the systems. With the exception of the
wind turbine (see Sect 6.5.1), all examples are eventually placed in the
upper-right quadrant of the coordinate system. Unfortunately, I miss
to note down which system Carim’s group has received. The placing
and discussion of the examples on the coordinate system takes a lot
of time and lasts into the break. There is no time for a concluding
discussion of the sequence. Many students immediately leave the
classroom afterwards. Carim, too, is unavailable for a final interview.
In the questionnaire three weeks later, he describes as the most
important thing he has learned:
That such small computers control a fridge or even a car.
Again, he contrasts low threshold and high capability. Their general
compatibility was his most central learning experience. Does he
remember when he learned this? “No.” And quite possibly, there is
no specific point at which he did. From the reading assignment in the
first block, to the analysis of the small Raspberry Pi and throughout
the project work, he could experience in several ways how capable
and versatile such “small circuit boards” (the technology behind it) can
be. Maybe he already knew that computing technology is built into
many things. In the first block, the car was already sorted as clearly
informatics by his group. But cars are big and expensive. The fact
that such powerful technology can also be very small and cheap
was apparently new to him. The fridge was initially sorted by his
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group as clearly not informatics. So the lessons also showed him new
and maybe unexpected applications of computing technology (novel
examples, ubiquity). What Carim might have said in the end about the
consequences of all these small computers, however, only he knows.
6.6 limitations and discussion
In the context of design research (Sect. 3.3), the central limitations of
the present study stem from the fact that it was not possible to conduct
data analyses between the individual iterations of the sequence. As
already mentioned in Sect. 6.3, this meant that the practical revisions
made to the sequence plan from one iteration to the next were not
based on systematic evaluation and thus should not be regarded as
proper research results. In the terms of McKenney and Reeves (2012),
the study thus lacks in research conducted on the intervention itself.
Therefore, it does not allow for an assessment of the quality or effec-
tiveness of the presented lesson design. Instead, the analysis focused
exclusively on students’ learning processes, i.e., “on understanding
the responses the intervention engenders” (23). Due to the same limi-
tation, however, the identified critical aspects and learning conditions
could not yet be incorporated into subsequent design cycles. As such,
they remain rather tentative, even though they appear highly con-
sistent with previous and subsequent research (see below). In sum,
the present study is better understood not as three, but rather as a
single design-research cycle with a clear focus on research through the
intervention.
Given the design and scope of the study, the presented results
are, of course, highly context-sensitive. On the one hand, the two
participating schools implemented different internal curricula and
were located in different socio-economic areas of the city. On the
other hand, as with the studies presented in Chaps. 4 and 5, the
school types and general urban environment was common for all
participants. Again, from a naturalistic perspective, context-sensitivity
is not a limitation per se, but should be considered when attempting
to transfer the results to other contexts.
The similarity between the participants of the present study and
the ones reported in Chaps. 4 and 5 may also have contributed to the
overall consistency between the respective results. As described in
Sect. 6.3, the various examples presented to the students during the
sequence were purposely selected to represent the different domains
of technology identified in Chap. 4 in order to establish a notable
diversity in the eyes of the students. As argued in Sect. 6.5.2, and
consistent with prior research on example-based learning (Sect. 2.1),
this diversity, in turn, appears to have enabled meaningful learning for
several students, particularly by means of novel instances. Of course,
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these observations are circumstantial and do not actually establish a
reliable connection between the reported student perceptions and the
employed selection criteria. More detailed and comparative data on
different selection approaches would be needed here. Nevertheless, it
is at least plausible and certainly consistent with the grounded theory
proposed in Chap. 4.
Furthermore, consider the different assessments of the wind turbine
discussed on page 114. They are consistent with different catego-
rizations in relation to the domains outlined in Chap. 4. Group A,
particularly Adria, seems to have categorized the wind turbine as
public technology, or at least relevant to the public and thus also to
themselves (Sect. 4.4.3). In contrast, groups B and C appear to have cat-
egorized the turbine rather as industry. As such, it is part of specialized
“real” technology that may be rather removed from students everyday
lives and may only immediately affect certain experts (Sect. 4.4.2).
Hence, a focus on global rather than situated consequences may be
related to a categorization of public technology. This is also consistent
with the previous observation that public artifacts were regarded as
more important or relevant by some students, possibly because their
consequences, by nature of their category status, reside on a more
global scale.
With respect to students’ identification of informatics, their card
sorting and related argumentations (Sect. 6.5.1) were highly consistent
with the grounded theory proposed in Chap. 5. Again, concepts like
system, networking and multi-functionality were clearly informatics in
the eyes of the participants, whereas electronics or mechanics were,
respectively, often ambiguous or clearly excluded. Consider, in partic-
ular, the sorting criteria compiled by course B shown in Fig. 6.2. For
“surely not informatics,” they describe “purely mechanical or electrical
functions,” for “possibly informatics” they simply mention “electron-
ics,” and for “surely informatics” they list “software,” “displays” and
“internet.” These are such a remarkably close match to the three levels
of capability described in Sect. 5.4.2 that it should be mentioned that
those criteria had not been prearranged with the teacher as a set target.
Moreover, the conflict between low threshold and high capability per-
ceived by several students is highly consistent with the process of
warranting capability also described in Sect. 5.4.2. Requiring a warrant
for higher computing capabilities arguably rests on the notion that
they do not simultaneously have a low threshold, that they should
only be present where the same (perceived) functionality cannot be
achieved by simpler means. Recall Adria who kept maintaining that
informatics would only be used if a function actually necessitates
it. Presumably, such assessments can only rest on actually noticed
functions and their respective perceived complexities (recall Will and
Valerie, respectively; Sect. 5.4.3).
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The phenomenon of making the connection described in Sect. 6.5.2 is
generally consistent with motivational and dispositional accounts of
transfer (Sect. 2.1). Accordingly, it seems that several students may
lack a reason or motivation to even stop and think where else previ-
ously learned concepts might play a role, particularly in the context
of their everyday lives. If a situation does not provide any salient
“cues” (Wagner 2006) or explicit prompts, if technology fades into the
“natural” background (Bill, page 125), related disciplinary knowledge
may simply stay “inert” (Renkl et al. 1996). These observations are
also consistent with the interpretation already proposed in Sect. 4.6.
There, I argued that the absence of informatics concepts from students
categorizations might suggest that they are not particularly disposed
to think about technology in terms of computing unless the situation
explicitly calls for it. The present results further support this.
Various parts of the present results also appear transferable to a
related study recently reported by Mertala (2019b) about children’s
conceptions of ubiquitous computing and IoT. He presented 33 Finnish
children aged 3 to 6 with pictures of a car, a washing machine and
a teddy bear, and asked whether they thought those could contain a
computer or internet connection. For each item, the large majority ini-
tially denied those properties. Subsequently, children were introduced
to more “scientific definitions” of these two concepts, including that
Computers can be really small. Many devices, such as
cameras and remote-control cars, have computers inside
them. (6)
They were also allowed to physically examine a Raspberry Pi 3 Model
B.7 Afterwards, it was found that many children had changed their
minds about the car and washing machine, whereas the teddy bear
seemed more resilient to that change. The children were also able to
come up with several of their own ideas for embedded or IoT-items,
like a robot, toy car, pet house or air plane.
In terms of the critical aspects, the presented definitions introduced
children to the low threshold (“really small”) and ubiquity (“many
devices”) of computing technology as well as their potential internet
connectivity (high capability). As outlined above, this seemed to have
had positive effects on their related learning. The critical aspect
consequences was apparently not directly addressed by the intervention
design, which may well be justified given the participants’ young age.
Moreover, the present results also provide a plausible explanation
for the higher resilience of the teddy bear. The presented Model B
Raspberry Pi (the technology behind it) may still have been too large a
reference object to comfortably fit into a soft teddy bear. Cars and
7 A more powerful but also larger version than the one used for this intervention: https:
//www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-3-model-b/ (visited February 28,
2020).
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washing machines, which are much larger in comparison, accom-
modate it much more easily. The items designed by the children
themselves also seem consistent with this. With the sole exception
of “Barbie’s smartphone” (Mertala 2019b: 15), none of the reported
examples produced by the children seem smaller than the presented
reference technology.
Lastly, in contrast to cars and washing machines, teddy bears likely
fall in the no/low technology domain (Sect. 4.4.1) such that re-catego-
rizing them as computational may also constitute a larger concep-
tual jump overall. Mertala (2019b) reports on a boy who apparently
regarded “the plush toy bear and digital technology [as] mutually
exclusive categories” (11). Recall the student who referred to “paper”
in a similar fashion (page 118). However, as argued in Sect. 6.5.2,
such artifacts, if presented appropriately, may provide suitable extreme
examples to illustrate the low threshold of computing technology. In
retrospect, the exclusion of no/low technology items from the present
set of classroom examples (Sect. 6.3) may thus have been a mistake.
6.7 summary and implications
The aim of this study was to investigate research questions q5 and
q6 about what students need to learn about computing technology in
order to adequately identify it in their environment, and how such
learning may be enabled. The critical aspects and learning conditions
proposed in Sect. 6.5 respectively aim to answer those questions.
Four such critical aspects were identified: low threshold, high capabil-
ity, ubiquity and consequences (Sect. 6.5.1 and Fig. 6.3). In particular,
several students seemed to perceive a conflict between the first two:
computing technology is either small and cheap, or powerful and ver-
satile, but not both. However, it is critical that students understand
the compatibility of the low threshold and high capability of computing
technology in order to adequately understand its ubiquity. Arguably,
something that is easy and cheap to use, but only has a very limited
functionality, will not become ubiquitous. It will only be used, where
its limited function is sufficient. Conversely, something that is very
powerful and versatile, but also requires large amounts of resources,
will also not become ubiquitous. It will only be used, where such
resources are available and their expenditure is warranted. The latter
line of reasoning, in particular, could be observed on several occasions.
Only combined, the two aspects are able to explain how and why
computing technology has come to pervade virtually every part of
society. It is precisely this combination, however, that seemed to have
caused “difficulty for students in the process of learning” (Guo et al.
2012: 255).
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The analysis also revealed several conditions that seem to have en-
abled meaningful learning experiences related to those critical aspects
(Sect. 6.5.2). First, there is evidence that students may often not engage
with their existing computing knowledge – both in- and outside the
classroom – unless explicitly prompted to do so. From a motivational
perspective, a possible way to address this, may be to foster a sense of
personal affliction in students. They may need to “internalize” (Ryan
and Deci 2017: 184-190) the consequences of computing technology as
relevant, not just on an abstract level but for their own personal lives
as well. Second, the results suggest certain properties of classroom
examples that appear to have enabled meaningful learning in relation
to the critical aspects. Accordingly, they should be perceived as novel
and realistic applications of computing as well as exhibiting some
extreme expressions of the critical aspects. While a deliberately diverse
selection of examples arguably increases the chance that students
will perceive some of them in the above fashion, further research is
needed to better understand what kinds of technology are particularly
suited in that context. Third, there is evidence that if and when a
physical computing platform is used to illustrate the technology behind
computing systems, this platform may turn into a reference object
for students. Hence, with respect to the above-mentioned conflict, it
may be important to choose a platform that saliently illustrates the
compatibility between the aspects low threshold and high capability.
Finally, with respect to example- and context-based teaching, and
in accordance with Knobelsdorf and Tenenberg (2013), I have already
argued in Sect. 4.6 that familiarity from everyday life may neither be
necessary nor sufficient to spark students’ interest in a technology.
The present results inform another dimension of this issue. For in-
stance, within the framework of educational reconstruction, Diethelm;
Hubwieser, et al. (2012) have identified teaching contexts that appear
interesting for students by asking them to list
phenomena, processes or operations relating to the every-
day use of information and communication technology,
which you regard as particularly complicated, incompre-
hensible or difficult to understand. (168).
Arguably, this approach will primarily produce examples whose com-
putational nature is already apparent to students. In other words, it is
unlikely to yield novel examples and thus unlikely to enable learn-
ing about the critical aspect ubiquity. Moreover, to the extent that
students might possess a conception of computing technology that
does not have a low threshold, the approach would also be unlikely to
yield examples exhibiting that aspect. In contrast, if students should
internalize the consequences of computing technology as personally
relevant for their own lives (see above), the discussed examples might
try to strike as “close to home” as possible. The more extreme their
impact the better, as long as they are still accepted as realistic. In
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such a case, an approach like the one used by Diethelm; Hubwieser,
et al. (2012) may be more suitable. In general, asking students to
produce their own learning examples has to be done carefully because
their responses will not only indicate where their interests lie. They
will also, to some extent, reproduce their existing conceptions, which
may or may not be desirable. In the end, an appropriate selection of
examples has to be more than just interesting. It has to be purposely
oriented towards “what is to be learned.”
Part III
Closure
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å Purpose is lost whenever the substance
[. . . ] is displaced by the symbol [. . . ]. To
heal a lost purpose, or a lossy categoriza-
tion, you must do the reverse:
Replace the symbol with the substance;
replace the signifier with the signified; re-
place the property with the membership
test; replace the word with the meaning;
replace the label with the concept; [. . . ]
mentally simulate the process instead of
naming it; zoom in on your map.
– Yudkowsky (2008)
7 GENERAL D ISCUSS ION
In this chapter, I will integrate and discuss the results of the three
studies reported in Part II and indicate potential directions for future
research. I will start with an overall discussion of the inquiry’s trust-
worthiness. Subsequently, I will review the presented results in terms
of my central motivations, namely knowledge transfer and learning
objectives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of educational
terminology in the context of computational artifacts.
7.1 trustworthiness
In this section, I will discuss the studies and results reported in Part II
with respect to the quality criteria for naturalistic inquiries (Sect. 3.1.2)
and grounded theories (Sect. 3.2). I have already addressed various
limitations for each individual study in Sects. 4.5, 5.5 and 6.6. However,
when viewed in its entirety, a few other points warrant attention in
terms of the inquiry’s overall trustworthiness.
With respect to credibility and the corresponding techniques outlined
in Table 3.2, it may be noted that member checks are the only one not
used at all throughout the inquiry. However, Lincoln and Guba (1985)
argue that:
The member check [. . . ] is the most crucial technique for
establishing credibility. If the investigator is to be able to
purport that his or her reconstructions are recognizable
to audience members as adequate representations of their
own (and multiple) realities, it is essential that they be
given the opportunity to react to them. (314)
After all, the respondents themselves are assumed to have the most
direct access to their own realities (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 295).
To some extent, the word cards used in the second interview study
(Sect. 5.2) and parts of the intervention design (Sect. 6.1) may be
understood as testing “insights gleaned from one group [. . . ] with
another” (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 314) and thus as forms of indirect
member checks.
The reason why the inquiry did not use more direct forms is that,
for organizational purposes, it was not necessary to collect contact
information from the participating students. Collecting such sensitive
data, especially from adolescents, must not be done without purpose,
and may also have discouraged some students from participating at
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all. At the time, the possibility for follow-up interviews and member
checks was simply overlooked.
However, for grounded theories in particular, Thomas (2017) also
argues that “[t]here is usually no reason to expect that individual
participants would have specific expertise in critiquing a theory or
framework,” or to even recognize themselves in an account synthe-
sized from multiple perspectives (29). This may be doubly true in the
case of school students, who may also be inclined to agree with an
account presented by a university researcher merely on authoritative
grounds. Hence, conducting member checks with adolescents likely
comes with its own methodological challenges. The fact remains,
however, that the inquiry reported in Part II did not even attempt it,
which remains as a caveat to its credibility.
With respect to transferability, as mentioned already, any attempt to
utilize the reported findings has to rest on a comparison between their
original and the potential target context. While I attempted to provide
thick descriptions of the studies’ contexts (Table 3.2), particularly via the
case reports (Sect. 5.4.3 and 6.5.3), there are two contextual aspects that
warrant special attention as they directly impact the research object
itself, i.e., processes of knowledge transfer.
First, the inquiry focused exclusively on physical artifacts: devices,
appliances, machines. However, not all computational artifacts are
strictly physical in nature, and transfer of computing concepts may
also extend beyond the realm of computational artifacts altogether.
This may constitute a notable limitation of the inquiry’s transferability,
and I will discuss this issue in further detail in the next section.
Second, all studies reported in Part II were conducted in school
buildings or even as part of regular school classes. Given that the
inquiry’s central motivation stems from transfer to everyday situations
(Sect. 1.2), it should be noted that none of its data were collected in
such situations. Recall Lave (1988), who investigated everyday transfer
of arithmetics by observing people during their routine grocery shop-
ping. While a similar approach would have been desirable for this
inquiry, it was well beyond its boundary conditions. In the context of
adolescents’ everyday use of technology, privacy concerns and ethical
approval alone pose considerable hurdles. Enabling authentic obser-
vation in this context may require unreasonably and unacceptably
prolonged engagement (Table. 3.2) before participants become accus-
tomed to and comfortable with being observed in their daily lives.
This issue presents a considerable challenge for research interested
in how, when and where students actually use their school-learned
(informatics) knowledge in actual everyday situations. It stands to
reason that conducting research in a school context (recall that location
is one dimension of context; Barnett and Ceci 2002) already gives a
higher “cueing priority” (Wagner 2006: 12-13) to the same kind of
school-related knowledge that is under investigation. Therefore, the
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presented inquiry likely overestimates students’ abilities for transfer
compared to everyday situations.
Moreover, and to a similar effect, the inquiry likely underestimates
motivational requisites for transfer (Jacot et al. 2015; Sect. 2.1). When
a person enters an interview or a (compulsory elective!) classroom
situation, whatever motivated them to do so has already happened.
Hence, people who lack such motivation are likely underrepresented
in the studies reported here. Moreover, and even in mandatory test
situations, participants may to some extent be motivated to complete
a given task, simply because the situation offers little else to do. In
contrast, everyday situations rarely present themselves together with
a clear task, and may be comparatively high in “motivational interfer-
ence” (Fries and Dietz 2007) by affording a variety of different courses
of action, only few of which may involve engagement with a particular
kind of knowledge. I will discuss this issue in some further detail in
the next two sections, but the fact remains that the present inquiry can
shed little light on the motivational requisites for transfer, particularly
in everyday situations.
Lastly, with respect to dependability, I have argued in Sect. 6.6 that
the results of the learning study were largely consistent with the
grounded theories previously constructed from the interviews, in
some cases remarkably so. A critical reader may argue here that I
was likely biased towards reaffirming my own previous research in
the context of a subsequent study. Alternatively, the case may be
rendered as “increased instrumental proficiency (better insights)” for
the human-as-instrument (Guba 1981: 81). As the primary author of
those frameworks, I was undeniably in a unique position to recognize
their elements in another context and it certainly stands to reason that
an uninvolved third party may not have produced the same interpre-
tations. However, in terms of confirmability, this is only problematic if
and when those interpretations cannot be traced back to data, and be
confirmed as plausible and justified. To strengthen both these points,
two audits were conducted during the analysis of the learning study
data (Sect. 6.4). The investigative reader may also turn to Appendix D
for information on how to access the research data themselves.
As described in Sect. 3.2, Charmaz (2014) proposes to evaluate
grounded theories not on the basis of their objective truth value, but
their pragmatic usefulness. Do they offer “interpretations that people
can use” (338)? In that sense, the learning study provided an op-
portunity to test whether the categories and processes described by
the grounded theories can provide useful analytical tools in order to
produce meaningful insights about students’ learning processes. I
would argue that they could. Future research may very well produce
better, more sophisticated and refined frameworks to analyze students’
thinking about computing technology. Hopefully, the grounded theo-
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ries proposed here can serve as useful stepping stones in that endeavor,
too.
7.2 phenomena and transfer
Motivated by general educational goals (Chap. 1), the focal point
for the inquiry presented in Part II have been processes of learning
transfer. To quote Humbert and Puhlmann (2004) again
If the aim of education is to enable young persons to take
part in society in an active and responsible way [. . . ], then
the touchstone or the heart of literacy with respect to infor-
matics is whether someone understands the occurrences of
informatics in everyday life and society. It will be insuffi-
cient to merely have some internal knowledge of informat-
ics that cannot be linked to the world. (66)
Subsequently, Humbert and Puhlmann (2004) describe three general
categories of such occurrences, which they call “pheonomena:” those
that are (1) directly, (2) indirectly, or (3) not at all related to comput-
ing technology. The inquiry reported in Part II mainly investigated
phenomena of the second, indirect type, which “occur in everyday
situations whenever informatics systems are involved without being
apparent at first glance” (Humbert and Puhlmann 2004: 68). Ac-
cordingly, the inquiry has essentially asked how and under what
conditions they may become apparent to students, and it has revealed
both desirable and undesirable facets in their related thinking.
First, given that computing technology can take virtually any form,
participants’ general focus on function rather than physical appearance
(Sect. 5.4.2) seems desirable. Accordingly, the inquiry, particularly
Chap. 5, suggests that many students already entertain conceptions
under which informatics is relevant for a large variety of technical
artifacts – certainly more than just desktop or laptop computers (see
also Sect. 2.2.2).
Second, participants in Chaps. 5 and 6 frequently and spontaneously
referred to a variety of disciplinary concepts and ideas, including pro-
gramming, networking, data storage or information processing. From
an actor-oriented perspective (Lobato 2012), these constitute genuine
and desirable acts of transfer in terms of those concepts. At the same
time, and consistent with a transfer-in-pieces account (Wagner 2006,
2010), there is also evidence of such abstract “pieces of knowledge”
being changed or overridden in the face of concrete situational cues
(Sect. 5.6). In accordance with Wagner (2006), transferable knowledge
has to “account for (rather than overlook) contextual differences” (orig.
emph.: 6), lest those differences become the reason why transfer is
precluded.
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Third, however, the above processes were all elicited by explicit
task-related prompts. Students were asked, either in an interview or
as part of a classroom activity, to consider technology in terms of
informatics. It is in that aspect, in particular, that the inquiry likely
overestimates the observed acts of transfer. In contrast, the study
reported in Chap. 4, while also conducted in an overall school context,
left participants unaware that it was related to informatics, and allowed
considerably greater freedom to think about and categorize technology
in different ways. The corresponding results contain virtually no
evidence of computing concepts. Similarly, several participants in
Chap. 6 appeared little disposed to engage with their prior informatics
knowledge unless directly prompted and some explicitly stated that
they had rarely if ever thought about their everyday environment in
terms of computing. In all these situations, transfer of related concepts
was effectively precluded. This suggests that students may indeed
possess “internal knowledge of informatics that cannot be linked to the
world” (Humbert and Puhlmann 2004: 66). While the positive acts of
transfer discussed above indicate that they are not generally incapable
of making that link, they may still lack the necessary motivation or
volition to actually do so autonomously.
Fourth, the studies reported in Chaps. 5 and 6 also suggest more
conceptual limitations for transfer. Accordingly, higher computing ca-
pability may often require a warrant in the eyes of students (Sect. 5.4.2)
and may even be in conflict with a lower threshold (Sect. 6.5.1). Hence,
even if students do stop and think about a technology in terms of
computing, they may conclude, on the basis of these conceptions,
that certain concepts are not relevant because the technology is not
perceived as capable enough. Conversely, entire device domains like
kitchen appliances may be categorically brushed aside because they do
not warrant expensive computing technology. From an actor-oriented
view, many such situations also classify as genuine instances of trans-
fer, but not of the knowledge that may be educationally desirable.
Instead, alternative explanatory models (see also Brown 1992; Brown
and Clement 1989) in terms of (electro)mechanics or electronics may take
precedence such that transfer of the desired informatics knowledge is
precluded.
As mentioned in the previous section, an apparent limitation of my
inquiry is its strong focus on physical artifacts. In contrast, Humbert
and Puhlmann (2004) explicitly mention software as an example of
their first category of phenomena. Those are “directly related” to
computing technology and “occur when a person consciously uses
an informatics system, such as a word processor” (68). Incidentally,
Schulte et al. (2018: 68) also discuss a word processor as an example
of an everyday “digital artifact.”
Of course, a software artifact is usually interacted with by means
of a physical one – a tablet, a smartphone, a desktop computer. The
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results reported in Chap. 5 strongly suggest that many students readily
perceive such artifacts as informatics and as “real” computers. This
may be beneficial for transfer, as they might also perceive the software
that runs on them accordingly. Indeed, as seen in Sect. 5.4.2, at least
some students regarded “software” as highly complex, computational
and strongly related to informatics. From a situated perspective,
interacting with a software artifact may often be difficult to even
distinguish from interacting with the physical device that executes it.
Both are part of the situation as a whole.
The line becomes further blurred in the context of embedded sys-
tems, where software and hardware are even more closely intertwined.
In fact, when interacting with a washing machine, a traffic light or
a robot, students may not even perceive the situation as involving
proper software at all, but instead write it off as a simple program
or piece of hard-wired circuitry (Sect. 5.4.2). Hence, when selecting
examples of software artifacts, educators should probably consider
that students might delineate the concept differently than they do.
Discussing the speech assistant in a modern defibrillator or the in-
terface of a thermostat may enable other learning experiences than a
word processor or web browser – partially because the former may
be more difficult to conceptually separate from the physical devices
on which they run. Ultimately, whether “a person consciously uses an
informatics system” (my emph., Humbert and Puhlmann 2004: 68)
critically depends on whether the system is indeed perceived as such.
Further research is certainly needed to better understand students’
perceptions in the context of software, but the results reported in
Part II may already provide useful points of departure.
Humbert and Puhlmann (2004)’s third category outlines phenomena
that do not involve computing technology at all, “but have an inherent
informatical structure or suggest informatical reasoning” (68). Given
that technical artifacts constitute one of the discipline’s most salient
manifestations in everyday life (Sect. 2.2.1), their absence might make
related transfer in this area more challenging. As the inquiry in Part II
focused exclusively on technical artifacts, its results cannot illuminate
transfer processes in that category though.
However, Humbert and Puhlmann (2004) also acknowledge that
someone “without informatics education may well be able to cope
with these phenomena” (68). Indeed, their examples of a card player
who has “to sort the cards in her hands,” and “the travelling sales-
man problem” (69) do not seem to be intended as authentic real-life
situations that would benefit from a computational approach. Instead,
they should provide learning opportunities by allowing students to
“(re-)invent parts of informatics” (69).
According to the literature (Sect. 2.1), fostering successful transfer
to real-life situations that do not involve computing technology may
require students to analyze and compare various examples of pre-
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cisely such situations. One way to do this might be via “Computer
Science Unplugged”1 activities, which aim to introduce fundamental
computing principles in the explicit absence of computing technology.
However, Bell and Vahrenhold (2018) have recently reviewed various
implementations and evaluations of the approach and concluded:
The value of CS Unplugged for students is that it engages
them with lasting ideas in our field, although the research
shows that it needs to be linked to current technology and
should not just be used in isolation. (514)
With respect to Humbert and Puhlmann (2004)’s third category of
phenomena, and from the perspectives of general education and trans-
fer, the question thus remains: what authentic real-life phenomena
are there that do not involve computing technology, but have “an
inherent informatical structure” (68) that calls for a transfer of related
knowledge in order make an informed and responsible decision?
7.3 objectives and activities
The guiding educational objective for this thesis has been to enable stu-
dents to recognize and evaluate computing technologies in everyday
life. In Sect. 1.2, I have argued that this needs to be further “broken
down into a more focused, delimited form” (Anderson et al. 2014: 15).
With reference to Marton et al. (2019), it has been my guiding question
to investigate “what is to be learned” by students about computing
technology in order to achieve that goal. In this section, I will propose
a set of corresponding subgoals and activities, based on the results
reported in Part II.
Anderson et al. (2014) point out that while learning objectives and
activities are often formulated similarly – as student behavior in
relation to some content topic – they should not be confused.
Objectives describe ends–intended results, intended out-
comes, intended changes. Instructional activities, such as
reading the textbook, listening to the teacher, conducting
an experiment, and going on a field trip, are all means by
which objectives are achieved. (my emph.: 16)
At the same time, their taxonomy of global, educational and instruc-
tional objectives makes clear that specific goals may themselves be
set in the service of more higher-order ones. In order to achieve an
overarching objective, students may first need to achieve other, inter-
mediate or constituent ones. Therefore, thinking of activities and
1 https://csunplugged.org (accessed February 28, 2020); this new website already
includes various ideas for “plugging it in.” For the original conception, see https:
//classic.csunplugged.org/principles/ (accessed February 28, 2020).
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objectives merely as means and ends, respectively, may not always be
appropriate.
The notion of transfer may provide a more useful distinction here.
In contrast to learning activities, objectives may (and often do) de-
scribe behavior outside the classroom – things that students should
eventually do on their own without anyone telling them to. This, in
turn, may require noticing relevant situational cues and activating
contextual knowledge resources, as well as necessary motivational
and dispositional factors (Sect. 2.1).
Discussions of competency include similar aspects. Weinert (2001)
reviews different academic uses of competency, several of which in-
clude aspects of motivation and volition. While Weinert (2001) himself
“defer[s] from giving a unified definition,” he nevertheless argues that
the concept
should be used when the necessary prerequisites for meet-
ing a demand are comprised of cognitive and (in many
cases) motivational, ethical, volitional, and/or social com-
ponents (orig. emph.: 62).
Accordingly, learning objectives that aim to describe competencies
(e.g., Gesellschaft für Informatik e.V. 2008) can be understood to
also include – at least implicitly – non-cognitive components like the
motivation and volition to actually carry out the described behaviors.
Therefore, in the following, I will understand learning objectives not
only as things that students should be able to do but also to autonomously
engage in. In contrast, I will understand learning activities as things
that students may be prompted to do and possibly conduct with the
help of additional guidance or direction. I will denote objectives and
activities with o and a, respectively.
o1 Students recognize computing technologies in various
areas of life.
o2 Students understand the ubiquity of computing technol-
ogy in society.
a1
Students compare diverse example technologies, particu-
larly those that are novel to them.
Figure 7.1: Recognition strand of learning objectives and activities
Figure 7.1 shows a strand of two objectives and an activity related
to the recognition of computing technology (o1), which constitutes a
part of the guiding objective discussed in Sect. 1.2. In that context,
the results reported in Chaps. 4 and 6 have shown that at least some
students hardly if ever engage in this process of recognition. They
neither seemed to be aware that computing technology may virtually
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“hide” everywhere, nor did they feel the need to even ask that ques-
tion of their environment: “I did not ask myself what is behind it”
(Bill, page 125). Therefore, enabling students to understand the ubiq-
uity of computing technology in society (o2) appears to be a critical
component for the achievement of this objective.
More specifically, in the terms of Anderson et al. (2014)’s taxonomy,
o2 may be classified as understanding conceptual knowledge, which
includes related classifications, principles and mental models (28-29).
Hence, in the context of this objective, students might also learn about
concepts like “embedded system,” the “Internet of Things” or other
“ubiquitous computing” phenomena that are yet to come – all of which
would constitute learning objectives in their own right, but may also
need occasional revision to stay up-to-date.
With respect to understanding, Anderson et al. (2014) describe it as
the construction of meaning and explicitly demarcate it from “rote
learning” like mere memorization (70-76). Therefore, in order to
achieve o2, it arguably cannot suffice for students to learn the general
definitions of related concepts, or to recite a set phrase that “computing
technology is everywhere.” They also need to be able to produce and
classify concrete examples, and to draw comparisons between them
(67).
Previous research (Sect. 2.1) as well as the results reported in Chap. 6
suggest that activity a1 can foster those abilities. Letting students
compare a variety of notably different example technologies may
broaden related conceptual categories, particularly if they are novel
to them. Concrete examples may also help build relevant contextual
support knowledge necessary to subsequently construe (recognize)
other, novel technologies as similar (Wagner 2006, 2010). The taxonomy
proposed in Chap. 4 outlines several domains, which may serve as a
first framework to assess the diversity of selected examples.
o3 Students appropriately evaluate computing technologies.
o4 Students understand that computing technology can
simultaneously have a low threshold and high capabilities.
a2
Students analyze and create example technologies that
saliently exhibit both low threshold and high capability.
Figure 7.2: Evaluation strand of learning objectives and activities
Figure 7.2 shows a strand of two objectives and an activity related to
the evaluation of computing technology (o3), which constitutes another
component of the guiding objective discussed in Sect. 1.2. According
to Anderson et al. (2014: 83-4)’s taxonomy, evaluation is a rather
advanced cognitive skill, and is always carried out in relation to some
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criterion. For instance, with respect to the dual nature of artifacts
(de Vries 2016; Schulte et al. 2018), evaluation may require knowledge
of a system’s purpose (“What is it good for?”) and then making a
judgment about how well this purpose is achieved.
Of course, in the absence of explicit prior knowledge, novel artifacts
and systems first need to be analyzed and understood. According
to the process of establishing transparency described in Sect. 5.4.1, two
things appear necessary here. First, students need to determine – or
notice – the artifact’s function, which might involve direct interaction
with it (Schulte et al. 2018). Second, they need to formulate a corre-
sponding explanatory model. For such a model to be appropriate, it
should arguably draw on disciplinary concepts and procedures, whose
acquisition entails a whole set of additional learning objectives and ac-
tivities. As such, those may also constitute necessary subcomponents
for o3, but are well beyond the scope of this discussion. Moreover,
as argued already, in order to analyze and understand a technology,
students first need to recognize its very presence. Therefore, o1 also
constitutes a critical prerequisite in this context.
However, the results reported in Chaps. 5 and 6 suggest that even
if and when students successfully recognize a technology as compu-
tational, they may underestimate its capabilities. A reason for this
appears to be that higher capabilities often require an explicit warrant
in the eyes of students (Sect. 5.4.2), and may even be in conflict with a
lower threshold (Sect. 6.5.1). As a result, various computing technolo-
gies, particularly small and embedded ones, may be seen as inherently
incapable of certain computing functions, which can only be detrimen-
tal to an appropriate evaluation, especially in relation to their potential
consequences (see below). Therefore, students need to understand that
computing technology can simultaneously have a low threshold and
high capabilities (o4) in order to appropriately asses its potential. The
results reported in Chap. 6 suggest that having students analyze and
create example technologies that saliently exhibit both these aspects
(a2) can successfully challenge a perceived conflict between them.
Moreover, as argued in Sect. 6.7, neither low threshold nor high capa-
bility alone is able to explain why computing technology has become
ubiquitous. According to Anderson et al. (2014: 75-76), explaining
is another constituent of understanding. Therefore, o4 may also con-
tribute to o2. While comparing diverse and novel examples (a1) may
show students that computing technology has become ubiquitous, o4
provides an explanation for how this is possible.
Of course, o4 also implies an appropriate understanding of the
notions low threshold and high capability themselves. Section 6.5 and
Fig. 6.3 primarily illustrate them in terms of size and price, on the
one hand, and multi-functionality, adaptability and networking, on
the other. While many students already seem to conceive of (proper)
computing technology as potentially very powerful (Sects. 5.4.2 and
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6.5), a well-grounded disciplinary account of this potential may again
draw on various other subject areas – e.g., programmability, network-
ing, information processing, or even issues concerning the theoretical
limits of computability, artificial intelligence or big data. To reiterate,
all of these would entail genuine learning objectives in their own
right, and may also have general educational value beyond the issues
discussed here. However, even an adequate understanding of these
concepts is likely of little relevance in a situation where a technology
is seen as simply incapable of them.
o5 Students develop a disposition of personal affliction to-
wards computing technology.
o6
Students understand the consequences of computing tech-
nology, particularly for their own lives.
a3
Students evaluate and compare example technologies
that have extreme yet realistic consequences.
Figure 7.3: Disposition strand of learning objectives and activities
Figure 7.3 shows a strand of two learning objectives and an activity
related to dispositions towards computing technology. As argued in
Sect. 6.7, students may need to feel personally afflicted by them. As
such, o5 describes a non-cognitive objective, a kind that is not covered
by Anderson et al. (2014)’s taxonomy. Nevertheless, as outlined above,
volition and disposition constitute important aspects of competency
and transfer. The cognitive processes described by o1 and o3 require
certain amounts of attention, exertion or time – resources that people
may prefer to spend elsewhere (Fries and Dietz 2007). Students need
to be motivated to actually engage in them.
On the one hand, intrinsic curiosity or interest in one’s technical
environment might achieve that purpose, and it may be possible to
also foster those dispositions to some extent (Renninger and Su 2012;
Silvia 2012). On the other hand, the literature suggests that the main
arguments behind general educational objectives (Sect. 1.2) are rather
extrinsic in nature. Citizens should act informed and responsibly
not because they are expected to derive intrinsic pleasure from the
action itself, but to effect or avoid certain consequences – to cope with
problems, to craft solutions, to be in control of technology rather than
being controlled by it. According to self-determination theory (Ryan
and Deci 2017), such intended outcomes constitute extrinsic motivators
(14). Those, however, can still facilitate volitional, autonomous and self-
determined action if they represent values or goals that the individual
has internalized as personally important (184-190).
Conversely, people may decide not to act in a situation due to
various reasons. For example, they may perceive a sense of universal
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or personal helplessness (Ryan and Deci 2017: 190-191). They may feel
that they lack the competence to act, or that the action, even if carried
out, will not produce the desired result. Arguably, knowledge of
disciplinary concepts and procedures, especially for problem solving,
may diminish such perceived helplessness. However, people may also
decide not to act if they “have neither intrinsic interest in a behavior
nor a desire for the outcomes it might yield,” or if they simply have
never been exposed “to the potential value of acting” (Ryan and Deci
2017: 191).
Therefore, a critical component in motivating students to act on the
consequences of computing technology, is to let them understand the
extent of those consequences, particularly for their own lives (o6). The
results reported in Chap. 6 suggest that letting students evaluate and
compare examples that exhibit extreme yet realistic consequences (a3)
may foster such understanding. As with ubiquity (o2), comparing
concrete examples may generally help build relevant contextual sup-
port knowledge and foster students’ abilities to exemplify and identify
related instances. Moreover, if and when students should evaluate
computing technologies (o3) with respect to their consequences, iden-
tifying and understanding those first, arguably constitutes a necessary
prerequisite.
The study in Chap. 6 also indicated that students may rate different
kinds of consequences, like bodily injury, material damage or pri-
vacy, as more or less important overall, but that such judgments may
themselves be mediated by other values and dispositions. Address-
ing those – for example, fostering a heightened concern for privacy
– would yet again entail separate learning objectives. However, as
the study did not enable a detailed reconstruction of these judgment
processes (Sect. 6.5.1), these indications should be taken with high
caution. Further research is needed to better understand students’
perceptions of the consequences of computing technologies and re-
lated value judgments. I would argue that such research is highly
desirable, as it may indicate ways to foster dispositions that might
motivate students to actually seek out and engage with computing
technologies in their environment.
As indicated, the three strands discussed above are not disjoint but
highly interconnected. Figure 7.4 shows an overview of the proposed
objectives and activities in abbreviated form as well as the described
relations between them. The top row in Fig. 7.4 resides on the level of
competency. It outlines cognitive (o1 and o3) and non-cognitive (o5)
aspects of the guiding objective discussed in Sect. 1.2. The second row
resides on the level of the four critical aspects proposed and described
in Sect. 6.5. Recall that, according to variation theory, those constitute
“what is to be learned” about a certain object of learning, particularly
with respect to possible learning difficulties (Guo et al. 2012; Marton et
al. 2019; also Sect. 2.1). As such, o2, o4 and o6 constitute intermediate
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objectives set in the service of more general competency. The third row
then resides on the level of learning activities. Based on prior research
and the inquiry reported in Part II, they appear to be conducive for
the achievement of those intermediate objectives.
The processes described in a1, a2 and a3 are primarily meant as
learning activities in a literal sense, that is, as cognitive processes.
Together with the grounded theory proposed in Chap. 4 and the learn-
ing conditions described in Sect. 6.5.2, I would argue that they are
sufficiently specific and comprehensive to inform the design of edu-
cational practice. At the same time, they are not to be confused with
those practices, that is, with actual classroom activities and materials
meant to facilitate those processes. While the intervention described
in Chap. 6 includes corresponding example tasks and materials, as
discussed in Sect. 6.6, the study does not allow for an assessment of
their quality. In essence, it is not clear how effective the intervention
was in facilitating the activities described by a1, a2 and a3. Simply
put, while several students arguably engaged in them, I cannot claim
that they did so because of the concrete task design, and not rather
despite of it.
Lastly, the set of objectives and activities proposed here is, of course,
not exhaustive. An arrow x ! o in any of the figures shown here
should be interpreted as a claim that “x contributes to o” or possibly
that “x is a requisite for o” if x is itself an intermediate objective. At
the same time, there certainly exist – and I have addressed several –
other necessary or conducive subgoals and related activities, which
were beyond the scope of my inquiry. As such, Fig. 7.4 does not show
a closed system, but a small section of a much wider network.
7.4 more than computers?
The literature reviewed in Sect. 2.2.1 has shown that computers occupy
a pivotal position in many students’ thinking about technology and
informatics. This situation then turned into a focal point for the design
of my inquiry, namely that computers – if recognized in a situation –
may provide important cues for transfer. Other authors, in contrast,
have taken this exact way of thinking and criticized it as limited and
undesirable, and a reason to shun the term “computer” altogether.
According to Humbert (2006), the informatics community has reached
a consensus that the term is insufficient to illustrate “the ‘new’ quality
of the science behind this technology” (my transl.: 5).
Similarly, Grover et al. (2016: 569) argue that education should
“move students away from thinking of computer science only in rela-
tion to computers” and towards an understanding that it is primarily
about solving “real-world problems,” for which computers are merely
tools. At the same time, this position makes clear that such “moving
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away” certainly must not go so far as to dissociate the discipline from
precisely those real-world solutions. Recall Adria, who had largely
alienated informatics from actual technologies – hardly a desirable
learning outcome. Connor et al. (2017) express similar concerns and
argue that “efforts to make computer science entirely about ‘compu-
tational thinking’ in the absence of ‘computers’ are mistaken” (26).
In the end, students should connect the discipline to certain technical
artifacts and systems. The educational questions I wish to discuss
here are: which ones, and what should we call them?
Schubert and Schwill (2011) also criticize terms like “program” and
“computer” as “one-sided” and instead advocate the term “informatics
system,”2 defined as follows:
Informatics system denotes a specific compilation of hard-
ware, software and network connections in order to solve
an application problem. (my transl., orig. emph.: 5)
The term has become widely established in the German disciplinary
community. Several introductory text books on informatics education
(Hubwieser 2007; Humbert 2006; Modrow and Strecker 2016; Schubert
and Schwill 2011) as well as central curricular documents (Gesellschaft
für Informatik e.V. 2008; Landesinstitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-
Brandenburg 2015) use it consistently. But is it also a good term to use
with students in the classroom?
In his dissertation on “informatics systems and competency devel-
opment” (my transl.), Stechert (2009: 33-49) devotes an entire chapter
to the definition and discussion of the term. Many of his cited sources,
however, do not really distinguish it from “computer” or “computer
system.” With reference to the above definition, Stechert (2009) asserts
that
The term informatics system is thus a specialization of both
a computer system [. . . ] as well as a computer network,
which are often described without reference to an applica-
tion problem and overemphasize technical questions. (my
transl. and emph.: 36)
Accordingly, informatics systems are a subset of computer systems
because the latter may also be general-purpose and thus exist without
solving any specific problem. This would appear to call into question
whether desktop computers, smartphones, tablets or the internet
should even be classified as informatics systems – an implication that
does not seem educationally desirable.
Part of the issue seems again rooted in different taxonomic inter-
pretations of “computer” (Sect. 2.2.2). A basic-level understanding
would, indeed, subsume a rather insufficient and one-sided set of
2 German: “Informatiksystem”
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artifacts. Stechert (2009: 41-45)’s account, however, shows that a dis-
ciplinary discussion in terms of hardware architecture or automata
theory inevitably raises the term to a highly superordinate level.
Therefore, an alternative option to defining a new terminology may
be to instead broaden students’ existing conceptions about comput-
ers towards a more technical and superordinate understanding. The
literature reviewed in Sect. 2.2 and the studies reported in Chaps. 5
and 6 suggest that students often already associate computers with
hardware, software, networking or social implications. Recall Urien
(Sect. 5.4.3), whose first and central associations with the term were
the control of large infrastructure networks, information and com-
munication. Moreover, as argued in Sect. 5.6 and in accordance with
Brinda et al. (2019) and Grover et al. (2016), many students already
appear to interpret the category as much more than just desktop de-
vices. In short, rather than having students learn about a (seemingly)
completely new artifact category, we might attempt to enrich and
generalize an already existing one. In fact, there are several points
that speak in favor of the latter.
First of all, it stands to reason that the top-down definition of a new
terminology would lack relevant contextual associations developed
through everyday experience and interaction. With respect to transfer,
this is likely not conducive to a learning process that ultimately aims
to build competencies in precisely those everyday contexts. In contrast,
the basic-level interpretation of “computer” might even serve as a
viable conceptual asset here as it centers the superordinate category
around a set of richly contextualized “typical” examples. Exemplar
typicality essentially describes “how good an example it is of its
category” and has been found to have positive effects on inductive
generalization (Rein et al. 2010: 377; see also Sect. 2.1). Several stu-
dents’ references to “real” or “normal” computers in the context of the
studies reported in Part II, indeed, seemed to evoke such typical exam-
ples as a means to reason about other artifacts. In contrast, for purely
technical terms, similar referential and contextual support knowledge
may first have to be developed.
Of course, certain features of “typical” computers, particularly phys-
ical ones like shape or size, are inappropriate for a superordinate
understanding and should not be inductively generalized. However,
some prior research suggests that students’ preconceptions in that area
may not be particularly stable. As mentioned in Sect. 2.2.2, Robertson
et al. (2017) report that, once told about computer chips, children aged
5 to 8 were immediately able to name a range of different devices that
they thought would contain this technology. The results reported by
Mertala (2019b), discussed in Sect. 6.7, point in a similar direction.
Accordingly, even teaching younger children, for whom superordinate
categories may still be rather challenging (Murphy 2004: 225), about
the ubiquity of computers may to some extent be as simple as letting
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them know that they can be rather small and physically fit into a lot
of things.
While the study presented in Chap. 6 also points at possible learn-
ing difficulties in that context, particularly the conflict between low
threshold and high capability, there is so far no evidence suggesting that
this difficulty is bound to the term “computer.” On the contrary, the
process of warranting capability described in Sect. 5.4.2 equally applied
to students’ computer and informatics categories; and the card sorting
task at the beginning of the intervention (Table 6.2) even only used
the term “informatics” but still elicited the same phenomenon.
In summary, students’ thinking about informatics as centered on
computers has been judged as limited and undesirable. At the same
time, the discipline should certainly not be dissociated from its real-
world solutions and products. In order to address this issue, two
options generally appear available. On the one hand, we may define
and introduce a new technical term for the category of artifacts that
students should associate with the discipline. At least in Germany,
such an attempt has been made with “informatics system.” On the
other hand, we may also attempt to broaden students’ existing com-
puter conceptions towards a more superordinate understanding. Prior
research suggests that the latter approach at least warrants serious
consideration.
Disconnecting students from the rich body of knowledge resources
that exist around the term “computer” may seriously impair their
ability for transfer in that context. While some of these preexisting
resources may be undesirable, addressing those may still be preferable
compared to developing many others from scratch. In my opinion,
disciplinary discussions about technical definitions should not over-
shadow questions of learning. In the end, I would argue, the more
important issue is not how students call a certain technology, but how
they think about it. In that sense, terminology is a means, not an end,
and the extent of its viability is an empirical matter.

8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUS ION
In a world that is entirely green, the concept green, much less color,
has no meaning (Marton 2015: 43-45). It can neither be discerned
nor understood. As computing technology becomes more and more
ubiquitous, a constant and “natural” backdrop for our everyday in-
teractions and perceptions, so it becomes more and more difficult to
discern and understand. Doing so is not trivial. From a cognitive
and motivational perspective, it requires deliberate effort. From a
marketing and design perspective, it may even be discouraged. From
a general educational perspective, however, it is a critical component
in becoming a self-directed and responsible citizen.
Accordingly, my guiding question for this thesis has been what
students need to learn about computing technology in order to ade-
quately recognize and evaluate it in their environment (Sect. 1.2). Hav-
ing taken previous research on example-based learning, knowledge
transfer and student conceptions (Chap. 2) as its points of departure,
the inquiry reported in Part II has assumed a naturalistic approach
(Chap. 3) to investigate students’ thinking in the context of technical
artifacts.
Chapter 4 has investigated what subordinate kinds of technology
students regard as salient and meaningful, what similarities and differ-
ences they perceive among them. Based on the analysis of 21 student
interviews, I have presented a grounded theory for a corresponding
taxonomy of technical artifacts. It outlines five domains of technology
– entertainment, household, public, “real” and no/low technology – which
appear to be saliently distinguishable by students. First, these may
serve as a framework to select and assess classroom examples that aim
to introduce systematic variation in the eyes of students. Second, how-
ever, the results contain virtually no evidence of computing concepts,
suggesting that computing technology is, in fact, not a very salient
artifact category for students.
Chapter 5 has then investigated more directly how students dis-
tinguish computing from non-computing technology. Based on 28
student interviews, including the participants of the first study, I have
presented a grounded theory for their related thinking and reasoning.
It outlines the processes of establishing transparency and warranting
capability. The latter, in particular, suggests that in the absence of
an explicit warrant, students may, by default, assume the absence of
computing technology rather than its presence. Generalized assump-
tions such as “computing is probably in everything these days” were
virtually and surprisingly absent from students’ reasoning. In contrast,
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“what is behind it” has to be just capable enough to enable the device’s
perceived function, but no more than that. The theory also outlines three
corresponding levels of (computing) capability – (electro)mechanics,
electronics and informatics – that many participants seemed to distin-
guish. I have argued that the middle level, electronics, constitutes
an educationally undesirable conception that may be detrimental to
transfer processes and should thus be addressed via instruction.
Consequently, Chapter 6 has investigated students’ learning pro-
cesses in authentic classroom situations with the intention to address
these conceptions. Based on the results of the previous studies, a
learning study was designed for and conducted in three grade-10
compulsory elective informatics classes. As a result, I have proposed
four critical aspects of computing technology: low threshold, high capa-
bility, ubiquity and consequences. In particular, several students seemed
to have had difficulty understanding that computing technology can
simultaneously have a low threshold and high capability, thus lim-
iting its potential ubiquity and consequences. The study has also
investigated situational conditions that may enable related learning.
Taken together, these studies have made visible various acts of and
potential issues for knowledge transfer, which were integrated and
discussed in Chap. 7. First, I have addressed overall limitations of
the inquiry’s trustworthiness, particularly in the context of transfer to
everyday situations, which may be significantly overestimated by it. Sec-
ond, the inquiry exclusively focused on physical artifacts. Therefore,
its results primarily inform transfer processes in that area. Neverthe-
less, other technical phenomena, particularly software artifacts, are
often closely connected to physical ones and may thus be indirectly
informed by them. Third, and in answer to my original guiding ques-
tion, I have proposed a set of corresponding learning objectives and
activities. I have argued that those constitute – at least an essential part
of – “what is to be learned” by students about computing technology
in order to adequately recognize and evaluate it in their environment.
Fourth, I have discussed an issue of educational terminology, i.e.,
“computer” vis-à-vis “informatics system,” and argued that such ques-
tions cannot be resolved by means of technical definition alone, but
necessitate empirical investigation of the actual learning processes that
accompany those terms.
As indicated above, my original motivation for this inquiry stems
from the question for an appropriate contemporary general education
(Sect. 1.2). In accordance with various other authors, I have departed
from the notion that such an education should enable students to
adequately and responsibly participate in a modern digitalized society,
which, in turn, requires at least a basic understanding – and appropri-
ate transfer – of informatics concepts and principles. The relevance of
the present inquiry and its proposed findings thus fundamentally rest
on this, arguably normative, position about what it means to be an
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educated citizen these days, and the corresponding nature and goals
of a general informatics education.
In that context, Schulte and Budde (2018) have only recently pro-
posed a framework for a general informatics education based on what
they call “Hybrid Interaction Systems,” the union of “two actors: the
human being and the technology” (7). They frequently emphasize that
their model was not derived from a disciplinary perspective, as many
others have, but from an education-theoretical one, by asking what is
needed for “educating the nation’s young” (2). They argue that such
education should not be about “learning facts and skills only,” but
also about “learning a point of view on the world” (2).
Indeed, other approaches have taken the exact opposite route and
instead departed from a disciplinary perspective. Grover and Pea
(2018), for instance, describe computational thinking as “thinking like
a computer scientist,” which “is fundamentally about problem solving
using concepts and strategies most closely related to computer science”
and “can be taught without the use of the computer” (21-22). Similarly
Modrow and Strecker (2016) define fundamental ideas as constitutive
for the discipline (20) by “representing an informatics-specific view of
the world, how a computer scientist sees the world” (my transl.: 24).
So there seem to be certain similarities, but also differences between
these approaches. On the one hand, both apparently aim to impart
students, among other things, with a particular way to think about
and see the world around them. On the other hand, they appear to
differ drastically in their positions toward the concrete technologies
pervading that world. As outlined in Sect. 1.3 discussions about fun-
damental ideas and computational thinking often seem to distance
themselves from those technologies. In contrast, Schulte and Budde
(2018)’s account renders humans and technical artifacts as equal par-
ticipants in an holistic interaction process. This suggests that the
artifacts themselves become legitimate and relevant objects of educa-
tional consideration under this view. The findings presented in this
thesis strongly speak in favor of this second position.
In terms of constructivist and situated transfer, “seeing the world”
in a particular way can essentially be understood as recognizing corre-
sponding elements in it and jointly reconstructing them accordingly.
Both the literature reviewed in Part I and the inquiry reported in
Part II strongly suggest that an abstract understanding of concepts
and strategies alone is not sufficient in this respect. Enabling students
to actually recognize and engage with such knowledge in their ev-
eryday environment, in the absence of anyone telling them to do so,
likely requires explicit and systematic attention to the concrete fea-
tures of example situations, contexts and technologies. They cannot be
arbitrarily substituted merely on the grounds that they all instantiate
the same disciplinary ideas.
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Conversely, consider Grover et al. (2016)’s comment on their partici-
pants’ learning about “What is a computer?”
While most students answering “yes” for “Is a microwave a
computer” indicates that students learned to broaden their
definition of computers, it is not clear that students gained
a deeper understanding of computing and computation.
(567)
What the authors describe here as an apparent shortcoming is a direct
implication of the same issue. It has been a central theme throughout
this thesis that learning about general computing principles, on the
one hand, and learning to recognize them in concrete technologies, on
the other, are simply two different learning processes. Without good
reason or evidence to the contrary, we probably should not expect an
activity designed for one of them to also have a significant impact on
the other. Yet both need to be achieved eventually if we want students
to appropriately make sense of and evaluate their everyday technical
environment with the help of their informatics knowledge.
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å Life was simple before World War II.
After that, we had systems.
– Grace Hopper
A CORE CURR ICULA
Berlin core curricula are generally goal-oriented. As such, they are
primarily built around abilities and competencies that students should
have attained by the end of a certain grade. Teaching content meant to
foster these competencies is then presented in the form of general topic
areas, not all of which are mandatory, and who offer considerable
leeway to schools and teachers in how to implement them.
a.1 lower secondary
Lower secondary levels cover grades 7-10, at which students are
usually aged between 12 and 15. A brief English overview of the cor-
responding Berlin core informatics curriculum is provided by the Lan-
desinstitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg (2017: 40-41),
which is reprinted on the following two pages. It outlines six overar-
ching areas of competency as well as several mandatory and optional
content topics. The more elaborate German version further differenti-
ates those (Landesinstitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg
2015). It also outlines different competency levels, ranging from A
(low) to H (high), where A-C are reserved for primary levels. For
example, for “understanding informatics [IT] systems,” it presents the
following table:
Describing informatics sys-
tems
Explicating and applying
technical bases
Students are able to:
D
E
name the components of infor-
matics systems
describe the interaction of
hardware, software and net-
works on the basis of the
school’s computers
F
describe everyday informatics
systems (e.g., data base, mo-
bile phone, GPS system, etc.)
and classify typical compo-
nents
explicate the interaction of
hardware, software and net-
works on the basis of everyday
devices
G
H
design, modify or implement
a simple informatics system,
e.g., a traffic light or robot
model
(my transl., Landesinstitut für Schule und Medien Berlin-Brandenburg 2015: 17)
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Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
IT systems which include computers and smartphones, but also large systems like the Internet and social 
networks, have found their way into almost all areas of life and profoundly transformed society. Computer 
applications can often no longer be directly identified, but they function using the same basic structures and 
must be critically evaluated by people to decide how best to use them. To ensure that students develop the 
abilities they need for evaluation and decision-making, knowledge and experience are necessary to broaden 
their perspective, allowing them to see and experience not just the colourful and appealing multimedia-
based interfaces of applications, but also the underlying structures. This is the only way a knowledge-based 
assessment is possible of the role and mutually reinforcing relationship between humans and electronic 
devices in present and future society. ICT education at secondary level I comprises two areas: 
 
Basic ICT course at levels D and E: 
This area (ICT) has two areas of focus: acquiring the practical skills needed to use the computer as a tool and pre-
paring students to participate in a society that is shaped to a large extent by information and communications 
technology. The levels are covered by the topics standard software, ICT systems and living in and with networked 
systems (see below). 
 
Voluntary elective at levels F, G and H: 
Here, students acquire knowledge and experience related to the structure and function of ICT systems and gain ini-
tial insights into techniques of formal modelling (visualising and structuring data and data processing steps, using 
data objects to represent real objects). 
What competencies do students acquire in ICT and computer science class? 
Reciprocal relationships between computer systems, humans and society: Students explain e.g. how IT sys-
tems permeate and change everyday life and careers. They assess and evaluate the opportunities and risks 
of current developments for the individual and society and draw conclusions for their own responsible con-
duct.  
Handling information: Students describe the difference between data and its interpretation. They make tar-
geted use of digital data and help systems to get information. In the process, they develop an awareness of 
how to manage their own data and the importance of privacy in a democratic society.  
Understanding IT systems: Students identify the components of different IT systems in their everyday envi-
ronments and describe their functionality as the interaction between hardware and software components. 
They know how to use IT systems properly and observe and evaluate their own handling of these systems.  
IT modelling: Students use IT models for problem analysis and solution design. They can implement models 
with suitable tools and reflect on the results. Students can describe the structure and functionality of com-
puters and computer networks on the basis of models and have basic knowledge of the historical develop-
ment of computer science. 
Problem-solving: IT systems are characterised by systematic processes with algorithms at their core. Stu-
dents design algorithms from different areas of application (e.g. robotics, encryption) and implement them 
using programming environments. They evaluate the multifaceted dependence of almost all areas of society 
on software products in the context of their knowledge of the possibilities for manipulation and the imper-
fection of software algorithms. 
Communication and cooperation: Students can make use of the different possibilities for communication, 
interaction and information in the area of networked computer systems for collaboration, they communi-
cate in projects and adopt standpoints consistent with their role. They help each other apply the software in 
use to practical situations.  
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What topics and content are taught in the subject? 
Use of standard software, e.g.  
- Using word processing software and at least one other software application (presentation, spread-
sheet or graphic design) 
- Using a browser 
- Creating and giving their own presentations (in a project context) 
- Selecting software to solve a specific problem, operating graphical user interfaces 
Design and functionality of IT systems, e.g.  
- Basic knowledge of computer operation using the example of the school's computer system 
- Proficiency in the operation of hardware and software, structured storage of files 
- Data protection and data traces (e.g. social networks, customer loyalty cards, discount systems, cost 
traps)  
- Analysis and comparison of IT systems  
- Social impact of IT systems (forms of communication, the working environment, free time activities, 
addiction problems, etc.) 
Living in and with networked systems, e.g. 
- Getting specific information from different sources when needed 
- Using search engines properly 
- Data exchange in the network  
- Upholding netiquette conventions in digital communication, cyber-bullying 
- Legal foundation (e.g. copyright in music sharing platforms) 
Algorithmic problem-solving 
- Modelling of simple workflows using algorithms 
- Analysing, modifying and implementing algorithms 
- Basic algorithmic structures (sequence, selection, loop) 
- Using programming environments (also to control external devices, e.g. in robotics) 
- Data modelling: data types, variables, describing objects based on their properties and methods 
Databases 
- Identifying and describing real-life data collections 
- Planning and implementing the design of a simple database 
- Data protection: right to informational self-determination, data privacy laws and rights, data traces, 
data mining, consumer protection, monitoring  
Elective topics 
- History of computer science 
- Project management 
- Physical computing 
- Digital images and visualisation  
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a.2 upper secondary
Upper secondary levels cover grades 11 to 13, although most schools
in Berlin only go up to grade 12, at which point students are usually
aged about 17/18. Students may elect the subject here as either a basic
or advanced course, usually consecutive to a lower-secondary elective
course. It is also possible under certain conditions to freshly begin the
subject in grade 11, although not as an advanced course.
The upper secondary informatics core curriculum (Senatsverwal-
tung für Bildung und Sport 2006) is built around the same six general
competency areas as the lower secondary levels (9-11; see page 180
above), but emphasizes modeling as particularly central (18). More-
over, being somewhat more dated, it does not yet use the same com-
petency levels A-H. It only differentiates between basic and advanced
courses, and outlines respective competencies that students should
have attained after their completion. For example, for “understanding
informatics systems” it presents the following table:
Basic Advanced
Students
 describe computers as programmable, universal automata,
 compare formal and natural languages,
 discuss the functionality, capability and reliability of informat-
ics systems,
 evaluate the efficiency of algorithms
 explicate simple layer models of networks and informatics
systems
 explicate madularization (in-
terfaces) and apply it in an
implementation
 apply addressing (IP, sub-
nets) to networks on the basis
of the internet protocol
 construct modularized soft-
ware
 assign algorithms to given
complexity classes
 analyze the structure and
functionality of a general ma-
chine models (Turing- or reg-
ister machine)
 analyze and construct formal
languages and exemplify the
relation between automata
and grammars
(my transl., Senatsverwaltung für Bildung und Sport 2006: 15)
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It then describes various mandatory and elective content topics, which
are briefly summarized below. Their order and depth of coverage may
vary depending on the type (basic, advanced) and duration (two or
three years) of the course. Moreover, they are not disjunct and aspects
from different topics may be combined on the basis of a common
context.
databases, which includes data modeling, relational databases, data
management and query languages. Advanced courses also cover
normalization procedures. Students implement a database system.
Related contexts include data privacy and security, cryptology, ac-
cess rights or online databases.
computers and networks, which includes layer models, the von-
Neumann-architecture, client-server structures, and protocols. Stu-
dents acquire a basic understanding of the working principles of
computers and networks and evaluate their capabilities. Related con-
texts include number systems, operating systems, network topolo-
gies, data privacy, confidentiality and authenticity.
software development, which includes object-oriented modeling
and programming, algorithms and data structures, and basics of the
software life cycle. Advanced courses also cover either declarative,
functional or logical programming. Students design and implement
software artifacts. Related contexts include packets and interfaces,
software ergonomics, impact on the working environment, or simu-
lations.
languages and automata, which includes comparing natural and
formal languages, syntax and semantics, state-based modeling and
finite automata. Advanced courses also cover grammar of formal
languages, and either Turing- or register machines. Related contexts
include robotics, implementing automata via programming, stack
machines or the Chomsky hierarchy.
informatics, humans and society, which includes data privacy
and security, confidentiality and authenticity, application and im-
pact of informatics systems, and ergonomics. Students discuss
opportunities, risks and legal issues of informatics systems and
artifacts. Related contexts include the history of computing technol-
ogy, malicious programs, legislations and rights, ethics and social
aspects, or artificial intelligence.
(my transl., Senatsverwaltung für Bildung und Sport 2006: 19-23)
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b.1 picture cards
The following pictures were used during the interview studies re-
ported in Chaps. 4 and 5. See Sect. 4.2 for details.
3D printer Curiosity rover defibrillator
diesel generator digital camera digital radio
digital watch electric drill electric toothbrush
185
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fire extinguisher Geiger counter hairdryer
industrial robot lawn mower mech. calculator
microscope Nintendo DS old alarm clock
plasma lamp plasma TV Playstation 4
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pocket calc. Raspberry Pi smartmeter
smartphone Swiss knife Tesla car
ticket vending m. toaster traffic light
washing machine wireless router Zuse 1
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Sources and Licenses, last retrieved on July 20, 2017.
3d printer: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:LulzBot_Mini_3D_
Printer.jpg CC BY 2.0 Generic. By Spark-
Fun Electronics.
alarm clock: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Wecker_freigestellt.jpg
CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported. By Andre Hoek.
curiosity mars rover: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Curiosity_
Rover’s_Self_Portrait_at_’John_Klein’
_Drilling_Site,_Cropped.jpg Public Do-
main. By NASA / JPL-Caltech / MSSS.
defibrillator: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Defibrillator_(UOMZ)
.jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported, 2.5 Generic,
2.0 Generic, 1.0 Generic. By Yury Petrovich
Masloboev.
diesel generator: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Portable_
electrical_generator_angle.jpg CC BY-
SA 3.0 Unported. By Gbleem.
digital camera: https://www.flickr.com/
photos/samsungbelgium/8357889004/ CC
BY 2.0 Generic. By Samsung Belgium.
digital radio: https://www.flickr.com/
photos/mattkieffer/3462915577/ CC BY-
SA 2.0 Generic. By Matt Kieffer.
digital watch: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Casio_F-91W.jpg CC BY-
SA 3.0 Unported. By NotFromUtrecht.
electric drill: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bosch_PSB_
550_RE_drill.JPG CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported.
By Karol Szapsza.
electric toothbrush: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Electrical_
toothbrush_20050717_001.jpg Public Do-
main. By Jonas Bergsten.
fire extinguisher: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fire-Extinguisher.
JPG CC BY-SA 2.5 Generic. By
Caduser2003.
geiger counter: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Geigerzähler2.
jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported. By Horst
Frank
hairdryer: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Hairdryer_20101109.jpg
Public Domain. By Batholith.
industrial robot: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Robot_ABB_4.
jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported. By Peter
Potrowl.
lawn mower: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Oberkrämer_garten_13.
07.2013_11-48-45.JPG CC BY 3.0 Un-
ported. By Dirk Ingo Franke.
mechanical calculator: Copyright by Ste-
fan Höltgen. Usage permission granted.
microscope: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Aufbereitungsmikroskop.
jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported, 2.5 Generic,
2.0 Generic, 1.0 Generic. By Wolfgang
Lehmann.
nintendo ds: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Nintendo-3DS-AquaOpen.
jpg Public Domain. By Evan-Amos.
plasma lamp: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Plasma_lamp_touching.
jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Unported. By Diliff.
plasma tv: https://www.flickr.com/
photos/samsungbelgium/9306927910/ CC
BY 2.0 Generic. By Samsung Belgium.
playstation 4: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Sony-PlayStation-4-PS4-
wDualShock-4.jpg Public Domain. By
Evan-Amos.
pocket calculator: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Solar-
calculator.jpg Public Domain. By Evan-
Amos.
raspberry pi: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:RaspberryPiModelBRev2.
by.Philipp.Bohk.jpg CC BY-SA 3.0 Un-
ported. By Philipp Bohk.
smartmeter: CC BY-SA 2.0 Generic. By
Michael T. Rücker. Adapted from origi-
nal file: https://www.flickr.com/photos/
miss_efficiency/2305272011/ CC BY-SA
2.0 Generic. By Miss Efficiency.
smartphone: https://www.flickr.com/
photos/vernieman/7928852930/in/album-
72157631400684150/ CC BY 2.0 Generic.
By Vernon Chan.
swiss knife: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Swiss_army_knife_open_
20050612_(cropped).jpg Public Domain.
By Jonas Bergsten
tesla car: CC BY 2.0 Generic. By
Michael T. Rücker. Adapted from origi-
nal file: https://www.flickr.com/photos/
greggjerdingen/9119012135/ CC BY 2.0
Generic. By Greg Gjerdingen
ticket vending machine: https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DB-
Fahrkartenautomat.JPG CC BY 3.0 Un-
ported. By Bahnthaler.
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toaster: https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Acosta-toaster.jpg CC BY-
SA 3.0 Unported. By www.acosta.eu
traffic light: https://de.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Datei:Semaforopedonale.jpg
Public Domain. Author unknown.
washing machine: https://www.flickr.
com/photos/samsungbelgium/8514616987/
CC BY 2.0 Generic. By Samsung Belgium.
wireless router: https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Linksys-
Wireless-G-Router.jpg Public Domain.
By Evan-Amos.
zuse 1: http://www.fu-berlin.de/
campusleben/forschen/2012/120830_
zuse/ License Unknown. Copyright Ju-
lian Röder. Copyright holder could not be
reached.
b.2 word cards
The following is a reproduction of Table 5.2 using the original German
terms. See Sect. 5.2 for details.
elektrisch elektronisch informatisch
mechanisch technisch digital
Programm Software
vorprogrammieren umprogrammieren
System
Hardware
Roboter
Motor Platine Computer
Chip Prozessor
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c.1 software
The following is a brief summary of the software systems developed
and used for the intervention reported in Chap. 6. Further details and
the complete source code can be found in the respective git repositories
(last accessed on February 28, 2020).
Micropi
 https://gitlab.informatik.hu-berlin.de/iopi/micropi
Micropi is an embedded Linux/Debian operating system for the
Raspberry Pi Zero (W). Its primary purpose is to configure the Pi
such that it can be connected to a host PC via USB, and programmed
via the Arduino IDE. To that end, Micropi simulates a network interface
via USB, which can then be used by the IDE to transfer the program.
From a user perspective, the experience is similar to how a program is
deployed to an actual Arduino board via serial port, that is, by clicking
the compile/upload button.
Additionally, Micropi automatically scans for known wireless net-
works and connects to them if found. The network connection can
then be used immediately in an Arduino program without further
setup. Lastly, Micropi is optimized for fast boot times. Compared to
bare-metal micro-controllers, booting a Linux OS takes a substantial
amount of time before any user space program can be executed. While
Micropi still does not quite match that speed, it comes close, establish-
ing wireless connection and starting user space execution after only a
few seconds.
IoPi Server
 https://gitlab.informatik.hu-berlin.de/iopi/iopi-srv
The Internet of Pi (IoPi) is an educational IoT-server. It provides two
general means of interaction. The first is a web interface that can
be accessed with any conventional browser. Here, users can “log
in” simply by providing a (unique) project name in order to access
the corresponding project page. No sign up or personal information
is needed. If a project with the given name does not yet exist, a
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new empty project is automatically created and the user is redirected
accordingly.
A project page consists of three sections: messages, commands, and
sensor logs. The messages section lists all the messages that were sent
to the server addressed to this project. It can be used, for instance,
to log certain events, such as the triggering of a sensor or button.
The command section enables the sending of commands to a client
device (see below) in order to control it remotely. The sensor logs
section shows a graphical representation of received sensor data, e.g.,
temperature, luminance, distance, or any other kind of value that may
be sensibly represented as a connected graph.
The second way to interface with the server is via a client device.
This can be any HTTP-enabled device that can reach the server over
a network, e.g. a Raspberry Pi or Arduino. The server provides
three specific HTTP-interfaces to send messages or sensor data to it, or
receive commands from it. The specific syntax of these interfaces is
documented in the git repository above.
IoPi Arduino Library
 https://gitlab.informatik.hu-berlin.de/iopi/iopi-lib
The IoPi Arduino library is a small library for the Arduino IDE. Its
sole purpose is to abstract from the HTTP-syntax of the client device
interface provided by the IoPi Server (see above). As such, it allows
to send messages and sensor data, or receive commands simply by
invoking a function. The passed parameters are then assembled into a
corresponding HTTP-request. The server’s response, if applicable, is
passed as a return value.
The library only builds on the Arduino HttpClient-library, which
has been implemented for a large variety of platforms. As such, any
platform that supports the HttpClient-library and provides a network
connection can also use the IoPi library to interface with an IoPi server.
c.2 lesson materials
Major parts of the lesson materials were presented via the Berliner
Lernraum,1 an online LMS hosted by the Berliner Senatsverwaltung
für Bildung, Jugend und Wissenschaft. All lesson materials, including
a backup of the LMS course file, are documented and archived in
digital format at Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. For details, see
Appendix D. Parts of the printed lesson materials are reproduced on
the following pages for convenience.
1 https://www.lernraum-berlin.de, last accessed on February 28, 2020.
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Picture Cards
Eighteen pictures were used to supplement those handed in by stu-
dents as a homework assignment. Those were the
1. digital radio
2. electric drill
3. hair dryer
4. lawn mower
5. plasma lamp
6. plasma TV
7. Raspberry Pi
8. smartmeter
9. Tesla car
10. ticket vending machine
11. traffic light
12. washing machine
13. wireless router
already used for the interview studies (Appendix B.1) as well as
door lock fridge heating
satellite wind turbine
doorlock: https://www.flickr.com/
photos/99781513@N04/16048194165
CC BY 2.0 Generic by Scott Lewis.
fridge: https://pixabay.com/de/
illustrations/k%C3%BChlschrank-
gefrierschrank-2420419/
Pixabay License by charly3d
heating: https://pixabay.com/pt/photos/
aquecedor-aquecimento-calor-inverno-
1244926 Pixabay License by Arcaion
satellite https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:GPS_Satellite_NASA_art-
iif.jpg Public Domain by NASA
wind turbine: https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:CNX_UPhysics_10_00_
WindFarm.jpg CC BY 4.0 International by
OpenStax University Physics
All last retrieved on August 18, 2019.
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Embedded Systems Text
Eingebettete Systeme: Klein, aber oho!
Wie erkennt der Ofen, wann er heiß genug ist? Woher weiß das Radio, was es tun muss, wenn 
man auf diesen oder jenen Knopf drückt? Wie entscheidet die Ampel, wann sie umschalten 
muss? Die Antwort lautet: eingebettete Systeme!
     Ein eingebettetes System ist ein kleiner Computer, der in einen größeren technischen 
Kontext (z.B. ein Haushaltsgerät) eingebaut ist und darin bestimmte Aufgaben übernimmt. Er 
kann z.B. Dinge messen, überwachen, steuern oder allgemein Daten verarbeiten. In 
modernen Waschmaschinen ist zum Beispiel ein kleiner Rechner dafür zuständig, dass das 
ausgewählte Waschprogramm korrekt abläuft. Er regelt die Wassertemperatur und die 
Trommelgeschwindigkeit, gibt Statusmeldungen auf dem Display aus und kümmert sich darum, 
dass Nutzereingaben korrekt ausgewertet werden. Ein richtiges Multi-Tasking-Talent also!
Eingebettete Computer sind klein 
und spezialisiert, trotzdem sind sie 
keine Schwächlinge. Sie können und 
müssen oft sehr viele Dinge 
gleichzeitig überwachen, regeln und 
steuern.
Display Eingaben
TemperaturDrehzahl
automatische
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Stromstärke
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Verkaufzahlen pro Jahr
ARM
Prozessoren
PCs u. Tablets
Smartphones
M
il
li
a
rd
e
n
Verkaufte Stück p o Jahr:
Mikroprozessoren weltweit:
1%
99%
Laptops
Tablets
PCs / Macs
Server
Supercomputer
Unterhaltungselektronik
Haushaltsgeräte
Verkehrsmittel
medizinische Geräte
Industrieanlagen
...
Lizensiert von Michael T. Rücker unter Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International.
Der Unterschied zwischen eingebetteten Computern und normalen Computern ist, dass sie viel 
kleiner, sparsamer und kostengünstiger sind. Prozessoren für Heimrechner von AMD, Intel 
oder Nvidia sind oft ziemlich teuer. Prozessoren von ARM, einem der größten Entwickler für 
eingebettete Prozessoren, kosten in der Regel nur ein paar Euro oder sogar nur Cent! 
Natürlich sind sie viel langsamer als ihre großen Brüder und Schwestern und haben viel 
weniger Speicher, trotzdem können sie prinzipiell genau das Gleiche. Sie basieren auf 
den selben Prinzipien und können beliebig programmiert werden. Zudem sind sie viel 
energiesparender. Viele eingebettete Systeme (z.B. Thermostate) können über Wochen oder 
sogar Monate mit einer kleinen Batterie betrieben werden. Versuche das mal mit einem Handy, 
Laptop oder Desktop-PC!
Eingebettete Systeme stecken heutzutage fast überall. Über 99% aller Mikroprozessoren 
weltweit sind eingebettet. Denk mal darüber nach: Alle Tablets, Laptops, PCs, Macs, Server 
und Supercomputer der Welt zusammen machen weniger als 1% der weltweiten Computer aus. 
Prozessoren für eingebettete Systeme sind so billig und sparsam, dass viele Dinge, die früher 
ohne Computer liefen, heute welche enthalten. Es ist oft einfacher und billiger, eine Funktion 
über ein Computerprogramm umzusetzen, als einen aufwändigen Mechanismus oder eine 
elektronische Schaltung zu entwerfen, die das Gleiche tut. Und natürlich erönet so ein einge-
betteter Computer, wenn er einmal da ist, noch viele weitere und neue Möglichkeiten...
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Arduino Work Sheet
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System Descriptions
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c.3 questionnaire
Hattest du vor der Unterrichtsreihe schon einmal mit einem 
Raspberry Pi gearbeitet?
Ja Nein1)
Hattest du vor der Unterrichtsreihe schon einmal mit der 
Arduino-Umgebung gearbeitet?
Ja Nein2)
Wusstest du vor der Unterrichtsreihe, dass der Raspberry Pi 
Internet-fähig ist?
Ja Nein3)
Zu Beginn der Unterrichtsreihe habt ihr unterschiedliche Geräte in die Gruppen 
informatisch, nicht informatisch und vielleicht informatisch sortiert. Versuche, dich 
noch einmal zu erinnern, wie du dabei vorgegangen bist. Meinst du, du würdest heute 
beim Sortieren etwas anders machen?
Ja Nein
Nach welchen Kriterien hast du sortiert?Was würdest du anders machen und warum?
4)
Was war deiner Meinung nach das Wichtigste oder Interessanteste, das du in dieser 
Unterrichtsreihe über Computer und Informatik gelernt hast?
5)
Erinnerst du dich, wann in der Unterrichtsreihe du es gelernt hast oder wodurch?
Abschlussfragebogen
In der vergangenen Unterrichtsreihe habt ihr euch mit eingebetteten Systemen, dem 
Raspberry Pi und dem Internet der Dinge beschäftigt. Erinnere dich noch einmal zurück.
Vorname:
Questionnaire front page
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Questionnaire back page

D DATA REPOS ITORY
 https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/fd-inf/ (accessed February 28, 2020)
The above url leads to the informatics education media repository at
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The following data pertaining to this
thesis are archived there for a duration of at least 10 years.
study materials
The study materials, already partially documented in Appendices B
and C. Those comprise
 the 33 pictures used for the interview studies
 the printed materials used for the learning study, containing
– the 18 pictures used to supplement the homework assignment
– the reading text used for iteration C
– the 6 IoT system descriptions
– the 3 IoT role descriptions
– the delayed questionnaire
 a backup of the LMS course used for the learning study, containing
– the homework assignment
– the example project assignment and corresponding guiding in-
structions
– an overview of and guiding instructions for the components
available to students during the project work
– the assignment to connect the Pi to the network and correspond-
ing guiding instructions
Those resources are publicly available under the licenses documented
with each file. For details, see the respective entries in the repository.
research data
The research data collected and analyzed in the studies reported in
Part II. Those comprise
 a maxqda exchange file for the two interview studies, containing
201
202 data repository
– 28 interview transcripts
– 22 still pictures of “free” groupings produced in the first study
– 80 still pictures of “directed” groupings produced in the second
study
– 3 still pictures of sorted word cards
– 5643 code assignments
– 151 memos
– 8 mind/code maps
 a summary spreadsheet of the “free” groupings produced by the 21
participants in the first study
 a summary spreadsheet of the “directed” groupings produced by
the 28 participants in the second study
 a maxqda exchange file for the learning study, containing
– 21 observation protocols
– 34 case student interview transcripts
– 18 teacher interview transcripts
– 41 pictures handed in by students as a homework assignment
– 44 pictures taken of various classroom situations
– 23 student project documentations extracted from the LMS
– 17 screenshots of students’ IoPi project pages
– 7 projects’ Arduino source codes
– 31 students’ questionnaire responses
– 2325 code assignments
– 113 memos
– 8 mind/code maps
At the time of this writing, those data, unfortunately, could not be
made publicly available. For information on how to request access,
see the respective entries in the repository.
SELBSTSTÄND IGKE I TSERKLÄRUNG
Hiermit erkläre ich, die vorliegende Dissertation mit dem Titel
A Naturalistic Inquiry into Student Conceptions of Computing Technology
and their Role for Learning and Transfer
selbstständig und nur unter Verwendung der angegebenen Hilfen
und Hilfsmittel angefertigt zu haben. Ich habe mich nicht ander-
wärts um einen Doktorgrad in dem Promotionsfach beworben und
besitze keinen entsprechenden Doktorgrad. Die Promotionsordnung
der Mathematisch-Naturwissenschaftlichen Fakultät, veröffentlicht im
Amtlichen Mitteilungsblatt der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Nr. 42
am 11. Juli 2018, habe ich zur Kenntnis genommen.
Michael T. Rücker
203
